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INTRODUCTION
The rise of the public interest law movement ushered in an
era of intense debate over the best way to provide legal repre-
sentation to those unable to afford private counsel.' This de-
bate has involved two related dimensions of public interest
representation. First, advocates and observers of public interest
1. For a history and summary of this debate, see JOEL F. HANDLER ET AL., LAWYERS
AND THE PURSUIT OF LEGAL RIGHTS (1978); JACK KATZ, POOR PEOPLE'S LAWYERS IN TRANSI-
TION (1982); MARK KESSLER, LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR: A COMPARATIVE AND CONTEM-
PORARY ANALYSIS OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS (1987).
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practice disagree over the proper role of lawyers acting on
behalf of poor and underrepresented clients. They offer compet-
ing visions of representation spanning a continuum, from
providing equal access to the courts for as many poor people
as possible,2 to attacking the causes and effects of poverty and
powerlessness.3
The second dimension of the debate over public interest
advocacy concerns the appropriate locus of legal services deliv-
ery within the legal profession. Proponents of a staff attorney
system of legal services delivery argue that the professional
obligation to provide adequate legal representation to poor
people requires the involvement of professional public interest
and legal services lawyers.4 Critics of legal services, along with
funding organizations seeking to reduce their commitment to
litigation, contend that the private bar is equipped and willing
to assume significant responsibility for providing this represen-
tation.5
The two dimensions of the debate over public interest repre-
sentation frequently overlap. Those who argue for a more
proactive, change-oriented role typically prefer representation
by professional, full-time public interest lawyers.6 Those who
2. See Marshall J. Breger, Legal Aid for the Poor: A Conceptual Analysis, 60 N.C.
L. REV. 282, 286-97 (1982).
3. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 293-391 (1988)
(developing model of"law reform" or "impact" work); Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson,
From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice,
58 B.U. L. REV. 337, 338 (1978) (contrasting dominant concern over corporate and
bureaucratic failure with emphasis on individual grievances and with grass roots
organizing); Gerald P. L6pez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the
Life of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603, 1608 (1989) (developing concept
of nurturing sensibilities and skills compatible with fight for collective social change);
William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469, 485
(1984) (noting that ideal of practice is "constituting or reconstituting nonhierarchical
communities of interest"). For a discussion of competing models of public interest
advocacy, see infra Part I.A.
4. See LUBAN, supra note 3, at 302-04; Marie A. Failinger & Larry May,
Litigating Against Poverty: Legal Services and Group Representation, 45 OHIO ST. L.J.
1, 55 (1984) (stating that "the poor have a strong interest in publicly funded legal
assistance in civil cases").
5. See SAMUEL J. BRAKEL, JUDICARE, PUBLIC FUNDS, PRIVATE LAWYERS AND POOR
PEOPLE 123-29 (1974); Andrea J. Saltzman, Private Bar Delivery of Civil Legal Services
to the Poor: A Design For a Combined Private Attorney and Staffed Office Delivery
System, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1165, 1169-75 (1983)(summarizing the arguments for a
private bar delivery system); see also Samuel J. Brakel, Legal Services for the Poor
in the Reagan Years, 68 A.B.A. J. 820, 821 (1982) (discussing the implications of the
Reagan Administration's desire to dissolve the staff attorney system).
6. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, Why Legal Services for the Poor?, 68 A.B.A. J.
550, 554 (1982) (arguing that the national legal services program furthers societal
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support an individual services model often advocate relying
heavily upon private practitioners to provide pro bono repre-
sentation.7
The debate over the proper structure of legal services
delivery often rests on a set of empirical assumptions about the
behavior of lawyers in particular institutional contexts. For
example, proponents of a staff attorney delivery system argue
that staff attorneys have greater expertise in the crucial
aspects of public interest representation than private practitio-
ners.8 Proponents of the private attorney delivery system argue
that "private lawyers are less vulnerable to political interfer-
ence than staff lawyers."9 These empirical assumptions have
not been adequately tested and may be incorrect or overbroad.
In addition, proponents of particular models of representa-
tion frequently propose a universal norm of advocacy for public
interest representation and a concomitant system of service
delivery designed to implement that model. They fail to link
their view of the lawyer's appropriate role with a particular
institutional context or legal problem. Yet each model's desir-
ability may vary with the needs and constraints of particular
institutions and problems.
Finally, the discussion frequently ignores the potential of
collaboration to enhance the representational capacity of each
organizational advocate. There is, however, an emerging trend
toward cooperative representation by coalitions of lawyers from
the private, public, non-profit, and law school settings, partic-
ularly in complex, lengthy, institutional reform litigation.1 °
This trend is driven by the increased variety, complexity, and
expense of public interest litigation: no one sector of the legal
profession has the expertise and resources to provide adequate
representation for the range of problems needing legal atten-
tion. Yet few commentators have discussed how to allocate
goals such as "helping the poor to help themselves."); John A. Dooley, Legal Services
for the Poor: The Debate Between Staffed Programs and Judicare, 17 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 193, 198 (1983) (noting that the office of economic opportunity decided to fund
staff programs because it wanted "a broad definition of the work, a degree of loyalty
to poor people's issues, and a willingness to try all advocacy tools").
7. See, e.g., Brakel, Legal Services for the Poor in the Reagan Years, supra note
5, at 821; Saltzman, supra note 5, at 1174-75 (summarizing arguments ofjudicare
proponents).
8. Saltzman, supra note 5, at 1171-72.
9. Id. at 1174-75.
10. See Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 639, 737-38 (1993).
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responsibility for public interest advocacy based upon the
strengths and limitations of the various sectors of the legal
profession.
This Article attempts to fill these gaps in the discussion of
public interest advocacy by exploring the roles of various legal
organizations in providing representation to inmates chal-
lenging the conditions and practices in prisons, jails, and
juvenile justice institutions." It is an outgrowth of a study
conducted for the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation on the
extent and quality of representation in corrections litigation.
It puts forward an organizational change model of public
interest advocacy as the most promising strategy for legal
representation in the corrections area. It then identifies the
major organizational providers of representation, assesses
where they fall on a continuum of practice models, and pres-
ents advocates' views of the potential and limitation of each
organizational setting to provide adequate representation.
This analysis underscores the importance of collaboration
among legal organizations to meet the varied and sometimes
competing demands facing lawyers in corrections cases. Within
each organizational setting, repeat players-lawyers with
sustained involvement and expertise in corrections
cases-currently play the central role in generating and
sustaining advocacy.' 2 Organizations specializing in corrections
litigation currently provide the most sustained and intensive
representation, and act as the hub of other organizational
involvement in corrections. Yet, they lack adequate resources
and expertise to meet the enormous legal need and to provide
the combination of informal advocacy skills and complex
litigation expertise demanded by the institutional change
model of representation. Legal services organizations, private
firms, and law school clinics each play a more limited but
potentially significant role in representing inmates. Lawyers
and policy makers have yet to capitalize on the potential for
11. The term "jail" generally refers to institutions for the confinement of adults
who are awaiting trial or who have been convicted of minor offenses and sentenced
to terms of incarceration which in most states may not exceed one year. The term
.prison" generally refers to an institution housing adults convicted of more serious
crimes and sentenced to confinement periods in excess of one year. Correctional
institutions for juveniles include detention facilities housing children detained prior
to court disposition and institutions housing children who have been found to be
delinquent and committed to state custody.
12. See Mark Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REV. 95, 114-19 (1974).
Lawyers at the Prison Gates
creative collaboration among various organizational players to
achieve an effective legal services delivery system. This Article
identifies the distinctive niche that each organizational player
could occupy, and concludes with some proposals to encourage
creative collaboration and a greater appreciation of the need
to integrate litigation and non-litigation strategies for correc-
tional reform.
I. THE ELEMENTS OF A THEORY OF CORRECTIONS ADVOCACY
Any meaningful assessment of the advocacy roles played by
various organizations providing representation in corrections
cases requires a working theory of representation. Unlike many
discussions of lawyers' roles, this Article grounds its conception
of the appropriate advocacy role in the particular legal prob-
lems of the client group and in the institutional context in
which these problems arise. This conception of the advocate's
role emerges from an understanding of the nature of the legal
problems at stake, the dynamics of the institutional and politi-
cal setting that contributes to these problems, and the relative
potential of various forms of advocacy in achieving change
within this context. The diagram below depicts the dynamic







This Section identifies four models of public interest repre-
sentation that emerge from the scholarly literature and
interviews with corrections lawyers. It then provides a brief
overview of the legal needs of inmates, the institutional and
political context of corrections institutions, and legal advocacy's
potential to respond to these needs. Finally, it returns to the
four models of advocacy and situates them within the frame-
work of corrections.
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A. Models of Public Interest Advocacy
Commentators generally bifurcate public interest advocacy
into two categories: individual service and law reform/impact
advocacy.13 Although this dichotomy captures a fundamental
cleavage in perspective on advocacy roles, it fails to reflect the
full range of choices facing public interest advocates. In addi-
tion to the individual service model, three additional models
of advocacy emerge from the debate: the impact litigation
model, the institutional change model, and the political
empowerment model. These three models share a change
orientation and a focus on group representation; indeed, many
lawyers combine them in practice. Lawyers' activities and
priorities, however, frequently reflect the adoption of a particu-
lar model as an organizing framework.
The individual service model focuses on providing quality
representation for those who seek but cannot afford legal coun-
sel. 14 Marshall Breger has attempted to provide a conceptual
framework for the individual service model by developing a
theory of access rights. He posits that "each citizen should have
an equal claim to legal assistance when such assistance is
necessary to vindicate significant interests."15 This approach
rejects the propriety of selecting clients or issues for represen-
tation based on the "social utility" of their cases, in favor of
providing legal representation on a first come, first serve basis
based on a client's articulated legal needs. It emphasizes the
importance of preserving individual autonomy and maximizing
the likelihood of achieving fair decisions in cases involving poor
people.
The law reform or impact litigation model focuses on maxi-
mizing the impact of litigation on the legal rules and on other
similarly situated institutions.16 This model charges the lawyer
with responsibility primarily, for designing and winning law
13. See Failinger & May, supra note 4, at 5. For a description of this distinction
between service and impact litigation, see JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE
LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 26-27 (1978); KESSLER,
supra note 1, at 18-19; cf. Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives
on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207 (1976) (describing impact litigation).
14. Failinger & May, supra note 4, at 16.
15. Breger, supra note 2, at 295.
16. For a discussion and critique of the law reform model, see Sturm, supra note
10, at 706-16.
Lawyers at the Prison Gates
suits with the greatest potential for furthering the substantive
interests of client groups. 17 Inspired by the litigation strategy
that culminated in Brown v. Board of Education,8 this model
emphasizes the importance of selecting cases based on their
potential impact on the law and their likely ripple effect on
institutions not before the court.19 The model focuses on liti-
gation as the means of pursuing an advocacy strategy and on
the importance of a coordinated, centralized strategy to intro-
duce favorable legal norms and avoid unfavorable precedent.
A leading special master describes this approach as defensive
strategy: "in today's climate, [advocates] must be willing to
take the risk of bad law into account. [They] must have a
national perspective because every case that goes up is a threat
to the reform movement. 20
David Luban offers a normative defense of the law re-
form/impact litigation model. He concedes that:
public interest lawyers bent on law reform recruit clients
as plaintiffs; that they sometimes manipulate their clients
and put the interests of the cause above those of the
clients; that they occasionally file class actions, even
though a large part of the class invoked, sometimes a
majority, opposes them; and that there will be times when
"their handling of test cases serves, not the enlightened
self-interest of the poor, but the political theories of the
lawyers themselves. "21
He justifies the law reform model based on its significance to
effective political advocacy, the substantive justice of the
17. Lucie White calls this vision of change oriented advocacy "the contest of
litigation." Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on
Lawyering and Power, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 699, 755.
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19. See JACK GREENBERG, LITIGATION FOR SOCIAL CHANGE: METHODS, LaMTS, AND ROLE
IN DEMOCRACY, (1974) (Thirtieth Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture delivered before
The Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Oct. 31, 1973) (discussing strategies
used in litigation campaigns aimed at social change in the areas of school segregation,
welfare rights, and bail); MICHAEL MELTSNER & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCA-
CY: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION (1974) (grounding criteria for case selection
on timeliness of issue and orderly development of legal reform).
20. Interview with Vincent Nathan, Partner, Nathan & Roberts and Special
Master, in Washington, D.C. 6 (July 19, 1991) [hereinafter Nathan Interview]
(transcript on file with author).
21. LUBAN, supra note 3, at 317 (quoting CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS 940 (1986)).
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underlying cause, and the impossibility of relying on existing
class members to represent the interest of future generations.22
The institutional change model emphasizes advocacy strate-
gies that target particular institutions or systems with illegal
practices that affect a significant number of clients. The
model employs a variety of strategies directed at applying sus-
tained pressure on such institutions or systems to conform to
legal norms and eliminate abuses. One approach involves con-
fronting particular institutions "with an increasing number of
individual grievances, coordinated by a group of experienced
advocates whose commitment and continuous attention is
ordinarily only available to the regular players in the sys-
tem. ' " Publicizing the existence of inadequate conditions,
coalition building with community groups, and direct political
and administrative negotiation supplement this high volume
strategy. Another strategy focuses on the remedial stage of
institutional reform litigation:
Under the implementation model, the remedial stage
becomes the focus of litigation planning, resource alloca-
tion, and development of an overall advocacy strategy....
Factors such as the potential involvement of capable and
supportive insiders, the political environment, or the
existence of a local advocacy network may take precedence
over significance of the legal principle at stake.25
Finally, the political empowerment model focuses on mobiliz-
ing those directly affected by institutional inadequacies to
advocate on their own behalf. It calls upon lawyers to "nurture
sensibilities and skills compatible with a collective fight for
social change."26 This model emphasizes the importance of help-
ing a group identify its own needs, perspectives, and strate-
gies. This process requires a commitment to client control
over strategy. Lawyers pursuing this model "must know how
to work with others in brainstorming, designing, and executing
22. Id. at 321, 323, 348.
23. See Gary Bellow, The Legal Aid Puzzle: Turning Solutions into Problems,
WORKING PAPERS FOR NEW SOC'Y, Spring 1977, at 52, 59.
24. Id.
25. Sturm, supra note 10, at 727.
26. L6pez, supra note 3, at 1608.
27. Simon, supra note 3, at 486; White, supra note 17, at 764; see also Lpez,
supra note 3, at 1608.
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strategies aimed immediately at responding to particular
problems and, more generally, at fighting social and political
subordination .,,28
These four models of public interest advocacy offer differing
views of the role lawyers should play in providing public
interest representation. One's choice of model depends in part
on an overarching ethical conception of lawyers' appropriate
role. This Article focuses on a less recognized but equally
significant set of considerations: the types of legal problems
presented and their amenability to judicial or administrative
redress.
B. Legal Problems of Inmates
Inmates of correctional institutions face a host of legal
problems. Many of these problems are unrelated to institution-
al conditions and practices. Inmates bring with them to prison
a range of common civil legal problems, such as personal
injury, social security, and family law matters.29 In addition,
their status as criminal offenders and their removal from the
community leads to additional civil legal problems, in areas
such as immigration, divorce and custody, and bankruptcy.
Inmates also seek legal assistance in pursuing challenges to
their criminal trial, sentence, and parole status.3 °
Some of the programs discussed in this Article do provide
representation to inmates in civil and criminal matters unrelated
28. L6pez, supra note 3, at 1608.
29. See Geoffrey P. Alpert & C. Ronald Huff, Prisoners, the Law, and Public
Policy: Planning for Legal Aid, 7 NEW ENG. J. ON PRISON L. 307, 319 (1981) (summariz-
ing a study detailed in Geoffrey P. Alpert, Prisoners' Right of Access to Courts, 51
WASH. L. REV. 653 (1976), which analyzed the case load distribution of existing
prisoner legal assistance programs in Washington State and found that 30% of the
case load involved civil problems unrelated to incarceration and 15% involved family
problems).
30. See id. at 318-19 (reporting findings of a study in Washington state that 20%
of the case load of prisoners' complaints involved collateral attacks and 20% involved
institutional, parole, and sentencing problems, and findings of an A.B.A. study which
estimated that 20% of prisoners' legal problems involve collateral attacks, 12%
involved parole problems, and 10% involved sentencing); PRISON LAW OFFICE, FISCAL
YEAR 07-01-90 THRU 06-30-91, ANNUAL CASE COMPILATION (1991) (listing the number of
cases brought by inmates at San Quentin and Davis by problem areas, including a
total of 256 parole cases and 73 sentencing cases). For a description of the types and
numbers of requests for assistance received by a prisoners' legal services program in
its first year of existence, see Robert C. Hauhart, The First Year of Operating a
Prisoners' Legal Services Program: Part 11, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 219 (1990).
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to institutional conditions.31 The need for these services vastly
overshadows available resources.32 Although these legal problems
matter tremendously to inmates and should command attention,
they are not the focus of this Article.
A second major category of legal need involves the validity
of administrative decisions concerning individual inmates.
Every aspect of life in prison requires interaction with govern-
ment officials, and every interaction presents the potential for
a legal conflict. 33 Where inmates live, what work they perform,
what services they receive-all of these decisions present issues
of classification. Conflict among inmates or between inmates
and corrections officers usually leads to disciplinary proceed-
ings. Legal advocacy also involves representation of inmates
in these administrative proceedings and in appeals from
administrative decisions.34
The third category of legal need-and. the focus of this
Article-involves the conditions and practices in correctional
institutions. Inmates must depend on the government for fulfill-
ment of their basic needs for food, clothing, shelter, protection
from violence, and medical care. Yet many correctional institu-
tions continue to deprive inmates of these basic necessities.35
Many of the requests for legal assistance seek redress for indi-
vidual deprivation, most notably in the areas of medical care
and brutality. These individual cases often present examples
31. Generally, these kinds of legal problems are handled either by a state or local
legal assistance project for inmates or by a law school clinic. For a breakdown of the
clinics that handle civil matters that do not involve prison conditions, see infra Part
VII.B.
32. See Interview with Charles Dorsey, Executive Director, Maryland Legal Aid
Bureau, in St. Petersburg, Fla. 4 (July 19, 1991) [hereinafter Dorsey Interview]
(transcript on file with author) (estimating that Prison Project reaches less than 10%
of statewide need in prisons and jails). A study ofunmet legal needs in nursing homes,
prisons, jails, and mental health facilities in New York state found that prisoners in
county jails are among the most seriously underserved populations. PATRICIA J. ARTHUR,
NLADA, REPORT TO PAG FUNDING CRITERIA COMMITEE [sic] 13 (1992) (quoting THE
SPANGENBERG GROUP, NEW YORK LEGAL NEEDS STUDY, DRAFr FINAL REPORT 134 (1989)).
A study conducted by Prison Legal Services of Michigan in 1987 "found that all but
one state in the country providing civil legal services to prisoners operate with an
attorney to client ratio far below that recommended by the ABA." Id. at 13-14.
33. In fact, corrections litigation is in part responsible for this bureaucratization
of prison life. Sturm, supra note 10, at 667-68.
34. See Howard B. Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Civil Rights Cases and the
Provision of Counsel, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 417,439 (1993)("The prison deals so pervasively
with the inmates' lives that there are many ways in which disputes may arise.").
35. See Sturm, supra note 10, at 687-91 (describing continuing threats to health
and safety facing inmates in correctional institutions and the need for litigation to
address these threats).
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of institutional inadequacies that affect all of the inmates, such
as overcrowding, inadequate systems for health care delivery,
and unsafe living conditions.
C. The Institutional and Political Constraints
Facing Corrections Advocates
Corrections' status in the political and professional arena
frames both the need for and limitations of legal advocacy.
Correctional institutions tend to be isolated from public scrutiny,
while their inadequacies are often viewed as an issue that does
not warrant public concern or expenditure of resources.36 By
definition, most prisons remove inmates from the community
and limit their access to the public and the media. The remote
location of many institutions contributes to their isolation.
Inmates lack political power. In addition to their unpopular
status, " [m] any prisoners come from groups that already suffer
from political powerlessness-people of color and the poor."
37
Corrections as a field has not yet developed a level of profes-
sional standards and accountability to perform an effective
oversight role.
As a result, prison reform does not fall high on the list of
public priorities. The public tolerates and even justifies poor
conditions in correctional institutions as an appropriate punish-
ment for criminal violations.38 Corrections administrators
frequently lack the resources necessary to maintain minimally
adequate living conditions. They also lack direct control over
the size of their population.39 Sentencing policies and practices,
determined by legislators and judges, contribute to overcrowding
36. See Sturm, supra note 10, at 669 (noting that correctional institutions were
'previously insulated from rigorous scrutiny by their remote locations, the lack of public
concern over their inadequacies, and their careful control over public access").
37. Susan P. Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial
Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 805,845 (1990). According to a recent Bureau
of Justice Statistics report, the jail incarceration rate per 100,000 whites increased
from 68 in 1984 to 109 in 1992, while the comparable incarceration rate for blacks
increased from 339 to 619. ALLEN J. BECK ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPhT
OF JUSTICE BULLETIN: JAIL INMATES 1992, at 2 (1993).
38. The Supreme Court has provided some rhetorical support for this sentiment.
See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) ("To the extent that such conditions
are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders
pay for their offenses against society.").
39. Sturm, supra note 37, at 840-41.
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by increasing the proportion of individuals sentenced to prison
and the length of their sentences.4" Parole boards with authority
to release inmates who have served their minimum sentences
have generally tightened release criterih.4' None of these officials
bears direct responsibility for inhumane institutional conditions
caused by overcrowding.
The status of inmates poses special constraints on lawyers'
capacity to represent their interests. Inmates' legal status
prevents lawyers from realistically pursuing many of their
clients' preferences and interests. The law accepts the legitimacy
of a system that deprives inmates of autonomy and imposes
discomfort and hardship. Advocates may have no realistic
prospect of responding to many of inmates' most pressing
concerns. 42 Moreover, inmates face serious constraints on their
access to counsel, their capacity to participate actively in
advocacy, and their freedom to organize. Institutional rules and
regulations typically restrict organizing activity by inmates, and
the Supreme Court has upheld these restrictions.43
D. The Potential of Corrections Advocacy
to Promote Institutional Reform
In a related article entitled The Legacy and Future of
Corrections Litigation,4" I assess litigation's impact on cor-
rectional institutions and its potential as part of an advocacy
strategy to improve conditions and practices. Lawyers involved
in litigation and other forms of advocacy have had their greatest
positive impact in the following areas: opening correctional
institutions to public scrutiny, encouraging the adoption of
40. EDNA MCCONNELL CLARK FOUND., AMERICANS BEHIND BARS 10 (1992); Sturm, supra
note 37, at 841.
41. EDNA MCCONNELL CLARK FOUND., supra note 40, at 10.
42. See Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 438 ("Many prisoners file suit because the
prison administration had dealt with them in some arbitrary, irrational, bureaucratic,
or dehumanizing manner, even when no constitutional-or even legal-right is in-
volved. . . .'What to most people would be a very insignificant matter becomes, because
of the nature of prison life, of real concern to the prison inmate.'" (quoting THE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, TENTATIVE REPORT. RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING PRISONER
CIVIL RIGHTS CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 12 (Oct. 6, 1975)).
43. See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977)
(upholding prison regulations imposing a ban on a Prisoners' Labor Union's meetings
and inmate solicitations).
44. 142 U. PA. L. REV. 639 (1993).
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minimal standards governing prison conditions and practices,
legitimizing the problems of inmates in political discourse,
applying sustained pressure to increase the resources and exper-
tise available to the field, and eliminating egregious conditions
and practices.45
These past successes provide a framework for defining the
role of advocacy in the future. Advocacy will of necessity
emphasize implementing legal norms within a particular in-
stitution or system.46 The emphasis on implementation suggests
that advocacy should proceed simultaneously in several different
directions. Litigation, which will "focus on implementing well-
established, minimal standards of decency," has become "increas-
ingly complex, fact intensive, adversarial, and costly. '47 Liti-
gation challenging conditions and practices in correctional insti-
tutions likely will require sophisticated litigation tools and the
capacity to oversee large, complex cases. These cases require,
for example, massive document management, familiarity with
the vagaries of class action and Section 1983 litigation, and trial
skills.48 Many of those interviewed expressed the view that
discovery and trial in corrections litigation are very similar to
other forms of complex litigation: "Once the case is selected and
the strategy determined, any good lawyer can litigate. 49
"Discovery is discovery."50 "Litigation is a process. Lawyers can
always look up the law and figure it out."51
At the same time, successful implementation depends upon
administrative and political advocacy, vigorous and effective
monitoring of remedial decrees, creative use of experts in
problem-solving, and continual presence within the institutions
45. See Sturm, supra note 10, at 662-81.
46. For a more complete discussion of the increasing significance of an implementa-
tion model of advocacy, see id. at 716-35.
47. Id. at 716.
48. See, e.g., Interview with Robert Cullen, Senior Corrections Attorney, Georgia
Legal Services, in Atlanta, Ga. 9 (Aug. 10, 1991) [hereinafter Cullen Interview]
(transcript on file with author); Interview with Stephen 0. Kinnard, Partner, Jones,
Day, Reavis & Pogue, in Atlanta, Ga. 2 (Aug. 12, 1991) [hereinafter Kinnard Interview]
(transcript on file with author).
49. Interview with Allen Breed, Director, National Institute ofCorrections, in San
Francisco, Cal. 4 (July 19, 1991) [hereinafter Breed Interview] (transcript on file with
author).
50. Interview with Leslie Sooson, Associate, Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal,
in Chicago, Il. 6 (Aug. 9, 1991) [hereinafter Sooson Interview] (transcript on file with
author).
51. Interview with John Sparks, Partner, Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, in San
Francisco, Cal. 1 (July 18, 1991) [hereinafter Sparks Interview] (transcript on file with
author).
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posing the problems. Corrections specialists and general litiga-
tors agree that the remedial stage of corrections lawsuits differs
in important respects from other complex litigation.52 To fashion
a remedy that will bring about constructive change, one must
understand both the significance of the remedial stage to the
success of the litigation and the corrections context and culture.
As one corrections litigator stated, "[t]he [implementation] stage
doesn't resemble complex litigation .... You must get into the
prisons as institutions.... You must know who in the organiza-
tion will do the work so they can get assigned. It is about the
interplay between litigation and pressure." 3 Innovative
approaches to fact-finding, remedial formulation, and monitoring
are often key to successful implementation of corrections
decrees.54
Corrections advocates have also begun to recognize the impor-
tance of building coalitions with insiders in the corrections field
and linking litigation with broader strategies of political and
administrative advocacy.55 This push toward implementation
transforms litigation itself, as lawyers struggle toward more
consensual forms of fact-finding and problem solving that blur
the distinction between litigation and politics.
E. Revisiting the Models of Public Interest Advocacy
The foregoing discussion indicates that corrections advocacy
has a place for each of the four models of public interest advo-
cacy. The individual service model responds to the overwhelming
need for representation in individual cases.5" Like most legal
52. See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
53. Interview with Donna Brorby, Partner, Turner & Brorby and plaintiffs' counsel
in Ruiz, in San Francisco, Cal. 3-4 (July 19, 1991) [hereinafter Brorby Interview]
(transcript on file with author).
54. See Sturm, supra note 10, at 685. A common criticism of plaintiffs' lawyers
concerns their failure to recognize and take into account in their remedial orders the
dynamics ofrunning a correctional institution. As a result, consent decrees negotiated
by lawyers often fail to remedy the problems targeted by litigation.
55. This insight concerning the significance of cooperation by insiders emerged
as an important theme in many of the case studies on corrections litigation and judicial
intervention. See id. at 683-84.
56. A study comparing the success rates of prisoner civil rights cases with and
without counsel suggests that the appointment of counsel dramatically increases the
likelihood of success in these cases. Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explain-
ing Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the
Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 719, 770-71 (1988).
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services programs representing the poor, corrections advocates
cannot begin to meet the demand for legal representation." Ne-
cessity requires some -system for selecting cases to maximize
available resources and-avoid spreading services so thinly that
no one obtains adequate representation." Moreover, in the
corrections context many problems raised by individual cases
concern systemic problems which necessarily implicate the
interests of other inmates. For example, if an inmate's complaint
of violence stems from a systemic overcrowding or understaffing
problem, any remedy will affect other inmates living in the same
conditions. In many instances, group representation offers the
only prospect for respecting inmates' individual autonomy. In
cases challenging systemic problems, the individual service
model may not produce even individual relief unless institutional
and systemic concerns inform case selection, advocacy, and
remedial strategies.
The impact litigation model can also play a significant role,
particularly in situations presenting novel problems or arising
under new sources of law.59 The impact litigation model,
however, does not respond to the central challenge facing correc-
tions advocates implementing reform. Moreover, because of the
recent reluctance of federal courts to expand the scope of con-
stitutional protection to inmates, limited opportunity currently
exists for doctrinal innovation in the corrections area. ° Finally,
57. For example, North Carolina Prisoners Legal Services reports 3500 to 4000
new requests for legal assistance from inmates each year. Telephone Interview with
Marvin Sparrow, Director, North Carolina Prisoners Legal Services 5 (Aug. 2, 1991)
[hereinafter Sparrow Interview] (transcript on file with author). The Southern Center
for Human Rights receives about 20-25 letters per week requesting legal assistance.
Interview with Nancy Ortega, Staff Attorney, Southern Center for Human Rights, in
Atlanta, Ga. 1 (Aug. 11, 1991) [hereinafter Ortega Interview] (transcript on file with
author).
58. For a fuller discussion and justification of lawyers' decisions to select cases
for representation based on some criteria other than first-come, first-serve, see LUBAN,
supra note 3, at 317-57 (discussing the recruitment of clients for suits aimed at law
reform); Failinger & May, supra note 4, at 16 ("[Llaw reform proponents sanction case
selection procedures which would consistently choose the suit or legal action which
has the greatest impact on the greatest number of poor persons' interests."); Bellow
& Kettleson, supra note 3, at 343-53 (discussing potential ethical constraints on public
interest attorneys' choices of clients or issues).
59. Programs for disabled children in juvenile institutions and problems associated
with prisoners afflicted with AIDS are good examples of such situations. See Sturm,
supra note 10, at 733.
60. Id. at 711. In The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, I offer several
additional explanations for the decline of the test case model of law reform, including:
(1) the natural life cycle of social change and practices; (2) "the success of early efforts
to institutionalize legal norms"; (3) the complexity inherent in changing the behavior
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state and local actors dominate corrections policy and implemen-
tation at the state level. A national law reform strategy,
although significant, will not address the local concerns that
often drive correctional decisions and practice. Advocacy nec-
essary to implement nationally defined goals frequently requires
ongoing involvement at a state or local level.6'
The empowerment model also faces serious limitations as an
organizing framework for advocacy. Legal representation of in-
mates itself elevates the status of inmates by promoting the view
that inmates deserve decent treatment and have needs and
concerns that must be taken seriously and addressed.62 Group
empowerment, however, is more difficult to pursue. Prison rules
and regulations explicitly disempower inmates from making
many important decisions even about their day-to-day life.
Advocates must confront the risk of creating expectations for
a fundamental change in status without a realistic prospect of
meeting such expectations. Advocates must also face the prospect
that inmates will use their involvement in litigation to enhance
their individual power and status at the expense of other
inmates.63
The institutional change model thus offers the greatest
promise as an organizing framework for corrections advocacy.
It draws on the other three models but provides a focus for case
selection and choice of advocacy strategy. It permits individual
case representation but suggests allocating resources in the
manner that enables individual advocacy to achieve institutional
accountability. It also meets and capitalizes on the challenge
of implementing the large number of outstanding orders in
corrections cases.
of complex systems; and (4) "the inherent limitations of the law reform model." Id.
at 711-14.
61. Id. at 734-35.
62. See JAMES B. JACOBS, The Prisoners'Rights Movement and Its Impacts, in NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON PRISONS AND IMPRISONMENT 36 (1983). ("Just by opening a forum in
which prisoners' grievances could be heard, the federal courts destroyed the custodians'
absolute power and the prisoners' isolation from the larger society."). One advocate
spoke eloquently of the empowering effects oflegal access on inmates. "The self-esteem
of these inmates goes up tremendously. They were in shock that anyone responded
to their letter. It gave them a feeling of self-confidence and control." Ortega Interview,
supra note 57, at 8.
63. Susan P. Sturm, The Rhode Island Prison Decree, in DAVID W. LOUISELL ET AL.,
CASES ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 1243, 1246 (6th ed. 1989) ("The leadership of the
National Prisoners Reform Association within the prison . . . only maintains power
through the court-ordered reforms, by maintaining the administration's dependence
on them for compliance with the decree."). See Sturm, supra note 37, at 825 ("Inmates
subject to daily deprivation and institutionalized powerlessness are likely to be most
interested in enhancing their place within the prison's social structure.").
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This conceptual framework for corrections advocacy offers a
perspective from which to assess the potential role of the five
major organizational players in providing representation to
inmates: (1) national organizations specializing in corrections
litigation; (2) regional and local organizations specializing in
corrections; (3) legal services organizations; (4) private firms;
and (5) law school clinics. The next Section of this Article
explains the methodology used to gather information about the
extent and nature of representation provided by these major
organizational players in corrections cases. The remainder of
the Article examines these organizations in terms of the roles
that they play and the factors that influence their role defini-
tions. Such factors include their selection criteria, their
expertise, the extent and source of their funding, and their loca-
tion and geographical scope. Finally, this Article explores the
potential for collaboration to enhance the capacity of each
organizational player to provide effective and comprehensive
advocacy.
II. METHODOLOGY
This study began as an informal, open-ended examination of
the organizations with the most extensive involvement in correc-
tions litigation, with an emphasis on organizations funded by
the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation. It then expanded to a
more comprehensive survey of organizations and individuals
to determine the extent and nature of their involvement in
litigation challenging conditions of confinement in correctional
institutions. The research consisted of several information
gathering methods. First, structured interviews were conducted
with lawyers in each of the organizational settings involved in
corrections litigation. The directors of all of the programs special-
izing in corrections litigation were interviewed, as well as staff
members in some of the organizations. Other lawyers that were
interviewed included directors and staff attorneys of legal
services programs, directors of clinical programs engaged in
some form of corrections advocacy, legal directors of state
affiliates of the American Civil Liberties Union, and attorneys
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in private practice.64 In addition to lawyers, interviews were
conducted with several corrections experts, masters, judges,
directors of programs that recruit private attorneys for pro bono
representation, and academics. In total, over 100 interviews were
conducted.65
Second, the research included a written survey of legal services
offices, law firms, and law school clinics concerning their in-
volvement in corrections advocacy.66 The pool of legal services
programs surveyed consisted of organizations listed as members
of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association. Organiza-
tions whose titles clearly indicated that they did not represent
inmates were excluded from the pool. Responses were received
from 220 out of 385 organizations surveyed, yielding a response
rate of fifty-seven percent.
Law firms in three different pools were sent the questionnaire.
The first pool, which will be referred to as the "large-firm pool,"
consisted of firms with over sixty lawyers that identified
themselves as having some pro bono program. 67 Responses were
received from 73 of the 304 firms surveyed, yielding a response
rate of twenty-one percent. The second pool, which will be
referred to as "the random-firm pool", consisted of every
eightieth firm listed in the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory.68
Responses were received from 84 of the 508 firms surveyed, for
a response rate of seventeen percent. The response rate of the
third pool, consisting of one half of the firms listing civil rights
as a specialty in Martindale-Hub bell, was too low to warrant
inclusion in the data analysis.
64. Due to resource constraints, legal services directors in organizations that do
not have programs specializing in corrections were selected based on their attendance
at the National Legal Aid and Defenders Association Meeting in the summer of 1991.
Within this population, considerable geographic diversity was achieved.
Private practitioners were selected to achieve diversity in both size and geographical
area. Firms were interviewed in each major region of the country. In addition, attorneys
in large and small firms that have handled a substantial amount of corrections litigation
were identified through a process of networking and interviewing corrections specialists.
65. A listing of the individuals interviewed is provided in Appendix A. Some of
the interviews were conducted by Glen Bernstein, Jennifer Spotila, and Amy Weigand,
second-year law students who assisted me in conducting the research.
66. The questionnaire was developed with the assistance of Professor Jerry Jacobs,
a sociologist at the University of Pennsylvania. Analysis of the data was performed
with the assistance of Suet Lim, a graduate student in sociology, under the supervision
of Professor Jacobs. A sample of the private firm survey is provided in Appendix B.
67. This list was provided by Esther Lardente, a consultant to the American Bar
Association (ABA) on pro bono involvement by private firms.
68. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY (1991). Every 80th firm was surveyed to
produce a total pool of approximately 500 randomly selected firms.
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The law school clinic pool included every law school listed in
The AALS Directory of Law Teachers 1991-92.69 Law schools
that responded by indicating that they do not have any clinical
programs were excluded from the pool. Responses were received
from 95 of the 177 law schools surveyed, for a response rate of
fifty-four percent.
Third, an informal survey was conducted of federal court clerks
concerning the current status of programs for appointing counsel
to represent pro se plaintiffs in cases challenging conditions of
confinement in correctional institutions. Thirty-five district
courts and ten courts of appeals responded to the survey. v
Finally, I surveyed the directors of programs identified in the
National Prison Project's Prisoners Assistance Directory7' as
representing inmates in conditions of confinement cases to deter-
mine the current status of their programs' involvement.
The remainder of the Article presents the data obtained from
this research and analyzes it in relation to the roles played by
various organizational players, the factors that influence that
role definition, and the organization's place in a legal services
delivery system for inmates.
III. NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SPECIALIZING
IN CORRECTIONS LITIGATION
Two national organizations-the National Prison Project of
the American Civil Liberties Union (NPP) and the Youth Law
Center (YLC)-specialize in representing inmates in corrections
cases.72 These organizations dominate the field of corrections
litigation by virtue of their extensive involvement, their
visibility, and their prominence in the network of corrections
litigators. They handle more cases than other national organi-
zations and participate in many significant institutional cases
69. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW ScHoois, THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAw TEACHERS
1991-92 (1991).
70. John Greacen, the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, helped conduct this survey.
71. THE NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, PRISONERS
ASSISTANCE DIRECTORY (1990) [hereinafter NPP PRISONERS ASSISTANCE DIRECTORY].
72. NPP primarily addresses conditions in adult correctional institutions, although
it handles a small number of cases involving juvenile institutions. YLC represents
juveniles housed in jails, juvenile detention centers, and training schools. YLC also
provides representation to children in cases involving child welfare and health care.
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on both a national and local level. As of January 1990, NPP was
involved in 33 of the 41 states and other jurisdictions "under
court order or consent decree to limit population and/or improve
conditions in either the entire state system or its major
facilities."73 NPP has brought some jail litigation, although the
majority of its cases have been in state institutions. In the over-
whelming majority of these cases, NPP acts as lead counsel.74
Although statistics concerning the number of major juvenile
institutions under court order are not available, YLC achieves
a similarly wide scope of involvement in the juvenile corrections
area. 5 Unlike NPP, YLC functions as both a national and local
organization. A significant portion of its work involves California
institutions. The difference in geographic orientation, along with
important distinctions between the adult and juvenile corrections
context, emerge as factors affecting the advocacy roles played
by NPP and YLC.7"
The scope of the involvement of these organizations is
particularly striking in light of their relatively small size. NPP
employs eight staff lawyers, including the Executive Director.
YLC's staff consists of seven lawyers, not all of whom handle
corrections cases.7 7
73. TuE NATIONAL PRISON PROJwCT, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, STATUS REPORT.
THE COURTS AND THE PRISONS (1990) [hereinafter NPP STATUS REPORT] (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
74. Elizabeth Alexander, NPP's Associate Director for Litigation, estimates that
NPP is lead counsel in 90% of its cases. Interview with Elizabeth Alexander, Associate
Director for Litigation, National Prison Project, in Washington D.C. 14 (Nov. 15, 1990
& July 13, 1991) [hereinafter Alexander Interview] (transcript on file with author).
75. YLC has been involved in jail litigation in Alabama, California, Colorado, Idaho,
Kentucky, Maine, New Mexico, and Ohio, detention center litigation in Arizona,
California, Florida, Utah, and Washington, and in training school litigation in
California, Florida, Idaho, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, and South Carolina.
See YOUTH LAW CENTER, CASEs-PAST AND PRESENT 1-8 (1991) (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
76. See infra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
77. No other national litigating organization devoted solely to corrections issues
has ever existed. In the past, other national organizations have had significant involve-
ment in these cases. Such involvement, however, has diminished, or in many areas,
disappeared. For example, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund formerly
participated in a number of significant corrections cases around the country. They
discontinued their involvement years ago, however, due to inadequate staffing and
resources and due to a perception that the National Prison Project would continue
to do what was required. Telephone interview with Steve Ralston, Director of Litigation,
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund 1 (July 14, 1992) [hereinafter Ralston
Interview] (transcript on file with author).
The Special Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division of the United States Justice
Department has also investigated and brought litigation challenging conditions of
confinement in state institutions. The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act
(CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997a (1988), authorizes the Attorney General to sue state and
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Both national organizations place considerable emphasis on
the impact litigation model of advocacy. Their national focus,
and emphasis on and expertise in litigation reflect and reinforce
this law reform emphasis. These factors also enable them to
play a central role in supporting the field by sharing their
expertise and insight with others. The two organizations
articulate somewhat different levels of commitment to the
institutional change model of advocacy. Both face considerable
obstacles to effective performance of an institutional change role,
because of the dearth of political advocacy groups in corrections
and the decentralization of corrections policy making for state
institutions. But the two organizations differ in the extent of
their involvement in state and local advocacy. These differences
may stem from important distinctions between adult and
juvenile corrections, as well as the greater extent of local
involvement by YLC.
Because of the uniqueness and significance of these national
corrections organizations, this Section devotes considerable
attention to NPP and YLC and their role in corrections advocacy.
A. Overseeing a National Strategy: Case Selection, Expertise,
Resources, and Field Development
1. Case Selection: Hallmarks of the Impact Litigation
Model-The process and results of case selection by the national
organizations reflect their impact litigation orientation. Both
NPP and YLC concentrate on class-action litigation challenging
general conditions of confinement, overcrowding, and other sys-
temic problems affecting large numbers of inmates. Neither orga-
nization attempts to provide individual service to inmates on
local officials who operate institutions in which a pattern or practice of flagrant or
egregious conditions deprive residents of their constitutional rights. Before CRIPA's
enactment, the Carter administration's Special Litigation Section devoted considerable
resources to prison litigation. For example, it reportedly spent over one million dollars
litigating Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), and private counsel in
that case reports thatRuiz would have been impossible without Department of Justice
resources. Brorby Interview, supra note 53, at 3. The Justice Department also paid
for all the reports and experts in United States v. Michigan, 680 F. Supp. 270 (W.D.
Mich. 1988). Alexander Interview, supra note 74, at 5. Under the Reagan and Bush
administrations, however, the Justice Department essentially abandoned its role in
promoting constitutional prison conditions through litigation. Indeed, it has switched
sides in particular lawsuits to help states avoid judicial intervention, filed amicus briefs
urging the lifting of population caps, and offered to assist states and localities tied
up in litigation. Id. The role of the Justice Department in corrections litigation under
the Clinton Administration remains to be seen.
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a regular basis.78 They generally do not represent individual
inmates unless the relief will benefit other similarly situated
inmates, and they turn down most requests for representation.
79
In fact, NPP's Associate Director for Litigation stated that it
was almost never appropriate for NPP to take a case that affects
a small number of inmates because it is not "a good use of
resources." The organization has "a role in preserving a litigation
strategy."8 NPP and YLC rarely bring damages actions and will
do so only as part of a strategy to accomplish the equivalence
of injunctive relief.81
The national organizations treat case selection as crucial to
their ability to carry out their organizational mission. Both NPP
and YLC strive to serve as national trouble-shooters, and this
is reflected in their method and criteria for selecting cases. Each
organization chooses its cases through a self-conscious and
structured process that forces the organization to consider
potential cases in relation to overall organizational priorities.82
Case-selection decisions are made by the staff attorneys, who
repeatedly spoke of the importance of independence in selecting
cases. 83 Attorneys expressed strong concern over the prospect
78. A staff associate at NPP is responsible for responding to inmate mail, and NPP
has developed standardized letters and forms for this purpose. Alexander Interview,
supra note 74, at 34. YLC receives a small number of direct complaints from juveniles,
who appear to be much less likely to complain to outsiders about institutional problems.
Interview with Mark Soler, Executive Director, Youth Law Center, in Philadelphia,
Pa. 7 (June 17, 1992) [hereinafter Soler Interview] (transcript on file with author).
79. See Alexander Interview, supra note 74, at 12.
80. Id. at 19.
81. For example, NPP filed 20 related damages actions as part of a coalition to
address the problem of rape in Prince Georges County jail. Id. at 33.
82. NPP assigns one lawyer responsibility for collecting requests for legal assistance
and preparing a memorandum for legal staff meetings at which cases are selected.
Most cases are not accepted, and extensive factual development based on publicly
available information typically precedes the decision to file a law suit. Information
is gathered from such sources as grandjury reports, state legislative reports, extensive
inmate interviews, and, where possible, a tour of the facilities, sometimes with an
expert. Id.
YLC follows a similar process of case selection. Any YLC staff member may take
calls, during which the staffmember will obtain basic information and make an initial
assessment as to whether the case meets the organization's acceptance criteria. If the
case has potential, the attorney presents the case at a corrections staff meeting to decide
whether it meets the organization's goals and justifies the use of resources and staff.
If the case looks promising, an attorney is assigned to "work it up," a process entailing
examination of the pleadings, phone calls, and travel to the jurisdiction for further
investigation. Soler Interview, supra note 78, at 6.
83. Cf KESSLER, supra note 1, at 39 (describing the correlation between alternatives
to individual client driven case selection and the ability to undertake law-reform
activity).
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of increased foundation involvement in selecting cases or
targeting areas for attention. 4 The staff resists court appoint-
ment as a method of case selection, noting the danger of losing
control over their mission if they become reactive in their
approach.8 5 Unlike some state and regional organizations, the
national organizations do not rely upon inmate letters as a
source of identifying problems warranting organizational
involvement or analyze inmate mail to detect patterns of institu-
tional abuse.86
Each organization attempts to select cases that will have broad
implications for a state system or for the law generally.87 They
consider the practical and legal significance and urgency of the
issue and the potential negative consequence of losing, both upon
the possibility of reform within a jurisdiction and upon the law
generally. NPP lawyers expressed particular concern for orderly
presentation of legal issues and for pursuing a national strategy.
Several staff attorneys criticized local counsel for concerning
themselves solely with their clients' interests, sometimes at the
expense of national strategy.88
Examples of recent cases selected by NPP illustrate the
organization's commitment to the orderly development of
national legal norms. For example, NPP "took a case that
presents in a safe, narrow context a post-Wilson issue. [We were]
thinking strategically and defensively to cover our rear in light
84. See Interview with Alvin Bronstein, Executive Director, National Prison Project,
in Washington, D.C. 8 (Aug. 15, 1991) [hereinafter Bronstein Interview] (transcript
on file with author). Mr. Bronstein observed that it is "generally inadvisable and poten-
tially dangerous to have the funding source decide your litigation program .... We
want to be able to respond to what we think is important." Id. Foundations place a
premium on achieving demonstrable results and thus may contribute to national organi-
zations' emphasis on high visibility and broad impact. See Neil K. Komesar & Burton
A. Weisbrod, The Public Interest Law Firm: A Behavioral Analysis, in PUBLIC INTEREST
LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 80,88-89 (Burton A. Weisbrod et al.
eds., 1978). Because these incentives reinforce the priorities articulated by the staff
attorneys, however, they may not be experienced as constraints on organizational
independence.
85. Interview with Ed Koren, Staff Attorney, National Prison Project, and former
Director, National Jail Project, in Washington, D.C. 6 (July 31, 1991) [hereinafter Koren
Interview] (transcript on file with author). Mr. Koren stated that NPP rarely takes
cases fromjudges because then "judges think they can control our docket .... We must
keep our independence. It is part of our strength in managing and selection of our docket
and where resources go." Id.
86. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
87. Bronstein Interview, supra note 84, at 7; Soler Interview, supra note 78, at
2 (articulating organizational goals of YLC, including: "tlo stop the worst things
happening to children in the system; to attack particular inhumane practices; to affect
the greatest number of children; to develop principles which will apply to other
jurisdictions").
88. See Alexander Interview, supra note 74, at 30.
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of Wilson. [We want to] get a message out: We are still winning
cases after Wilson."9 The Executive Director of NPP also ex-
pressed strong interest in exploring international law as the
new frontier of law reform in the corrections arena.9 °
The extent to which case selection decisions rest purely on
attorneys' views of a case's significance and merit should not
be overstated. Attorneys at NPP and YLC described their
organizations as a scarce resource, and these attorneys reported
that they do consider the availability of adequate local represen-
tation in deciding whether to become involved.91 Staff availability
and interest play a significant role in the case selection process.92
NPP's position as a project of the American Civil Liberties Union
also affects its case selection process and its role.93 Almost every
state has an affiliate office of the ACLU. 4 As a national project,
89. Bronstein Interview, supra note 84, at 8. In Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321,
2326 (1991), the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs must prove deliberate indifference
to prevail in conditions of confinement cases.
90. Bronstein Interview, supra note 84, at 8 (urges strategy of using the developing
international standards of decency to challenge standards and policy in the United
States).
91. For example, Mark Soler described the problem of incarcerating juveniles in
adult facilities as one that individual lawyers could handle because the law is well-
established and the remedy is relatively straightforward. Soler Interview, supra note
78, at 5.
92. Alexander Interview, supra note 74, at 13; Bronstein Interview, supra note
84, at 7.
93. The American Civil Liberties Union has a national litigation office located
in New York, a national legislative office located in Washington, and a series of special
projects with national scope (such as the Women's Law Project and the Children's Law
Project in addition to the National Prison Project).
94. The affiliates vary considerably in size and activity, from large offices with
sizeable staff and resources to offices staffed only by a non-attorney director. In general,
these offices provide representation in cases with a wide range of civil rights and civil
liberties issues, including conditions and practices in correctional institutions. They
frequently work with cooperating private sector attorneys and often will cover the ex-
penses of the litigation with the express agreement that attorneys' fees awarded in
the litigation will be donated to the ACLU. Most affiliates do not specialize in corrections
litigation. In many states the affiliates must provide representation in a wide range
of civil liberties cases because they are the only active civil rights or civil liberties
organizations. Their involvement usually depends upon the availability of private
cooperating counsel willing to assume major responsibility or upon the willingness
of the NPP to co-counsel the litigation. Interview with Harvey Grossman, Legal Director,
ACLU of Illinois, in Chicago, Ill. 4 (Aug. 13, 1991) [hereinafter Grossman Interview]
(transcript on file with author); Interview with Laurie Seidenberg, President of the
Board, Wyoming Chapter of the ACLU 1 (Aug. 14, 1991) [hereinafter Seidenberg Inter-
view] (transcript on file with author); Interview with Betty Wheeler, Executive Director,
ACLU of San Diego, in San Diego, Cal. 3 (July 1, 1991) [hereinafter Wheeler Interview]
(transcript on file with author).
Some ACLU affiliates, such as those in Ilinois, Colorado, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, and the Mountain States regional office, have undertaken in-house
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NPP is obligated to support local affiliates, and NPP attorneys
report that they devote considerable time to assisting affiliates
with pending litigation.95 Requests from affiliates for NPP in-
volvement constitute an important source of referrals.96
NPP and YLC staff, along with other lawyers familiar with
their work, emphasized the importance of the national organiza-
tional perspective in selecting appropriate cases. Because they
are not limited geographically, the national organizations have
the capacity to intervene in areas that lack local advocates
equipped or willing to handle corrections cases. Most states lack
an effective local organization specializing in corrections
advocacy, and in many instances NPP and YLC represent the
only opportunity for effective representation in cases challenging
institutional conditions.97 Their longevity and national scope
gives them a comprehensive perspective unmatched by other
organizations.9" They consider a national perspective to be
crucial to understanding patterns and recurring problems, the
relationship of a particular case to the big picture, and the
potential impact of a case on other jurisdictions. 99
NPP's emphasis on litigation as the primary mode of advocacy
also reflects the organization's commitment to the impact litiga-
tion model. Staff attorneys at NPP devote most of their time
responsibility for major institutional litigation. For example, the Illinois office operates
an institutionalized persons project and has developed considerable expertise in this
area. Grossman Interview, supra, at 1. The staffcounsel of the Mountain States office
covers a 10 state area and has done a great deal ofjail and prison litigation. Bronstein
Interview, supra note 84, at 1. The Pennsylvania affiliate is part of a team litigating
a statewide overcrowding case, and the affiliate is paying a substantial portion of the
expenses in that case. Even those affiliates that have handled major litigation have
a relatively small corrections docket. Grossman Interview, supra, at 8.
95. Bronstein Interview, supra note 84, at 1.
96. Koren Interview, supra note 85, at 1 ("We are among the family of ACLU
projects. Contacts are made through affiliates. We put high priority on assistance to
affiliates.").
97. See infra Part III.
98. Interview with John Boston, Legal Director, Prisoners Rights Project, Legal
Aid Society of New York, in New York, N.Y. 12 (July 23, 1991 & Aug. 7, 1991)
[hereinafter Boston Interview] (transcript on file with author); Interview with John
Gresham, Associate Director, Prisoners Legal Services ofNew York, in New York, N.Y.
1 (July 29, 1991) [hereinafter Gresham Interview] (transcript on file with author)
("There is lots I learn from the National Prison Project. They have their tentacles in
all the states. People are doing the same sort of thing independently and out of touch.");
Nathan Interview, supra note 20, at 6 (asserting that NPP's "national orientation"
is critical).
99. See Nathan Interview, supra note 20, at 6 ("In today's climate, [advocates]
must be willing to take the risk of bad law into account. [They] must have a national
perspective because every case that goes up is a threat to the reform movement.").
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and energy to litigation. Even the lawyers identified within the
organization as most engaged in non-litigation advocacy esti-
mated that they spend approximately 75 percent of their time
litigating.100 YLC's lawyers also orient their activities largely
around litigation, but the organization devotes considerable
resources to non-litigation activity such as media work, legis-
lative advocacy, and public education." 1 Soler explained YLC's
more extensive involvement in non-litigation activity as reflect-
ing differences between adult and juvenile corrections: "[t]he
sympathy factor provides leverage for juvenile advocacy" and
there are "more non-lawyers interested in juvenile corrections. 1 2
2. Expertise and Field Development: The Advantages of
Repeat Players-The staff attorneys' background and expertise
equip NPP and YLC to provide national leadership in conducting
corrections litigation. Both organizations have considerable
expertise in complex litigation and corrections policy. They each
have lawyers on staff with substantial experience in class actions
and Section 1983 litigation. Both directors and at least half the
staff attorneys have been with the organization for more than
ten years.0 3 They regularly handle large, complex cases, and
have had extensive national experience with corrections
litigation.104
This accumulated expertise equips NPP and YLC with advan-
tages in their ability to conduct corrections litigation common
100. Interview with Adjoa Aiyetoro, Associate Director for Administration, National
Prison Project, in Washington, D.C. 1-2 (July 31, 1991) [hereinafter Aiyetoro Interview]
(transcript on file with author); Koren Interview, supra note 85, at 1 ("My priority is
the cases I am working on."). Aiyetoro expressed interest in moving toward a more
political approach to advocacy, and characterized as "short sighted" the decision in
the late 1960s and early 1970s to focus mostly on litigation. Aiyetoro Interview, supra,
at 4.
101. Soler Interview, supra note 78, at 5-6, 10. Most of Soler's examples of extensive
YLC involvement in coalition building and other forms of political advocacy are
geographically concentrated where YLC is based.
102. Id. at 10.
103. Four of NPP's eight attorneys have been involved in corrections litigation for
over 13 years, with Alvin Bronstein and Ed Koren participating from the inception
of the prisoners' rights movement. Four ofYLC's seven lawyers, including the director,
have been involved with juvenile litigation for over 10 years, most of which took place
at YLC.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 72-75. Neither organization has used
paralegals to the extent possible in major document cases. See Nathan Interview, supra
note 20, at 5 (stating that it is "important to learn to delegate work to paralegals
[because] [iut reduces the cost of litigation and the amount of upfront expenditure");
Soler Interview, supra note 78, at 13 (stating that YLC does not have experience with
cases involving over 10,000 documents).
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to "repeat players."' 5 Indeed, the expertise and accumulated
work product of the national organizations may account for the
tremendous scope of their involvement in corrections litigation.
Their familiarity with the substantive law enables them to avoid
"reinventing the wheel" in every case. Each organization has
developed extensive brief banks on the recurring issues in cor-
rections litigation. Each has developed an extensive file of expert
witnesses, including detailed knowledge of their past perfor-
mance and future potential.' °6 This access to experts dramati-
cally enhances the capacity to settle and litigate corrections
cases because of the importance of expert testimony in correc-
tions litigation and the key role experts can play in settlement,
remedial formulation, and implementation. 0
7
NPP and YLC also benefit from their national reputations
as experts who are willing to go anywhere with "big guns."'
0 8
This reputation can give them a decided advantage in settlement
negotiations.0 9 Expertise in the substantive law and familiarity
with the institutional setting can also enable them to settle cases
without the necessity of lengthy discovery.110
Indeed, their accumulated wisdom has prompted NPP and
YLC attorneys to develop more expansive conceptions of
litigation that respond to the demands of the correctional
context. They have focused considerable energy on developing
strategies for addressing such issues as the appropriate remedies
in particular problem areas, the use of consent decrees,
coordinated approaches to jail litigation, and the use of experts
in settlement, trial, and remedial development."' For example,
105. See Galanter, supra note 12, at 98-100 (noting that the advantages of repeat
players include specialized expertise, economies of scale, long-term strategy, ability
to "play for rules", and bargaining credibility).
106. Alexander Interview, supra note 74, at 7; Soler Interview, supra note 78, at 11.
107. See Sturm, supra note 10, at 720-21.
108. Soler Interview, supra note 78, at 6.
109. See Alexander Interview, supra note 74, at 35 (describing case in which local
legal services attorney handled initial settlement discussions without success, but state's
interest in settlement increased markedly when NPP became involved in the negotia-
tions); Telephone Interview with Howard Belodoff, Associate Director, Idaho Legal
Aid Services 3 (July 24, 1991) [hereinafter Belodoff Interview] (transcript on file with
author) ("[There is an] intangible effect of a big organization behind a case. It makes
defendants more inclined to settle, especially with an AG who doesn't know what to
do.") ; Cullen Interview, supra note 48, at 10; Interview with Ralph Knowles, Partner,
Doffermyre, Shields, Canfield & Knowles, and former Associate Director of the National
Prison Project, in Atlanta, Ga. 2 (Aug. 10, 1991) [hereinafter Knowles Interview] (tran-
script on file with author); Soler Interview, supra note 78, at 9, 16.
110. Sparks Interview, supra note 51, at 3.
111. See, e.g., Ted Janger, Expert Negotiation Brings New Approach to Prison
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NPP has developed an "expert panel" approach to remedial
development, using experts selected by the parties to perform
fact-finding, negotiate compliance plans, and monitor implemen-
tation efforts.
112
The prominence, visibility, and expertise of the national
organizations has fostered their role in supporting and devel-
oping the field of corrections litigation. Perhaps most im-
portant, they have become the key participants in the national
dialogue about corrections policy. Alvin Bronstein and Mark
Soler are regular and visible participants in major corrections
conferences." 3 They do extensive public speaking about
corrections issues. Corrections officials frequently request
technical assistance from NPP and YLC outside the context of
litigation." 4 They frequently emerge as the only national
representatives of inmates' interests in the public and pro-
fessional debate about institutional conditions and practices."'
Lawyers around the country in a wide range of organizational
settings view NPP and YLC as experts in the field and rely on
them for strategic advice and technical assistance." 6 Many of
Litigation in Hawaii, 6 NAVL PRISON PROJECT J., Winter 1985, at 6-7 (noting that parties
relied on expert mediators to meet court-ordered prison specifications, thus eliminating
"the adversarial nature of the process"); Alexander Interview, supra note 74, at 36
(describing innovative uses of experts in settlement discussions, such as joint factfinding
and collaboration in developing remedial plans; signalling that lawyers should play
a different and less directive role in remedial formulation). John Boston, Legal Director
of the Prisoners Rights Project of the New York City Legal Aid Society, stated that
the NPP has turned prelitigation settlement, threats, and publicity into a science.
Boston Interview, supra note 98, at 12.
112. For a thorough discussion of these innovative approaches to remedial formula-
tion, see Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J.
1355, 1365-76 (1991).
113. Bronstein Interview, supra note 84, at 3 ("I meet with officials we are suing
quite frequently in nonadversarial arenas. I met Mike Quinlan [Director of Federal
Bureau of Prisons] and Perry Johnson [American Correctional Association] at a
conference in Ottawa. We sit and talk about things we were not involved in litigat-
ing .... They recognize us as experts in their field."); Soler Interview, supra note 78,
at 7 (referring to numerous conferences and speaking engagements).
114. Alexander Interview, supra note 74, at 6; Soler Interview, supra note 78, at 1.
115. For example, NPP recently played the major role in opposing the American
Correctional Association's decision to weaken the standards governing the minimum
amounts of space that should be provided to inmates. See Elizabeth Alexander, The
New Turn of the Screw: Why Good News About Controlling Incarceration Rates Safely
May Not Be Welcome, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 213 (1992).
116. Boston Interview, supra note 98, at 14-15 ("The National Prison Project is
probably one of the most effective institutional reform organizations that has existed.
It provides specialized expertise for people all over the country."); Soler Interview, supra
note 78, at 16 ("The Youth Law Center gets calls from all over, not just for litigation
but about all kinds of things."). NPP and YLC have developed extensive brief banks
to draw on during new litigation, and both groups have experience with a wide range
of corrections issues. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
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the litigators interviewed described NPP's and YLC's assistance
in identifying and obtaining experts as the organizations' most
significant contribution.117 YLC and NPP also provide technical
assistance to attorneys involved in corrections litigation.
1 18
Both NPP and YLC also provide written materials to the field
generally and in response to specific requests for information.
Both have a brief bank, which they share with plaintiffs' lawyers
upon request. Articles and books by NPP and YLC attorneys
are among the few practice-oriented materials published in the
field.'19 NPP also publishes the NPP Journal and prepares a
117. Interview with Ruth Ann DeWolf, Legal Director, Correctional Law Project,
Chicago Legal Assistance Foundation, in Chicago, Ill. 4-5 (Aug. 12, 1991) [hereinafter
DeWolf Interview] (transcript on file with author); Dorsey Interview, supra note 32,
at 4; Telephone Interview with Neil Himelein, Managing Attorney, Community Legal
Aid Society of Delaware 7 (Aug. 28, 1991) [hereinafter Himelein Interview] (transcript
on file with author)("But for the National Prison Project, I don't know what we would
have done."); Telephone Interview with Grace Lopes, Managing Attorney, D.C. Prisoners
Legal Services Project 6 (July 15, 1991) [hereinafter Lopes Interview] (transcript on
file with author); Telephone Interview with John Midgely, Staff Attorney, Evergreen
Legal Services 5 (Aug. 1, 1991) [hereinafter Midgely Interview] (transcript on file with
author); Telephone Interview with Ernie Sanchez, Executive Director, Idaho Legal
Aid Services 4 (Aug. 6, 1991) [hereinafter Sanchez interview] (transcript on file with
author); Sparrow Interview, supra note 57, at 1, 7; Telephone Interview with Bob
Stalker, Director of Litigation, Advocacy and Training, Evergreen Legal Services 9
(July 16, 1991) [hereinafter Stalker Interview] (transcript on file with author). NPP
and YLC keep a current file of experts who testify in corrections cases, and the organi-
zations share this information with lawyers seeking expert witnesses. The national
organizations frequently are asked to co-counsel cases to cover the cost of experts.
Although they are not equipped to provide experts routinely, they do so in particularly
significant cases.
118. Boston Interview, supra note 98, at 15 ("Al Bronstein came up with expert
witnesses, participated in strategy sessions, and then went home."); Breed Interview,
supra note 49, at 4 ("If lawyers are new in the field, the first thing they do is call the
National Prison Project."); Brorby Interview, supra note 53, at 4 (NPP is a "repository
of what is most known and current in law and in prisons."); Nathan Interview, supra
note 20, at 10 ("When I got my first case, Al Bronstein sat with me for half a day ori-
enting me. I would have handled the case very differently had it not been for that
meeting."). NPP is most active in providing such assistance to ACLU affiliates and
lawyers within the ACLU and corrections network.
YLC also provides technical assistance to lawyers around the country. When YLC
-declines to take a case, it typically will offer the names of other child advocates in the
area, names of experts, and information about strategies that have worked in other
states and that might work in the case at hand. YLC staff attorneys receive requests
for information and technical assistance from around the country. They attempt to
link private attorneys and local advocates to whatever advocacy network exists in their
particular locale. Sanchez Interview, supra note 117, at 4; Soler Interview, supra note
78, at 7; Sparks Interview, supra note 51, at 3.
119. See, e.g., Alvin J. Bronstein, Offender Rights Litigation: Historical and Future
Developments, in PRISONERS' RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK 5 (Ira P. Robbins ed., 1980) (providing
an overview of legal developments in the area of prisoners' rights); Edward I. Koren
et al., A Primer for Jail Litigators: Some Practical Suggestions for Surviving and
Prevailing in Your Lawsuit, in 2 PRISONERS AND THE LAW 17-3 (Ira P. Robbins ed., 1993).
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status report on major prison litigation that is quoted widely
in governmental and scholarly publications as well as in
newspapers.
The national organizations provide additional support to the
field by holding conferences and strategy sessions on significant
issues in the corrections field. 120 These conferences also enhance
the organizations' ability to develop coherent litigation strategies
and to share these strategies with others involved in similar
litigation.
3. Resources: The Foundation of Independence-Until now,
the national organizations have had a great deal of financial
stability, resources, and independence compared to their
organizational counterparts. Unlike many of the state and legal
services organizations, national groups are not funded by state
agencies or others with an interest in limiting the type of
litigation they bring. 12' They have received substantial general
financial support from the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation
for their corrections litigation, with few constraints imposed
on the organization's activities.1
22
This financial stability and independence has afforded national
organizations considerable flexibility in selecting cases, using
resources to obtain experts, undertaking major litigation,
engaging in non-litigation activities, and influencing the case
selection decisions of other organizations that lack adequate
resources to pay for experts and discovery. Their travel budget
enables them to provide representation in areas that lack any
local access to lawyers in major corrections cases. Their ability
to pay the costs of experts at the outset of litigation has been
crucial to their success as litigators and negotiators. 23 It also
120. For example, NPP recently held two conferences to develop a strategy for
dealing with Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991), a case toughening the standard
for proving that prison conditions constitute cruel and unusual punishment, and with
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992), a case involving the
standard for modifying consent decrees in institutional reform cases. Both cases
presented issues of great concern to corrections litigators.
121. See infra Part IV.B.
122. See EDNA MCCONNELL CLARK FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 80 (1991) (showing that
for the Fiscal Year 1990-91, the Clark Foundation paid $595,000 in grants to support
NPP, and $276,753 in grants to YLC for its efforts to achieve "constitutional conditions
for juveniles in correctional institutions"). There is some question concerning the future
level and certainty of financial support from the Clark Foundation for corrections
litigation. The Clark Foundation recently decided to gradually phase out unrestricted,
general support for corrections litigation. This decision could dramatically affect the
capacity of grantees to continue their role as leaders in correctional advocacy.
123. See Alexander Interview, supra note 74, at 8 (emphasizing significance of access
to experts to NPP's effectiveness); see also Soler Interview, supra note 78, at 9 ("The
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enables them to pursue a national strategy by covering expert
fees in cases brought by competent local counsel that present
important and timely issues. 124 Their ability to finance major
litigation has become even more important since West Virginia
University Hospital, Inc. v. Casey,125 which precludes the
recovery of most expert fees. Their resources have enabled them
to forgo attorneys' fees in appropriate cases in order to achieve
a favorable settlement.'26 Also, staff attorneys identified the
organizations' financial stability as a major factor in their ability
to engage in a significant amount of non-litigation activities,
which do not generate attorneys' fees.
127
B. Implementation and Local Advocacy: The Achilles Heel
Both NPP and YLC staff acknowledged the centrality of imple-
mentation to effective correctional advocacy. As Mark Soler
stated, "the real issue is how to reach that critical mass of
reform, when everyone jumps on the bandwagon, instead of
impeding progress. '' 128 Performance of this institutional change
role requires familiarity with the players and with the political
context within a particular correctional system. It also demands
regular, ongoing involvement with the system. Advocates achieve
this sustained contact by bringing a high volume of inmate com-
plaints about institutional practices. They also pursue the
institutional change model by intensively monitoring decrees
mandating improvements in conditions and practices. Whatever
the approach, performance of the institutional change role
requires a commitment to implementation in a particular insti-
tution or system.12
9
National organizations face particular hurdles in pursuing
the institutional change model of correctional advocacy. They
key to YLC's relationship with firms is its greater resources, .. [and] its role in
bankrolling cases and co-counseling.").
124. Alexander Interview, supra note 74, at 4; Soler Interview, supra note 78, at 9.
125. 499 U.S. 83 (1991) (limiting expert fees to $30 per day); see Alexander Interview,
supra note 74, at 1 (NPP facing a new financial situation because of Casey; after Casey,
it "de-accepted" a case which would provide *no attorneys' fees and require large
expenditures for experts).
126. Alexander Interview, supra note 74, at 36.
127. For a description ofthese activities, see supra notes 101-02 and accompanying
text.
128. Soler Interview, supra note 78, at 9.
129. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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are by definition remote geographically from most of the jurisdic-
tions in which they sue. Because of their national focus, they
may lack detailed knowledge of the particular system at issue,
its strengths, and its important internal players. Such organiza-
tions may not have contacts with internal players who can
facilitate settlement and implementation. They also lack the
credibility, presence, and continuity in the local arena that may
be necessary in the implementation stage of litigation. Conse-
quently, they must depend on experts and local advocates to
assess the political and institutional dynamics, the potential
for building a successful corrections coalition, and prospects that
litigation will promote constructive change.13 °
If a local advocacy network exists and can be supported and
developed by the national organizations, this collaboration
enables the national organizations to overcome their geographic-
al and institutional obstacles to pursuing the institutional
change model. In the juvenile justice arena, such coalitions occur
more frequently and enable YLC to play a significant role in
supporting institutional change.' Adult corrections offers fewer
opportunities for collaboration with local advocates and
coalitions. 132 Where such coalitions do exist, NPP has played
an important role in coordinating and supporting their efforts. 1
33
130. Soler Interview, supra note 78, at 11 (stating that he always seeks local counsel
in another jurisdiction to keep track of what is going on locally, as they know the local
judges and idiosyncracies of local practice). See Interview with Barry Krisberg,
President, National Center for Crime and Delinquency, in San Francisco, Cal. 7-8 (July
17, 1993) [hereinafter Krisberg Interview] (transcript on file with author) (emphasizing
the importance of political considerations in determining where to sue and the
limitations of national organizations in assessing those political considerations).
131. See Krisberg Interview, supra note 130, at 4 ("Youth Law Center is exemplary
in its attention to remedy. They pay a lot of attention because of their child protection
mission. They want better outcomes."). For example, YLC described the organization's
participation in a multi-faceted advocacy effort to eliminate the incarceration ofjuveniles
in adult jails in California. A state law prohibiting such incarceration passed as a result
of four suits filed on the same day, along with substantial publicity, press conferences,
meetings with legislators, lobbying, and drafting of legislation. The suits were
specifically referred to in the legislative history of the statute. Soler Interview, supra
note 78, at 5-6.
132. Krisberg Interview, supra note 130, at 6 (limited potential for coalition building
in adult area).
133. For example, Adjoa Aiyetoro coordinates a community advocacy effort to coincide
with the statewide conditions suit currently pending in federal court. Aiyetoro Interview,
supra note 100, at 1, 4; Interview with Angus Love, Director, Institutionalized Persons
Project, Pennsylvania Legal Services, in Philadelphia, Pa. 7 (July 12, 1992 & July 14,
1992) [hereinafter Love Interview] (transcript on file with author). NPP is currently
part of a coalition of lawyers handling the statewide prison case in Pennsylvania, which
includes local advocates with considerable corrections expertise. The team includes
the ACLU affiliate, Legal Services' Institutionalized Persons Project, and David
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In the absence of an effective local corrections network,
however, national organizations face certain limitations in their
capacity to fulfill the institutional change model of advocacy.
To select appropriate cases for pursuing institutional change,
advocates require an understanding of the local culture and
political scene. NPP now depends primarily on local affiliate
offices to provide this information. However, NPP usually works
with the smaller affiliates, which are less likely to have sub-
stantial involvement or expertise in corrections issues.134 If local
counsel is not actively involved in the litigation, national organi-
zations may lack the information necessary to weigh the political
and institutional implications of litigation.135 Some members
of the advocacy community express the concern that national
organizations sometimes fail to consider the political ramifica-
tions of litigation and ignore the concerns of the local advocacy
community and of clients. 13
6
National organizations face particular challenges in monitoring
and enforcing decrees. Both NPP and YLC face the almost
impossible task of monitoring decrees in over twenty states. 137
Also, to the extent that national organizations place a high
premium on visibility and impact, they are less likely to devote
substantial resources to routine monitoring. 138 Staff attorneys
at both NPP and YLC acknowledge the difficulty of monitoring
decrees from afar. They have attempted to address the problem
by relying on local counsel to handle the enforcement stage,
unless problems arise requiring further litigation. 
139
Rudovsky, a private practitioner and fellow at University of Pennsylvania Law School
with considerable expertise in corrections.
134. Bronstein Interview, supra note 84, at 1.
135. See, e.g., Krisberg Interview, supra note 130, at 7 (describing current approach
to selecting overcrowding cases as "hit or miss," and expressing concern that national
approach to case selection is 'not necessarily consistent with political considerations").
136. See Meda Chesney-Lind, Patriarchy, Prisons, and Jails: A Critical Look at
Trends in Women's Incarceration, 71 PRISON J. 51, 62-63 (1991) (discussing the NPP's
push for construction of a new women's prison in Hawaii despite local concerns about
the proposed prison's size and level of security); Krisberg Interview, supra note 130,
at 4, 5 (criticizing impact litigation approach to case selection and advocating approach
targeted at rekindling prison reform movement); cf. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two
Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation,
85 YALE L.J. 470, 490-91 (1976) (describing the difference between clients and
constituents, and discussing their conflicting interests).
137. See supra notes 73, 75 and accompanying text.
138. See Krisberg Interview, supra note 130, at 4; cf. Komesar & Weisbrod, supra
note 84, at 88-89 (discussing public interest litigation firms' preference for "big cases"
over legal research, memo drafting, and litigation enforcement cases).
139. The approach preferred by the NPP for monitoring cases is to handle the case
through the development of the remedy, and then to send the case back to the local
setting for the local lawyers to handle the routine monitoring. NPP wants to be called
back in when there are national implications to the jurisdiction's noncompliance, or
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In many cases, however, this approach fails to meet the
demands imposed by the implementation stage.14 ° Often, local
counsel does not assume an active role at the remedial stage,
leaving cases without any active oversight.14 Moreover, unless
the national organization has had ongoing involvement in
enforcement activity, it will lack information concerning the
adequacy of local compliance activity.'42 In addition, the day-to-
day contact and "hassling" of the system represents a critical
aspect of institutional advocacy. Without it, many of the desired
changes in practice and culture will not occur. 43 Experts with
extensive involvement in corrections litigation expressed concern
over national organizations' reluctance to assume responsibility
for enforcement unless a crisis arises. 44 National organizations
face similar constraints on their role in local administrative and
legislative advocacy outside the litigation context. 4 ' In some
cases, lawyers have attempted to address these problems by
developing decrees that rely on monitoring by local agencies or
the advocacy community. 146
Thus, national organizations play a crucial role in bringing
and supporting impact litigation, providing a national perspec-
tive on corrections issues, and participating in the national
when there are problems with the implementation process. Alexander Interview, supra
note 74, at 16; Bronstein Interview, supra note 84, at 4.
140. Breed Interview, supra note 49, at 1 (stating that national organizations have
been "mediocre in follow-through").
141. Id. at 1 (local affiliates who have tremendous demands on their time are not
very involved in cases once the trials end); Bronstein Interview, supra note 84, at 4
("In most cases, we have to do most of the monitoring."). Bronstein reports that NPP
is involved in a Rhode Island case that has not had local counsel since the 1980s.
"Monitoring means a couple of trips up [to Rhode Island] a year." Id. For a discussion
of the limitations facing private firms and legal services programs in monitoring
remedies, see infra notes 272-75, 350-55 and accompanying text.
142. Telephone Interview with Randall Berg, Executive Director, Florida Justice
Institute 3 (Feb. 4, 1992) [hereinafter Berg Interview] (transcript on file with author)
("The real work has to be done at the local level on implementation-keeping people's
feet to the fire, bugging the special master, etc.").
143. See id. ("National organizations get a decree and they are gone."); Brorby
Interview, supra note 53, at 6 (discussing importance of "hassling the system in response
to inmate complaints").
144. Breed Interview, supra note 49, at 1; Nathan Interview, supra note 20, at 7
(also acknowledging resource limitations).
145. Aiyetoro Interview, supra note 100, at 3 (stating that legislators will not listen
to national people, but will listen to local community-people who can lobby and get
their attention).
146. Lawyers report decrees calling for regular inspections by agencies such as a
fire marshal's office, OSHA, or the state department of Health and Human Services.
Alexander Interview, supra note 74, at 45, 49. Some lawyers have looked to public
defenders and local prisoners' rights groups with regular inmate contact for compliance
review. Lawyers also have begun experimenting with the use of grievance mechanisms
as monitoring tools. Id.
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dialogue on conditions and practices in correctional institutions.
Their potential to pursue specific institutional change depends
upon their effective collaboration with local lawyers and
advocacy groups.
IV. REGIONAL, STATE, AND LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS
SPECIALIZING IN CORRECTIONS ADVOCACY
Regional, state, and local organizations specializing in
corrections advocacy constitute a second type of organizational
player in the advocacy arena. At least fifteen states and the
District of Columbia have programs within their jurisdictions
with a staff of more than one lawyer that provide legal represen-
tation to prison and jail inmates.147 In addition, the Southern
Center for Human Rights (SCHR) (formerly the Southern Prison-
ers Defense Committee) provides representation to inmates
incarcerated in southern prisons and jails. These programs vary
widely in their scope of involvement and the advocacy role they
play.
Some local programs offer services corresponding most closely
to the individual service model of advocacy. They provide
primarily individual representation or counseling in individual
cases.14 These programs tend to depend upon the state or
locality for funding, and they often operate with explicit limita-
tions on their involvement in class actions and conditions of
confinement cases. One of these programs was created specifi-
cally to fill a vacuum in individual representation to inmates
left by the demise of legal services and law school clinical
programs formerly providing these services."' Several of these
programs provide advice only and may not actually represent
147. These states include California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas,
Vermont, Washington, and the District of Columbia. This information was compiled
from responses to the corrections survey and interviews with each organization listed
in the National Prison Project's PRISONERS ASSISTANCE DIRECTORY as providing
representation to prisoners. NPP PRISONERS ASSISTANCE DIRECTORY, supra note 71.
148. Based on interviews with program directors, annual case reports, and
information reported in the National Prison Project's PRISONERS ASSISTANCE DIRECTORY,
this category includes the D.C. Public Defender Service, the Texas Center for Correc-
tional Services, Legal Services for Prisoners, Inc., Kansas, Legal Assistance to Minne-
sota Prisoners, Prison Legal Services of Michigan, and the Vermont Prisoners Rights
Office. See id.
149. Robert C. Hauhart, The First Year of Operating a Prisoners' Legal Services
Program: Part I, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 106, 108 (1990).
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inmates."15 They generally provide representation to the entire
state or locality, and they consequently face tremendous
demands on their services. They usually attempt to provide at
least some service to all those who request it and use informal
administrative advocacy wherever possible to resolve prob-
lems.15' Some focus primarily on administrative hearings and
civil problems unrelated to institutional conditions. These
organizations do not generally pursue institutional change
15 2
because of their service orientation, formal constraints imposed
by their funding source, limited attorney involvement, and huge
caseloads.
15 3
150. Michigan and Minnesota provide only advice or legal research, and Michigan's
program does not handle civil rights complaints. NPP PRISONERS ASSISTANCE DIRECTORY,
supra note 71, at 28; Telephone Interview with Phil Marron, Director, Legal Assistance
to Minnesota Prisoners 1 (July 19, 1991) [hereinafter Marron Interview] (transcript
on file with author). Texas' staff of three includes no attorneys, and attempts to resolve
complaints administratively. If they are unable to do so, the staff attempts to refer
the case to private counsel, who are paid at an hourly rate of $16.80. Telephone inter-
view with W.C. LaRowe, Director, Texas Center for Correctional Services 1 (July 15,
1992) [hereinafter LaRowe Interview] (transcript on file with author).
151. See Telephone Interview with David Rozwasky, Director, Inmate Legal
Assistance Program, Connecticut Prison Association 1 (July 17, 1992) [hereinafter
Rozwawsky Interview] (transcript on file with author) (attempts to resolve issues
administratively where possible).
152. See Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Dworkin, Director, Vermont Prisoners
Rights Office 1 (July 24, 1992) [hereinafter Dworkin Interview] (transcript on file with
author) (commenting that because the office is overburdened, only two lawyers and
one paralegal service the entire state, any hint of monetary recovery will be referred
out; the office does not bring conditions or medical care class actions because of
resource constraints); Telephone Interview with Stephen Kessler, Director, Legal
Services for Prisoners Inc., Kansas 1 (July 10, 1992) [hereinafter Kessler Interview]
(transcript on file with author) (office handles primarily individual problems, not
systemic problems). A memo written by a program attorney and quoted in Hauhart's
article on the D.C. program summarizes the limitations facing these service oriented
programs:
What are we accomplishing for our clients? This question haunts me .... All too
often, I hear myself telling or writing clients what I cannot do rather than what
I can achieve .... This is a result of legislative limitations, inadequate staff
resources, and the fragmented focus of the program .... Overall I feel the
program . . . is a set-up for all involved .... Unfortunately, the unmet need
exceeds the few tasks that [I feel] I have accomplished.
Hauhart, supra note 30, at 228 n.39.
153. See Interview with Robert Hauhart, Director, Prisoners' Rights Program of
D.C., Public Defender Services, in Washington, D.C. 1 (Aug. 14, 1991) [hereinafter
Hauhart Interview] (transcript on file with author) (Last year they opened 1100 appli-
cations for service, and the average caseload was about 220). In an article describing
the program's first year of operation, Hauhart noted that "[tihe burden of the caseload
has been a dominant feature of the program priorities and agenda so far." Hauhart,
supra note 30, at 228.
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A second, relatively small group of regional and local pro-
grams identifies with the institutional change model of correc-
tions advocacy. These organizations focus exclusively on
institutional change litigation and advocacy.' 54 They generally
do not handle individual cases or damages actions unless they
present issues that will benefit a large number of other
inmates. They focus on seeking and enforcing injunctions in
class actions challenging conditions and practices affecting
large numbers of inmates. These programs vary widely in staff
size and scope of involvement. At the high end of the continu-
um, New York Prisoners' Rights Project (PRP) has a staff of ten
experienced corrections litigators focusing on conditions in New
York City's adult correctional institutions. PRP is involved in
virtually every major correctional institution in New York City
and in every major case involving conditions and practices in
those institutions. 155 In contrast, the Correctional Law Project
serves all of Chicago's inmates with one full-time attorney, one
part-time attorney, a paralegal, and a half-time secretary.
156
Evergreen Legal Services serves all of Washington state with
two attorneys, a litigation coordinator, and a secretary.
157
A third group consists of organizations providing some
mixture of representation in individual cases, administrative
advocacy, and cases aimed at institutional change.' These pro-
grams generally attempt to provide some level of individual
representation to inmates, in addition to pursuing class action
litigation and administrative and political advocacy. Again, they
vary widely in their size, resources, and scope of involvement.
For example, New York Prisoners Legal Services (N.Y. PLS)
and North Carolina Prisoners Legal Services have large staffs
154. Based on interviews with program directors, these programs include the
Southern Center for Human Rights, the Prisoners' Rights Project of the Legal Aid
Society of New York, Legal Services for Prisoners with Children in San Francisco, the
Juvenile Law Center in Philadelphia, Evergreen Legal Services in Washington, the
Florida Justice Institute, and the Correctional Law Project of the Chicago Legal
Assistance Foundation.
155. Boston Interview, supra note 98, at 1.
156. DeWolf Interview, supra note 117, at 1.
157. Interview with Ada Shen-Jaffe, Executive Director, Evergreen Legal Services,
in St. Petersburg, Fla. (July 20, 1991) [hereinafter Shen-Jaffe Interview] (transcript
on file with author).
158. Programs falling in this category include Prisoners Legal Services in New
York, Prisoners Law Office in California, North Carolina Prisoners Legal Services,
Inc., Massachusetts Correctional Legal Services, Institutionalized Persons Project of
Pennsylvania Legal Services, Florida Institutional Legal Services, Inmate Legal Assis-
tance in Connecticut, Maryland Legal Services Prisoners' Rights Project, and D.C.
Prisoners' Legal Services.
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and participate in a substantial portion of the prison litigation
occurring in their respective jurisdictions.159 Other programs
are considerably smaller and less comprehensive in their scope
of involvement.
160
Thus, the state and local programs run the gamut in the
types of cases they handle.' 6 ' Their orientation toward correc-
tional advocacy differs in important respects from that of the
national organizations. Instead of an emphasis on impact litiga-
tion, lawyers in these organizations describe their goals in
terms of individual service or institutional change. In a few
cases, organizations strike a balance in their pursuit of insti-
tutional change and other advocacy roles that could serve as
a model for service delivery. Most of the state and local organi-
zations face resource and political constraints, however, that
limit the extent and mode of advocacy that they provide.
A. The Institutional Change Orientation:
Scattered Success Stories
Lawyers working in local organizations specializing in
corrections litigation show a tendency to focus their attention
on "bottom up" rather than "top down" institutional change.
Each lawyer interviewed from the state and local organizations,
without exception, discussed the problems facing particular
159. North Carolina Prisoners Legal Services has a staff of 13 lawyers and has
brought litigation in almost every institution in the state. Generally, prisons not under
court order either have cases pending against them or are newer, better-run facilities.
Sparrow Interview, supra note 57, at 4. Prisoners Legal Services in New York (N.Y.
PLS) has 32 lawyers and 15 paralegals on staff. Its Associate Director estimates that
N.Y. PLS is counsel in at least half the prison cases in New York in which inmates
have legal representation. They handle cases involving challenges to custody, civil
non-prison matters, post-conviction issues, parole and sentencing issues, and institu-
tional problems. N.Y. PLS gets 8000 requests for assistance a year. As of March 1991,
they had 5118 cases pending. Their most common type of case is a challenge to the
findings of a disciplinary hearing. Gresham Interview, supra note 98, at 4.
160. For example, six attorneys on the staff of the Prison Law Office cover the state
of California, and five staff attorneys cover the state of Florida. For other examples,
see sources cited supra note 32.
161. Most of these programs do not represent juveniles. See, e.g., Kessler Interview,
supra note 152, at 1 (handles problems of inmates in prisons and jails); Rozwasky
Interview, supra note 151, at 1 (no longer accepting juvenile cases); Interview with
Dick Taylor, Executive Director, North Carolina Legal Services, in Chicago, Ill. 6 (Aug.
12, 1991) [hereinafter Dick Taylor Interview] (transcript on file with author) (program
does not do any juvenile work).
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institutions in their jurisdictions, and described their advocacy
goals as centered on achieving change in those institutions.
This orientation manifests itself in a variety of ways.
Most telling perhaps is local corrections advocates' explicit
rejection of the law reform model of advocacy and their identifi-
cation with an institutional change model.'62 Robert Schwartz,
Executive Director of the Juvenile Law Center, described his
advocacy orientation in terms of "participation in change activi-
ties. 163 The Juvenile Law Center "uses litigation less than most
public interest firms because we have always looked at litiga-
tion in relation to what we are trying to achieve and what the
other options are .... The availability of an option you don't
use empowers other options."'64 As the Director of North
Carolina Prisoners Legal Services (N.C. PLS) noted:
NPP looks for big cases, milestones, important rulings. PLS
does volume, the brunt of the work .... We tend to concen-
trate on specific cases and solutions which apply to them,
[and we] shy away from issues of law because we are likely
to lose in the present political climate.
65
For example, N.C. PLS brings guard assault cases in the state
administrative forum for processing tort claims, despite criticism
from public interest lawyers for failing to pursue the civil rights
implications of these cases. The lawyers say they will do what-
ever works and choose the remedy most likely to provide swift
and certain relief.1
66
John Boston, the Legal Director of the Prisoners' Rights
Project, identified the prospects for achieving institutional
change as a key determinant in case selection. The organization
balances the manageability and resource requirements of a case
against the remedy likely to be implemented. 67 Boston explicitly
rejected the validity of the test case idea for most issues: "[tihere
is no multiplier. The idea of a test case has no reality. There
162. Boston Interview, supra note 98, at 6 (rejecting saliency of test case model);
Ortega Interview, supra note 57, at 2 ("Part of our agenda is to improve the system
in any way we can.").
163. Interview with Robert Schwartz, Director, Juvenile Law Center, in Philadel-
phia, Pa. 4 (July 8, 1991 & July 10, 1992) [hereinafter Schwartz Interview] (transcript
on file with author).
164. Id.
165. Sparrow Interview, supra note 57, at 4, 7.
166. Id. at 3; Dick Taylor Interview, supra note 161, at 4.
167. Boston Interview, supra note 98, at 4.
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is a fundamental problem at the central office level .... Taking
one prison and turning it into a model of how to do business
does not radiate to other institutions."'' 8 Indeed, Boston
emphasized that institutions evolve in reaction to litigation, so
that subsequent cases frequently differ in important respects
from their predecessors. 9
The lawyers staffing the state and local organizations reported
considerable reliance on inmates' expressed preferences and con-
cerns in deciding which cases to bring and how to approach these
cases, in contrast to the national staff attorneys. Many of these
organizations keep track of inmate letters and complaints and
use these letters to identify serious problems that deserve
sustained attention. 17 Some of these organizations conduct peri-
odic surveys of inmates to determine issues of greatest concern
to them. 17' They described much more extensive contact with
their clients and with inmates generally than did national staff
attorneys.172 They were more apt to comment on the importance
168. Id. at 5-6.
169. Id. at 3-4 ("The second medical care case is different from the first one. The
context and landscape change a lot... in ways that are related to how institutions
function.").
170. See id. at 1-2 (inmate complaints are the primary referral source; derives
litigation agenda in large part from perception of areas of greatest concern to inmates,
tempered by predictions of successful implementation of relief); DeWolf Interview, supra
note 117, at 4 (they keep statistics on inmate complaints received, which serve as an
important determinant of whether to bring class action); Gresham Interview, supra
note 98, at 4 (case selection process identifies issues of concern to large group of inmates
within particular institutions); Ortega Interview, supra note 57, at 1, 3-4 (organization
keeps track of inmate letters and uses coding system to identify and categorize
complaints against particular institutions); Sparrow Interview, supra note 57, at 4
(inmate letters constitute primary referral source for cases).
171. See, e.g., Love Interview, supra note 133, at 3 (describing client survey by
Institutionalized Persons Project).
172. Ortega Interview, supra note 57, at 2 ("When we litigate a case, we go out
to thejail on a weekly basis or every ten days, which you have to do in jail cases because
of client turnover.") Stalker Interview, supra note 117, at 4, 7 (stating that he maintains
regular contact with inmates through relationships with project staff and is familiar
with an informal network of inmates who have been at institutions for long periods,
and relies on them for monitoring compliance). This higher level of contact with inmates
by state and local organizations is not surprising in light of the greater proximity of
their offices to prisons and jails in their jurisdiction. Indeed, in co-counselled cases,
NPP lawyers explicitly allocate responsibility for inmate contact to local lawyers. See
Ortega Interview, supra note 57, at 5 (although NPP was lead counsel, SCHR attorney
acting as co-counsel visited more frequently with the clients and had more contact
with prisoners than NPP, as well as handling inmate witnesses in court).
In some states, the prisons actually house the lawyers providing representation
to the inmates, and the inmates have easy access to the program. See Interview with
Barry Barkow, Director, Massachusetts Correctional Legal Services, in Boston, Mass.
2 (Aug. 15, 1991) [hereinafter Barkow Interview] (transcript on file with author);
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of litigation to the status and dignity of inmates, 73 and on the
potential dangers to their clients associated with bringing
litigation against their keepers.
174
In contrast to the national organization lawyers, many of the
lawyers in the state and local organizations consciously avoid
high visibility and public exposure of the organization's advocacy
role. They view high visibility as a political liability that would
interfere with their ability to work constructively within the
local institutional and political community:
[NPP has] the visibility so that other folks who get into these
cases can use them as a resource. NPP's visibility is a
strength. We do not do newsletters and the stuff needed to
keep a high level of visibility. To be effective in the South-
east, I need to be as invisible as I can be most of the time
to work with Southern bureaucrats. If one goes out and toots
one's one horn, [it] inflames the ego of Southern characters.
... [Our] voice tends to be specific to the department, the
legislature, and the Bureau of Prisons.7 5
In place of high visibility, the institutional change oriented
lawyers emphasized regularity and continuity of contact as
essential to their success. 7 6 Many of the lawyers interviewed
Hauhart Interview, supra note 153, at 1. Some program directors view on-site programs
as the model service delivery system because they permit inmates to initiate contact,
promote administrative resolution of problems and save money and time. See Barkow
Interview, supra, at 6. Others expressed concern about on-site programs' ability to
control their caseload and to devote adequate attention to inmates housed in other
facilities. See Sparrow Interview, supra note 57, at 4. This difference in perspective
is attributable in part to lawyers' adherence to different models of advocacy.
173. Nancy Ortega of the Southern Center for Human Rights considers empowering
individual inmates to be an important aspect of her role. She noted that the "self-esteem
level of these inmates goes up tremendously" with their active involvement in litigation,
and that inmates "were in shock that anyone responded to their letter." The cases
sometimes increased inmates' "self-confidence and feeling of control" and made them
"better able to manage in the prison." Ortega Interview, supra note 57, at 8.
174. Id. ("Inmates get intimidated by prison officials.... It is difficult for these
guys to bring these suits and remain with them. Subtle things can be done to them
that we cannot prove in court.").
175. Cullen Interview, supra note 48, at 6; see also Sparrow Interview, supra note
57, at 3 (North Carolina Prisoners Legal Services avoids the public eye as much as
possible and doesn't seek publicity in connection with its cases because the organization
does not want to be identified as a political group and perceives the public to be hostile
to prison reform).
176. Barkow Interview, supra note 172, at 6 ("Arms length on site assistance
programs are the most effective and economical. Issues get addressed more effectively
because they often can be handled administratively."); Boston Interview, supra note
98, at 1 ("In New York City, we have regular contact with people in the prison system
and private providers of medical care. We are engaged with the Department of
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underscored local programs' familiarity with the procedures,
problems, and players of institutions they regularly sue, and
their resulting advantages in selecting the cases most likely to
respond to serious problems and to produce results. 77 Some local
lawyers described a strategy of creating a sustained advocacy
presence by intervening in a large number of cases raising issues
of compliance with legal and institutional rules.178 Others rely
upon their intensive and ongoing involvement in monitoring
compliance with court orders and consent decrees as the basis
of their ongoing relationship with the prison system.1 79 Both
strategies rest on the assumption that the regular presence of
lawyers raising questions concerning institutional conditions
and practices itself creates accountability and pressure for
reform. 180
Corrections on a regular basis on a very broad range of issues because of the consent
decree .... Familiarity breeds communication."); Interview with Stephen Bright,
Executive Director, Southern Center for Human Rights, in Atlanta, Ga. 3 (Aug. 11,
1991) [hereinafter Bright Interview] (transcript on file with author) (emphasizing the
importance of continuity of public interest practitioners and becoming part of the politics
of an institution); DeWolf Interview, supra note 117, at 6 (describing her tendency
to be less adversarial because she has to work with the Department of Corrections
a lot and must have a good working relationship); Gresham Interview, supra note 98,
at 8 ("NPP is covering the nation so they cannot know a system in detail. I know [the
Commissioner] ... I know the facts about how things work, how records are kept, how
the staff is deployed, what they do to screw people over.").
177. See, e.g., Interview with Michael W. Bien, Partner, Rosen, Bien & Asaro, in
San Francisco, Cal. 2 (July 18, 1991) [hereinafter Bien Interview] (transcript on file
with the author) ("Prison Law Office staff have a better feel of what is going on day
to day. They are really in there more. That is crucial for us. They can find witnesses,
potential plaintiffs. They know people, what works, and the scope of cases pending
in California."); see also Interview with Luther Ortin, Partner, Brobeck, Phleger &
Harrison, in San Francisco, Cal. 4 (July 18, 1991) [hereinafter Ortin Interview]
(transcript on file with author) (stating that the Prison Law Office had a lot of contact
with inmates and that they knew what kinds of reports to ask for).
178. Cullen Interview, supra note 48, at 6 ("I have good access to the prison
administration. I write a lot of letters describing allegations of inmates. They respond
routinely and fast. If it has merit, cases can often be resolved at that level. If the case
involves a systemic issue, I can go to the media where I have good contacts.").
179. Boston Interview, supra note 98, at 1 (process of enforcing consent decrees
creates vehicle for sustained presence of Prisoners' Rights Project in city corrections
on broad range of issues; observes similar relationship between N.Y. PLS and New
York State Department of Corrections); Bright Interview, supra note 176, at 1 (empha-
sizing importance of compliance work in achieving results); Cullen Interview, supra
note 48, at 5 (emphasizing importance of local presence "on the ground" to be able to
be "on site" on a regular basis to enforce decrees).
180. See JAMES B. JACOBS, STATEVILLE: THE PENTrENTIARY IN MASS SocIETY 123 (1977)
("It is the [Ill.] PLS staff members' daily presence at the prison, their persistent
questioning of the rules, their relentless demands to see files and records, and the fear
they invoke in the hearts of many of the prison staffthat has the most profound effect
on the day-to-day administration of the prison."); cf. Bellow, supra note 23, at 59-60
(advocating high volume strategy targeting particular institutions and problems as
the most effective means of achieving institutional change).
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Lawyers in the state and local organizations also place much
greater emphasis on linking litigation with other forms of advo-
cacy and pursuing non-litigation forms of advocacy. Their inter-
views underscored the value of developing credibility with the
local and state correctional institutions in empowering them
to resolve many issues informally:
One reason that administrative advocacy and policy work
are so successful is that officials take seriously the threat
of litigation; because Prisoners Legal Services is a successful
litigator, discriminating in the choice of cases, and doing
cases that affect a lot of people, they are respected.'81
The interviews produced many examples of the perceived
importance of continuity and expertise in achieving settlement.1 8 2
Local experts also play the role of supporting and developing
the field of corrections advocacy, albeit on a more localized scale
than the national organizations. A number of programs have
developed and distributed self-help manuals and materials. 183
Some of the state and local corrections organizations have also
developed materials and brief banks that they make available
upon request.
184
. 181. Lopes Interview, supra note 117, at 4; see also Boston Interview, supra note
98, at 14 ("We have developed such credibility that no one messes with us institu-
tionally."); Soler Interview, supra note 78, at 9 ("YLC is known for its track record
and willingness to spend whatever is necessary. This has a deterrent effect .... It
enables us to help reach that critical mass of reform when everyone jumps on the
bandwagon instead of impeding progress.").
182. Nancy Ortega of the Southern Center for Human Rights (SCHR) described
how she participated in a coalition that met with the commissioner of Georgia's
corrections system and persuaded him to change the state's AIDS policy, in part based
upon SCHR's previous litigation against Alabama involving the same issues and upon
the threat ofsimilar litigation in Georgia. Ortega Interview, supra note 57, at 5. Angus
Love reports: 'Beat them a few times and create a costly threat in attorneys' fees. Next
time they may be more willing to settle." Love Interview, supra note 133, at 8. Robert
Cullen described a collaborative relationship with a Department of Corrections Director
that developed from major class action (Guthrie), and his ability to 'milk the Guthrie
approach of beating them into the ground for years. Senior management people that
are Guthrie veterans are petrified of the judiciary." Cullen Interview, supra note 48,
at 5.
183. These programs include the Southern Center for Human Rights, Prisoners'
Law Office in San Francisco, the Institutional Law Project in Pennsylvania, the
Correctional Project of the Chicago Legal Assistance Foundation, and the Prisoners
Rights Project.
184. The Chicago Legal Assistance Foundation's Correctional Law Project has
prepared a manual that is made available to every lawyer appointed in a pro se prison
case in the Northern District of Illinois. John Boston of the Legal Aid Society of New
York's Prisoners Rights Project has written extensively in the field and prepares a
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Local corrections advocates also played up their role in
pursuing forms of advocacy other than litigation as a result of
their contacts within the prison and the local political and legal
community."8 5 For example, John Gresham of Prisoners Legal
Services of New York reported that he regularly consults with
the prison administration, the legislature, and the media about
prison issues. He and others in the organization have made a
major effort to cultivate contacts beneficial to the client group,
including the bar, church groups, health care organizations,
philanthropic organizations, and the media.186 Prisoners Legal
Services in the District of Columbia has also emphasized
involvement in the local community and in political issues.'87
Advocates and experts generally perceive nonlegal advocacy
as particularly promising and important in the juvenile
area.188 Robert Schwartz, the Executive Director of the Juve-
nile Law Center, described his involvement in a wide range of
nonlitigation activities that place him "at the table" on a wide
range of issues important to children in the juvenile justice
system, including serving on a committee that selected new
leadership of juvenile institutions and participating in task
forces and committees that determine public policy relating to
juveniles.189 At the initiation of the Juvenile Law Center,
participants in the juvenile justice system negotiated a
resolution of litigation concerning conditions and overcrowding
in Philadelphia juvenile institutions. The parties used
interest-based mediation, facilitated by a neutral mediator, to
quarterly docket of every federal case bearing on corrections issues, complex litigation,
and remedies. The docket is published in part in the National Prison Project Journal.
185. See, e.g., Aiyetoro Interview, supra note 100, at 3 (stating that legislators won't
listen to national people, but to the local community). But see Sparrow Interview, supra
note 57, at 3 (stating that the organization does little non-litigation work because of
a general office policy against advocacy and attorneys' preference to "practice law").
186. Gresham Interview, supra note 98, at 9.
187. Koren Interview, supra note 85, at 5. Prison Legal Services in Washington,
D.C. coordinated the formulation of a policy proposal on HIV and prisoners that enlisted
the support of experts, the local advocacy community, and the government. Lopes Inter-
view, supra note 117, at 4; see also DeWolf Interview, supra note 117, at 9 (Correctional
Law Project does a lot of substantive policy work, committee participation, and work
with the courts and the bar, and sees these activities as an effective means of attaining
results).
188. See Breed Interview, supra note 49, at 3 ("In any metropolitan community,
you find any number of support groups to help in a juvenile matter, where those
groups hardly ever exist on the adult side."); Krisberg Interview, supra note 130 at
3, 4, 6 (discussing potential for coalition building and effective linkages between
litigation and other advocacy efforts in juvenile area).
189. Schwartz Interview, supra note 163, at 1, 5.
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of the individual representation they provide.1 98 They also reported
that budgetary limitations constrained their use of experts,
discovery, and other activities crucial to effective representation. 99
Recent cuts in funding from Interest on Lawyer's Trust Accounts
Programs (IOLTA) have placed additional strain on limited
resources.2"0 Limited travel budgets also forced staff to refuse
201travel-intensive cases.
State and local programs also face obstacles to adopting the
focused, high volume approach to institutional change advocated
by Gary Bellow.20 2 Many of these programs must serve a wide
geographic area covering numerous institutions. They are
physically remote from the institutions at issue, and their energies
are diffused around the state. The sheer volume of cases makes
it difficult for them to justify defining a focus on one particular
institution for their individual cases.20 3
Resource constraints also limit the capacity of local programs
to monitor and enforce compliance with outstanding court
198. See Cullen Interview, supra note 48, at 6 (resource constraints force office to
be essentially crisis oriented); Sparrow Interview, supra note 57, at 4 (reporting that
North Carolina Prisoners Legal Services was forced to discontinue filing jail class actions
because of lack of funding); Stalker Interview, supra note 117, at 1, 5 (limited resources
and staffconstrain ability to accept and handle cases). This finding is consistent with
other studies. See KESSLER, supra note 1, at 109; Gary Bellow, LegalAid in the United
States, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 337, 342-43 (1980); Bellow, supra note 23, at 52.
199. Ruth Ann DeWolf reports that her office always does the less expensive discovery
first. DeWolf Interview, supra note 117, at 4. Robert Stalker also reports that funding
limits his office's ability to pay for experts. Stalker Interview, supra note 117, at 2,
10. Dick Beltz in Florida reports that the attorneys transcribe depositions themselves
half the time to save money. Telephone Interview with Dick Beltz, Director, Florida
Institutional Legal Services 2 (July 10, 1991) [hereinafter Beltz Interview] (transcript
on file with author). Howard Belodoffin Idaho reports that he cannot initiate a mental
health class action because it is too complicated and the need for expert witnesses is
too great. Where possible, he avoids depositions and tries to use local experts, but none
exist within the areas of expertise most needed. Belodoff Interview, supra note 109,
at 6.
200. See Barbara C. Clark, Interest Rate Decline Jeopardizes Stable IOLTA Funding,
14 NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N CORNERSTONE, Fall 1992, at 2 (noting that as a
result of declining interest rates, 60% of IOLTA programs participating in the survey
face income declines, resulting in cuts of up to 42% in funding for legal services). Interest
on Lawyers' Trust Accounts programs distribute money to non-profit organizations
that provide civil legal services to the public. They are funded by interest accrued on
interest-bearing checking accounts into which lawyers deposit client monies that are
too small or short-term to generate enough interest to warrant a separate escrow account.
IOLTA programs exist in every state (except for Indiana). PETER FREED, REPORT FOR THE
CLARK FOUNDATION ON INTEREST ON LAWYERS' TRUST AccOuNTS 1-2 (1991) (unpublished
report, on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
201. See, e.g., Bright Interview, supra note 176, at 2; Shen-Jaffe Interview, supra
note 157, at 5.
202. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 152-53 and accompanying text.
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orders.2"4 For example, Georgia Legal Services' director reports
that the program should be monitoring all of the institutions
under consent decree, but that the attorneys do not "have a
handle" on all outstanding court orders. 2 5 Robert Stalker of
Evergreen Legal Services reports that no one is monitoring the
decree in Capps v. Atiyeh 216 because there are no attorneys left
in the program.
0 7
Lawyer's in local organizations reported that organizational
dependence on state or local governments for financial support
dramatically affected the organization's mission and scope of
involvement. These lawyers reported explicit, state-imposed
constraints on the types of litigation that they are permitted
to bring and threats of funding cuts as a result of particular
litigation.0 8 State-funded programs often face explicit directions
to focus exclusively on providing direct service to inmates in
individual cases, and staff attorneys reported constraints imposed
on their programs' authority to handle class actions or to sue
state departments of corrections.20 9 Indeed, one organization
turned down a substantial contract with the state of Washington
to do prison litigation because the state would have required
204. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text (describing the impact of funding
constraints on state and local programs and legal services).
205. Interview with Phyllis Holman, Executive Director, Georgia Legal Services,
in St. Petersburg, Fla. 6-7 (July 21, 1991) [hereinafter Holman Interview] (transcript
on file with author). Holman reported that the office is considering the possibility of
suspending new case involvement to allow lawyers more time to monitor outstanding
decrees. Id.
206. 559 F. Supp. 894 (D. Or. 1982).
207. Stalker Interview, supra note 117, at 8.
208. KESSLER, supra note 1, at 56-57 (stating that commissioners responded to jail
suit by threatening to cut funding of legal services program); see Cullen Interview,
supra note 48, at 3 (expressing concern over whether legal services will continue to
support corrections litigation); Dworkin Interview, supra note 152, at 2 (stating that
Vermont's governor introduced a bill to eliminate the prison program); Telephone
Interview with Nancy Feldman, Director, Office of Inmate Advocacy, New Jersey Office
of the Public Advocate 1 (July 15, 1992) [hereinafter Feldman Interview] (transcript
on file with author) (stating that a decision was made to phase out the program gradually);
Stalker Interview, supra note 117, at 7 (stating that Oregon recently de-funded the
prison litigation project); Dick Taylor Interview, supra note 161, at 8-9 (stating that
the state is looking constantly for other ways to meet its obligation under Bounds and
that "it creates a minefield" when a program has "a funding source who is an adversary
in every piece of litigation done and is also asked for basic support for other representa-
tion").
209. See, e.g., Shen-Jaffe Interview, supra note 157, at 5 (stating that when Evergreen
Legal Services (ELS) began winning conditions of confinement suits, the state prohibited
the organization from using state funds to bring class actions). Programs in Michigan,
Texas, and Minnesota are also prohibited from filing actions; they provide advice only.
See supra note 150.
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the program to obtain prison officials' approval before filing a
conditions challenge. °
State funding also affected the lawyers' definition of their role
in many cases. Three of the local programs-those in Massachu-
setts, Maryland, and North Carolina-constitute the state's
method for meeting its obligation to provide inmates with access
to courts, 211 and are under contract with the state to provide
legal representation to inmates. Because these programs are
the sole avenue to court access for most inmates, attorneys in
these programs described a special obligation to respond to every
prisoner complaint received.212 Staff attorneys in the programs
attempting to combine direct service and impact litigation re-
ported an ongoing struggle to find alternative funding sources
to free up their staff to engage in impact litigation.213
Many programs looked to attorneys' fees as a funding source
free of state-imposed constraints to supplement their funding
and enable them to pursue impact litigation. Local programs
relied on fees to expand the scope of their coverage and to support
more creative and change-oriented litigation.214 Many lawyers,
210. Shen-Jaffe Interview, supra note 157, at 5-6 (ELS has not taken state funding
since 1989 because of a mandatory requirement not to file a conditions challenge without
the approval of the warden).
211. Maryland fulfilled its obligation to provide access to the courts by providing
legal services to inmates, which was found to be "an acceptable alternative to adequate
legal research facilities." Hall v. Maryland, 433 F. Supp. 756, 781 (D. Md. 1977), modified,
Carter v. Mandel, 573 F.2d 1721 (4th Cir. 1978). The state was later ordered to continue
to maintain and support the legal services program. Carter v. Kamka, 515 F. Supp.
825, 833 (D. Md. 1980). North Carolina failed to provide adequate access to law libraries,
and was ordered by the court to provide legal representation by contracting with Legal
Services of North Carolina. Smith v. Bounds, 657 F. Supp. 1327, 1332-33 (E.D. N.C.
1986). Kansas' program, although it is not required by the court, has been relied on
by the state as the basis for refusing to expand the law libraries in its correctional
facilities. Kessler Interview, supra note 152, at 1.
212. Sparrow Interview, supra note 57, at 5. North Carolina Prisoners Legal Services
(NCPLS) receives approximately 300 requests for assistance per month. NCPLS's Priority
Statement provides that "ensuring adequate access to the properjudicial forum is the
overriding concern of NCPLS." Most complaints are handled by counselling and advice,
or brief service such as administrative resolution. In addition, NCPLS investigates
every pro se complaint referred by the court, and it evaluates whether representation
is warranted. Only meritorious cases receive representation. Id.
213. NCPLS used all nondedicated state funds to initiatejail class actions, but had
to stop initiating new actions because it lacked funding. The organization is hoping
to recover its deficit from a projected attorneys' fee award. Id.
214. See Telephone Interview with Elliot Berry; Senior StaffAttorney, New Hampshire
Legal Services 3 (Aug. 22, 1991) [hereinafter Berry Interview] (transcript on file with
author) (reporting that an office used attorneys' fees recovered in a prison case to hire
a paralegal to do monitoring and informal dispute resolution); Cullen Interview, supra
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however, did not view the availability of attorneys' fees as
providing independence in their selection and conduct of litigation.
Some programs condition continued involvement in corrections
litigation on lawyers' success in generating attorneys' fees. This
requirement reportedly skews the types of corrections cases
brought toward smaller cases with a proven track record.215 It
also influences lawyers' strategy and decision making in ongoing
litigation. 216 For example, lawyers reported settling cases early
because fees were needed to assure the program's survival.2 7
Thus, attorneys in local programs specializing in corrections
present a picture of unrealized potential; most local programs
lack the resources necessary to capitalize on the strategic
advantages of continuity, credibility, and expertise. The few
exceptional programs with adequate resources perceive them-
selves as an important and effective promoter of institutional
change in correctional institutions. Most states, however, have
no program providing representation in corrections cases or
lack a program with adequate staff and resources to handle
major cases or respond to overwhelming need. In many states,
the National Prison Project, Youth Law Center, or a local
affiliate office of the American Civil Liberties Union represents
the only possibility for representation by an organization that
specializes in corrections. Inmates seeking legal assistance
frequently must depend on representation by other sectors of
the legal profession. Three other major organizational
note 48, at 3 (reporting that corrections litigation must generate $150,000 in income
to fund two lawyers and a secretary); Sparrow Interview, supra note 57, at 4 (stating
that NCPLS's involvement injail litigation depends on recovery of projected attorneys'
fees); Specter Interview, supra note 192, at 1 (reporting that the Prisoners' Law Office
is "pretty self-sufficient," and that § 1988 attorneys' fees are the only way the organization
survives).
215. For example, Angus Love reports that he cannot embark on a major class action
without outside backing. Love Interview, supra note 133, at 6.
216. According to Angus Love, the need to earn attorneys' fees influences the types
of cases he can bring. He may be inclined to accept an early settlement offer that may
be less advantageous to his client than one available later in the litigation because
he needs the money for the program's survival. Id.
Bob Cullen also reports that resources affect the kinds of cases brought and how
they are litigated. He would like to use more experts. He could not bring a statewide
jail case because of limited resources. Rather, he must pursue cases that will be relatively
simple to litigate and that are likely to generate fees. His operation must be crisis
oriented. In short, his ability to bring new litigation is limited. "The squeaky wheels
get the grease." Cullen Interview, supra note 48, at 4-6.
217. Love Interview, supra note 133, at 6.
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participants provide representation to inmates in corrections
cases: legal services, private firms, and law school clinics.
V. LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAMS
Legal services programs-programs providing general civil
legal assistance to indigent people-constitute another potential
source of representation for inmates. At least in theory, legal
services organizations constitute a promising source of correc-
tions advocates. As one legal services lawyer stated, concern
for individual rights animates the prisoners' rights issue, and
legal services lawyers already focus on preserving these rights
and on improving the system of justice for the poor and for
minorities.2 1 Legal services attorneys have a commitment to
these types of issues and to concerns affecting poor and minority
clients.219 Legal services offices also span the country and exist
in relatively rural areas, offering the potential for coverage
to inmates in remote geographical areas.22 ° Finally, given the
range of public interest concerns implicated by a poverty law
practice, we might predict that legal services lawyers have some
of the skills and expertise called upon to handle corrections
cases.
The widely shared assessment of legal services' general role
in corrections advocacy, however, portrays just the opposite
picture. Experts, lawyers specializing in corrections litigation,
and legal services lawyers involved in corrections portrayed
legal services as playing a minimal role in corrections advocacy
and expressed profound pessimism concerning the potential
for an expanded role in the future.221
218. Sanchez Interview, supra note 117, at 4.
219. Id.
220. The National Legal Aid and Defender Association provided the author with
a list of 385 organizational members, which served as the data base for the survey
of legal services involvement in corrections litigation. Of the programs responding to
the survey, 68% of the general legal services programs and 86% of the program with
a specialized corrections program have a state correctional institution within their
service area. Almost all legal services programs have a jail within their service area.
221. Breed Interview, supra note 49, at 4 (reporting that legal services lawyers
appear to have little interest in prison and jail cases); Himelein Interview, supra note
117, at 2 (Eighth Amendment concerns of prisoners are not central to legal services'
mission); Telephone Interview with Regina Rogoff, Executive Director, Legal Aid Society
of Central Texas 4 (Aug. 5, 1991) [hereinafter Rogoff Interview] (transcript on file with
author) ("If funding [is] withdrawn from corrections specialists, legal services [is] not
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The results of the legal services survey and interviews suggest
that the picture of current involvement and future potential
is more complex. In some jurisdictions, legal services programs
provide the only lawyers willing to handle these cases.2 22 Forty
percent of the programs responding to the survey have at least
one staff attorney with some background in corrections litigation.
A small number of programs have senior lawyers on staff who
have been litigating corrections cases for years and have sub-
stantial experience with class action litigation.223 Legal services
offices frequently are used as local counsel by national, regional,
and statewide programs specializing in corrections. 224 Legal
services programs are involved in twenty-two of the forty-one
states with court orders involving conditions in major insti-
tutions or entire systems.225 In most of these cases, however,
legal services acts as co-counsel with other organizations such
as the National Prison Project, which functions as lead coun-
sel.226 Most legal services programs have only limited involve-
ment in corrections, and they rarely handle these cases on their
own.
227
The data evidences a marked distinction in level and type
of involvement between generalist programs and programs with
a lawyer or program specializing in corrections advocacy. Those
programs with a specialized project targeting institutionalized
persons or a senior staff attorney specializing in corrections
likely to step into the vacuum; when your plate is full, you have to give something
up."); Soler Interview, supra note 78, at 14 (describing his perception of a low level
of involvement of legal services programs in corrections litigation).
222. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Neil McBride, Director, Rural Legal Services
of Tennessee 2 (July 12, 1991) [hereinafter McBride Interview] (transcript on file with
author) ("No one else in the geographical area handles prison cases.").
223. See generally Cullen Interview, supra note 48, at 4 (describing a handful of
seasoned corrections litigators sprinkled throughout legal services).
224. See Alexander Interview, supra note 74, at 6 (describing reliance on legal services
programs as local counsel in many cases); Soler Interview supra note 78, at 11 ("There
is a natural affinity there [between corrections experts and legal services lawyers].").
225. Alexander Interview, supra note 74, at 1-2 (identifying counsel in cases reflected
in the NPP STATUS REPORT).
226. Id.
227. See DeWolfInterview, supra note 117, at 9 ("Almost no cases arise in neighbor-
hood offices."); Hauhart Interview, supra note 153, at 3 ("Local legal services programs
are not involved in corrections."); Soler Interview, supra note 78, at 14. Handler,
Hollingsworth, and Erlanger found that 60% of legal services lawyers in the national
survey received pressure to engage in less law reform activity, particularly from bar
groups and private lawyers, while 31% reported receiving pressure to engage in more
law reform from such groups as the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) and client
groups. HANDLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 64-65.
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develop a short-term agreement to end overcrowding in the
juvenile detention center and a long-term plan of regular
meetings among officials to develop a unified approach to
juvenile justice in Philadelphia. 19'
Thus, corrections specialists in local corrections advocacy groups
expressed particular affinity for the institutional change model,
and in the few instances of organizations with adequate resources
and expertise, represent a promising approach to advocacy that
can meet the particular demands of corrections issues.
B. The Unfulfilled Promise: Pervasive
Pressures of Poverty and Politics
The preceding section paints a picture of strategic advantage
for local organizations specializing in corrections, based upon
continuity, commitment, and presence. However, a parallel and
recurring theme that overshadowed this strategic advantage
for most lawyers in these organizations was one of unfulfilled
promise due to resource constraints and political pressures
imposed by local funding sources. With only three exceptions, 191
the organizations' directors reported that inadequate resources
dramatically limited their organization's capacity to provide
effective advocacy and establish an organizational presence within
its jurisdiction.
A handful of organizations are able to play a significant role
in the face of resource constraints through a variety of creative
staffing and targeting approaches. Two organizations collaborate
extensively with large private firms and developed ongoing co-
counseling relationships that significantly increased their
litigation capacity.' 92 Several other organizations attempted to
maximize their impact by limiting their involvement to major
190. See Robert G. Schwartz, Philadelphia Solves Juvenile Crowding by Media-
tion, OVERCROWDED TIMES: SOLVING THE PRISON PROBLEM, Mar. 1991, at 16. The
implementation of these agreements has led to a reduction in prison population and
the development of effective population control mechanisms. See id. at 17.
191. These exceptional programs have a relatively stable binding base. Their staffs
emphasize the importance of independence and relative financial stability in their capacity
to perform their advocacy role.
192. See Lopes Interview, supra note 117, at 2 (much of Prisoners' Legal Services
Project's "big work" is done with private attorneys, typically through co-counselling);
Telephone Interview with Donald Specter, Director, Prison Law Office (July 16, 1992
& July 24, 1992) [hereinafter Specter Interview] (transcript on file with author) ("Most
of the organization's class action cases, at least in the liability phase, are with co-counsel,
primarily firms; PLO has good working relationship with these firms.").
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issues of shared concern implicating structural questions.193
Finally, programs with corrections expertise and ongoing contact
with corrections issues and actors reported a sustained presence
in their locale, despite resource constraints.194
Many of the state and local programs, however, particularly
smaller or more service-oriented ones, are extremely limited
in their capacity to handle large, complex litigation, at least
without more experienced co-counsel. 9 Smaller programs lack
the staffing flexibility that is necessary to handle a large correc-
tions case.196 Their lawyers tend to be less experienced in complex
litigation.'9 7 Furthermore, their huge caseloads of individual
disputes requiring continual attention limit the opportunity to
handle major litigation. Their lack of regular exposure to complex
litigation also prevents them from developing the litigation skills
or familiarity with procedural innovation frequently demanded
by major institutional litigation.
Limited resources further constrain the capacity of local
programs to engage in effective advocacy. Many local staff lawyers
commented that caseload and resource constraints often force
them to reject important cases and to compromise the quality
193. See DeWolf Interview, supra note 117, at 2-3; Shen-Jaffe Interview, supra
note 157, at 5.
194. See Cullen Interview, supra note 48, at 5 (discussing the advantages achieved
through expertise and continuity, despite limited resources); Shen-Jaffe Interview,
supra note 157, at 1 (Evergreen Legal Services makes every attorney a part ofthe team
on a complex case, promoting a high level of job satisfaction, avoiding isolation, and
increasing attorney continuity and expertise). Some of the state and local organizations
have leadership and staff members with extensive class action and corrections experience.
For example, the Legal Aid Society of New York's Prisoners Rights Project has a large
staff experienced in complex prison litigation, and its Director (John Boston) is a na-
tionally recognized expert in corrections and civil rights law.
195. See Love Interview, supra note 133, at 5 (acknowledging that the staff of
Institutionalized Persons Project is relatively inexperienced in complex litigation).
196. Alexander Interview, supra note 74, at 5, 32 ("To keep all the balls in the air,
someone must be available to collaborate on large cases. You can't do the cases that
need to be done with one person. They are so big that you must have the flexibility
to divide up the work."). Vermont's program, with a staffoftwo attorneys, cannot provide
representation in class actions involving conditions or systemic problems. Dworkin
Interview, supra note 152, at 2. Pennsylvania's program is staffed by designating one
person in each of five offices as the specialist in institutional litigation. These offices
handle only a few class actions; without some source of outside support, they cannot
bring major conditions litigation or litigation challenging system wide problems. Love
Interview, supra note 133, at 4. One office split this position among six staff attorneys,
each of whom spends five percent of his time on corrections and mental-health cases.
Id.
197. See, e.g., Love Interview, supra note 133, at 5 (describing himself as "not at
an advanced litigation stage"); Rozwasky Interview, supra note 151, at 1 (describing
relatively young staff with limited experience in complex litigation); cf. KESSLER, supra
note 1, at 92 (explaining that programs staffed primarily by recent graduates are less
able to engage in a significant amount of law reform).
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exhibit more extensive involvement in litigation and a much
broader and more proactive conception of their advocacy role.22
Programs without such a specialized project generally tend
to define their role in reaction to external pressures forcing
their involvement and to limit their involvement to litigating
one or two cases. The majority of legal services programs do
not provide representation to inmates in cases challenging
conditions of confinement in correctional institutions.
Even for the programs with a special project or expert staff,
the location of the specialized program within a general legal
services institution profoundly affects the nature and extent
of service delivery. Corrections litigators perceive deep ambiva-
lence within the legal services community over its involvement
in corrections litigation. The lawyers' orientation to advocacy
often combined a reactive, scatter-shot conception with a law
reform/impact litigation approach. Legal services lawyers active
in corrections litigation portrayed the structural, political, and
resource constraints affecting legal services organizations as
profoundly limiting their involvement in corrections cases.
A. The Significance of Repeat Player Status
Most legal services programs do not have specialized programs
serving inmates of correctional institutions or lawyers specializ-
ing in corrections litigation. Thirty-seven legal services
organizations, however, reported that they have a specialized
project targeting problems of people incarcerated in correctional
or mental institutions. Of these programs, twenty-five currently
have specialized projects providing legal representation to
inmates of correctional institutions.229
228. Indeed, several of the organizations that specialize in corrections issues, which
were discussed in the previous section, are affiliated with legal services or legal aid
programs, including North Carolina Prisoners Legal Services, Legal Aid Society Prisoners
Rights Project, Evergreen Legal Services, the Institutionalized Persons Project of
Pennsylvania Legal Services, and Georgia Legal Services.
229. Among respondents to the survey with specialized programs for corrections
or mental health cases were 16 organizations also included in the section describing
organizations specializing in corrections litigation.
FALL 1993]
56 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 27:1
The data show that repeat player status-regular and ongoing
involvement in corrections litigation by lawyers within legal
services-correlates with more extensive and intensive involve-
ment in corrections work. Specialization dramatically increases
the likelihood, extent, and continuity of involvement in correc-
tions cases.
1. Extent of Involvement in Corrections Cases-Table 1 shows
the level of past and recent involvement of legal services
programs.230
TABLE 1
LEGAL SERVICES ORGANIZATIONS' INVOLVEMENT
IN CORRECTIONS LITIGATION
This table shows that only thirty-six percent of the legal services
programs responding to the survey have been involved in any
such litigation within the last five years. Interviews with legal
services staff attorneys and directors indicate that legal services
programs dramatically reduced their involvement in corrections
litigation after President Reagan cut the legal services budget
in the early 1980s. 23' Those programs that have handled correc-
tions cases within the past five years expressed an interest
in minimizing or eliminating their future involvement.232
230. The results of the survey are likely to inflate the level of involvement in
corrections litigation, because legal services programs active in corrections litigation
were more likely to respond to the survey than programs that do not handle these cases.
For this reason, these statistics should be viewed as the upper-bound estimates of the
true level of legal services involvement.
231. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Pat Arthur, Staff Attorney, Evergreen Legal
Services 1 (June 2, 1993) (stating that "[the Legal Services Corporation does not provide
any funding specifically for the representation of eligible clients in institutions"); Himelein
Interview, supra note 117, at 3 (after reduction of funding and staff cutbacks in 1980,
there was a decision not to allocate resources to prison cases).
232. See Belodoff Interview, supra note 109, at 1 (stating that he would not accept
another jail case without co-counsel because the last case occupied too much time);
Telephone Interview with Robert Gross, Executive Director, New Hampshire Legal
Services 1 (Aug. 28, 1991) [hereinafter Gross Interview] (transcript on file with author)
(program not inclined to take on any more corrections cases); Rogoff Interview, supra
note 221, at 3-4 (program no longer involved in corrections cases).
Ever involved 55%
Involved within
past 5 years 36%
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The involvement of programs with specialized projects serving
institutionalized persons2 33 has been much more stable than
that of general legal services programs.. Twenty-eight of the
twenty-nine specialized projects ever involved in corrections
litigation have been involved within the last five years, as com-
pared with fifty out of the ninety-three programs without
specialized projects. Specialized programs handled sixty-three
percent of all the cases reported in the survey.234 Interviews
confirm that programs with specialized projects tend to have
more substantial involvement in corrections litigation than
general legal services programs do, and programs with special-
ized projects have remained involved in the area despite general
funding cuts.23 5 Unless someone in the local office has clout and
a commitment to corrections cases, most offices pursue only
limited involvement. 236 When senior lawyers with expertise in
corrections cases leave, legal services' involvement in corrections
cases frequently ends.
2. Strategy and Conception of Advocacy-Generalists and
specialists also differ in their conception of their role in pro-
viding representation to inmates in corrections cases. These
differences emerged both in the comments of individual law-
yers, the patterns of case selection, and the types of cases and
activities pursued by the organizations. As the data summa-
rized below demonstrate, neither group defines its role in
terms of individual service, and for the most part, neither
group provides representation to an individual unless his or
her case has implications for others similarly situated. Legal
services lawyers generally did not describe empowerment as
an important goal of their corrections representation. The
comments and caseloads of legal services lawyers centered on
the institutional change and impact/law reform models of
233. Twenty-four percent of the programs ever involved in corrections litigation
and 36% of the programs involved within the last five years have a specialized project
for institutionalized persons.
234. This figure was calculated by tabulating the responses to a question concerning
the referral source of cases.
235. See Cullen Interview, supra note 48, at 8; Gresham Interview, supra note 98,
at 9; Shen-Jaffe Interview, supra note 157, at 3.
236. See Interview with LeAnna Gipson, Director, Monroe County Legal Services,
in St. Petersburg, Fla. 5 (July 19, 1991) [hereinafter Gipson Interview] (transcript on
file with author) (stating that personal preference of the director was the key factor
in the office's previous involvement in corrections cases); Gross Interview, supra note
232, at 2 (stating that it takes leadership from the director, a staff attorney, or someone
in the community pushing for the program to do corrections cases).
237. In one case, the attorney interested in corrections cases left. When the office's
funding was reduced, a decision was made not to allocate resources to a corrections
case. See Himelein Interview, supra note 117, at 3.
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corrections advocacy. However, legal services lawyers. and
organizational projects specializing in corrections reflected a
greater level of involvement in and commitment to an organi-
zational change model of advocacy.
Tables 2 and 3 below analyze the types of corrections cases
brought by legal services programs that have been involved in
corrections cases within the past five years.238
These tables indicate that, to the extent that legal services
programs are involved in corrections cases, they focus on class
actions involving general conditions of confinement in male
prisons and jails. Table 2 shows that approximately seventy
percent of the programs responding have brought class actions
within the past five years.
Table 3 shows over fifty percent of the cases brought by
legal services programs involve general conditions of con-
finement in jails. Legal services programs' involvement in
women's and juvenile correctional institutions is much more
limited. Unlike many state and local organizations specializing
in corrections, legal services programs generally restrict their
representation in individual cases unless serious problems
affecting other inmates are presented. Only twelve percent of
the programs responding have filed any cases involving classi-
fication or other administrative hearings. Almost twice as
many programs brought injunction actions than damages
actions. 9
The interviews corroborate legal services' reluctance to
pursue an individual service model of corrections advocacy.
Most of the lawyers interviewed stated that their programs did
not accept individual cases and usually refused to pursue
damages cases.240 The only exceptions were the programs that
receive state funding expressly to provide inmates with rep-
resentation pursuant to court orders remedying inadequacies
in the states' provision of access to courts.241
238. Many corrections cases fall in more than one of the categories identified in
Tables 2 and 3. For example, most class action cases also fall in the categories of
cases challenging conditions of confinement and seeking injunctive relief. Many cases
challenge both general conditions of confinement and discrete problems, such as
medical care.
239. Programs funded by the Legal Services Corporation are required to refer fee-
generating cases, and may accept such cases only if they have been refused by the
private bar. Love Interview, supra note 133, at 3; Sparrow Interview, supra note 57,
at 4.
240. See Belodoff Interview, supra note 109, at 5 (program will not accept
damages cases or individual complaints since it handles only systemic problems or
problems common to a class, which are usually undertaken as class actions).
241. See Dorsey Interview, supra note 32, at 4-5 (noting that the state-funded
Maryland Legal Aid Bureau provides representation to inmates in areas of civil
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TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE OF LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAMS
BRINGING PARTICULAR TYPES OF CASES
WITHIN THE PAST FIVE YEARS
2 4 2
Projects General Programs Specialized
Class Actions 68.6% 87.5%
General Conditions 68.8% 8.9%




BREAKDOWN OF TYPES OF ISSUES HANDLED BY LEGAL
SERVICES PROGRAMS INVOLVED IN CORRECTIONS
CASES WITHIN THE PAST FIVE YEARS
2 4 3
Prisons Prisons Jails Juvenile(Male) (Male) (Female) Facilities
General Conditions
of Confinement 31.3% 13.3% 54.2% 15.7%
Medical Care 30.1% 9.6% 26.5% 6.0%
First Amendment 24" 21.7% 2.4% 1.2% 2.4%
Disciplinary rules
and procedures 22.9% 7.2% 9.6% 6.0%
Classification and
other administrative
hearings 12.1% 6.0% 8.4% 2.4%
Guard brutality 16.9% 2.6% 9.6% 4.8%
AIDS issues 8.4% 3.6% 12.1% 0.0%
Programming 4 5  8.4% 6.0% 9.6% 8.4%
Other 19.3% 9.6% 9.6% 4.8%
rights, access to courts, inmate grievance proceedings, and civil suits in state court);
Sparrow Interview, supra note 57, at 5-6 (program investigates every pro se complaint
and accepts those with a valid legal claim, supporting facts, and a substantial matter
in controversy in terms of dollar value or number of people involved).
242. The percentages in this table do not total 100 because multiple entries are
possible.
243. These results present the combined responses of general programs and programs
with projects specializing in institutionalized persons. The percentages in this table
do not total 100 because multiple entries are possible.
244. This category includes cases involving religious discrimination, censorship,
and freedom of association.
245. This category includes claims involving programming activities such as education,
recreation, employment, and job training.
60 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 27:1
The data suggest some significant differences between
general legal services programs and those specializing in
corrections litigation regarding the types of cases that they
handle and the advocacy roles that they perform. Legal servic-
es specialists in corrections articulate an institutional change
model as their frame of reference for evaluating their role in
corrections. Their descriptions of their case selection process,
implementation activities, and involvement in non-litigation
advocacy reflect this greater emphasis on institutional change.
In contrast, legal services generalists tend to consider
corrections cases not in relation to issues of conditions and
practices in correctional institutions, but in relation to the
problems facing poor people in general. They eschew an iden-
tification with correctional institutions and inmates as an
important focus of their institutional change activity. This
difference in orientation emerges in their approach to case
selection, implementation, and involvement in non-litigation
advocacy. It also mirrors differences expressed by legal ser-
vices lawyers in expertise and skills of corrections specialists
and generalists.
Table 2 above shows that eighty-eight percent of the spe-
cialized programs, as compared to sixty-nine percent of the
general legal services programs, handle class action litigation.
Specialized programs also reflect a greater level of involve-
ment in general conditions of confinement cases than
generalist programs. This data suggests that specialized
projects are more likely to emphasize cases that affect large
numbers of inmates and challenge institutional patterns,
although it does not differentiate between cases pursuing an
institutional change and law reform model of advocacy.
The differences in advocacy orientation are more pro-
nounced in the programs' approach to case selection. Table
4 compares the referral source of cases handled by
generalists and specialists in corrections litigations. Table 4
demonstrates that over two-thirds of the cases handled by
general legal services programs resulted from direct request
by an inmate, as compared with forty-six percent of the cases
handled by specialized programs. Also, attorney interest
was more than twice as likely to account for generalists'
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TABLE 4




Court Appointment 5.4% 20.3%
Civil Liberties Organization 3.8% 19.0%
Pro Bono Referral Organization 0.1% 1.0%
Attorney Interest 16.1% 7.1%
Client Request 67.7% 46.0%
Other 7.0% 6.8%
involvement in corrections cases than involvement of spe-
cialists.246 Specialized programs were four times as likely
as general programs to become involved as a result of
court appointment or referral by a civil liberties organiza-
tion.
Interviews demonstrated that programs with
specialized projects serving inmates are more likely to
articulate an affirmative and proactive approach to
selecting and pursuing corrections cases. Lawyers and
programs specializing in corrections discussed case selection
in relation to the potential impact of a particular case on
large numbers of inmates or on institutional practices and
conditions generally.247  They also describe a greater
246. Interviews confirmed the significance of attorney interest in determining
legal services involvement in corrections cases. See Gross Interview, supra note 232,
at 2 ('[E]specially since there is such a fight for money within legal services,
involvement in corrections takes leadership from the director, staff attorney, or
someone in the community pushing for the program to do corrections work. There
aren't clients walking in the door, so someone else with power must [push to become
involved] in corrections."); McBride Interview, supra note 222, at 2 (extent of
handling of corrections cases depends to some degree on expertise and interest of
staff, in contrast to income related areas, where if they lost their main experts in that
field they would actively look for someone to replace those people).
247. See, e.g., Midgely Interview, supra note 117, at 2 (expressing concern with
improving conditions and affecting as many people as possible). Programs with
projects or attorneys specializing in corrections litigation are more likely to encourage
lawyers generally to combine individual service work with impact litigation and law
reform. See, e.g., McBride Interview, supra note 222, at 1 (stating that staff lawyers
are expected to devote 50% of their time to impact litigation); Shen-Jaffe Interview,
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institutional presence in the legal and correctional
community on corrections issues.
In contrast, generalist lawyers and legal services programs
rejected an activist approach to corrections advocacy, and
expressed deep ambivalence over the organization's involvement
in corrections litigation. Lawyers perceived a general desire to
minimize or avoid involvement in corrections cases. 45 They
developed no special approach to selecting corrections cases and
processed inmates' requests for representation through the
general intake process, although inmates typically requested
representation in writing or over the telephone rather than in
person.2 49 Table 4 shows that general legal services programs
were considerably less likely to receive referrals from other civil
liberties organizations. Legal services lawyers described their
approach to case selection as reactive and scatter-shot: because
legal services offices usually represent only those people who
seek their assistance, they generally have not been very
effective in representing institutionalized populations.25 ° Heavy
caseloads and "lack of control over intake limit [many]
programs' capacity to do anything other than respond randomly
to needs." '251
The current process for establishing legal services priorities
institutionalizes generalists' tendency to rank corrections cases
supra note 157, at 1 (state support work is integrated into the program instead of
farming out complex cases to a support center); cf KATZ, supra note 1, at 102-03 (dis-
cussing the significance of changing caseload priorities toward impact litigation in
redefining Legal Aid organizations as independent guardians of poverty rights rather
than community service providers).
248. See Gross Interview, supra note 232, at 1 (stating that two active prison
cases were enough and that he was not inclined to take on any more corrections
cases); Himelein Interview, supra note 117, at 2 (legal services should represent
prisoners in family law and landlord/tenant matters as it does other poor people, but
not in Eighth Amendment cases because of a lack of resources); McBride Interview,
supra note 222, at 2 (reporting that program brought a local jail conditions class
action two years ago, and has brought one since, even though there have been com-
plaints because the program is not devoting time to other priorities).
249. Berry Interview, supra note 214, at 3 (inmates know about the program and
call collect); McBride Interview, supra note 222, at 2 (cases processed through
meetings held to decide whether to accept major cases are likely to take a long time
or require greater resources).
250. PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA BAR AssN TASK FORCE
FOR LEGAL SERVS. TO THE NEEDY, 30 (1990) [hereinafter BAR REPORT] ("Legal services
program directors testified that they have to reject requests from[ prisoners for legal
help .... [one director stated] 'I've got letters on my desk from prisoners who have
got real legal problems; the letters aren't answered.'") Berg Interview, supra note 142,
at 4.
251. McBride Interview, supra note 222, at 1.
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in relation to other poverty law issues and virtually insures
that corrections will remain a low priority for most legal
services offices.252 Since 1980, legal services programs have
suffered a dramatic reduction in funding and staffing, forcing
many programs to restrict their service to emergency needs.253
As a result, most legal services programs have limited their
representation to emergency needs involving denial of welfare
benefits, lockouts by landlords, and domestic violence.254
Moreover, legal services programs are required by statute to
establish programmatic priorities through a local board with
representatives of the client population, the community, and the
staff. Inmates rarely participate in this process of priority
setting, and corrections issues tend to be low on the priority list
for legal services programs.255 Fifty percent of the legal services
programs not currently involved in corrections litigation cite
other priorities as the main explanation for their lack of
involvement. One program director asks, "[ilf prisoners are fed,
clothed, and cared for, how can we justify serving them and not
the homeless?"256 Another is more blunt: "[1ots of people in
general are not being served. With such limited resources, one
must decide who to let die. 257
In addition, Legal Services Corporation funds are allocated
based on census information concerning poverty levels in the
area. Institutionalized persons are not included in the census
count that is used to determine levels of "basic field funding."258
Consequently, most programs will not appropriate field office
252. A campaign to change the funding formula is currently underway by the
Institutions and Alternatives Section of the National Legal Aid and Defender Associa-
tion. Arthur Interview, supra note 231, at 1.
253. For example, Pennsylvania reports a reduction in legal services attorneys of
almost 31% and a reduction in paralegals of almost 26%. BAR REPORT, supra note 250,
at 9. See KESSLER, supra note 1, at 9 (stating that by 1984, Legal Services Corpora-
tion's budget was cut from $321 million to $241 million); Ronald Sullivan, Poverty
Lawyers Swamped by Work, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1989, at B3 (stating that programs
are so swamped that some "perform the legal equivalent of triage-taking the most
urgent and serious cases"); Mary Thornton, Legal Aid Cuts Found to Have Drastic
Effects, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1983, at A9 (stating that programs are so swamped that
some turn away many eligible potential clients).
254. See, e.g., Cullen Interview, supra note 48, at 5 (program's priorities focus on
basic necessities of food, health, housing, income, and safety); McBride Interview,
supra note 222, at 1 (same).
255. See Berg Interview, supra note 142, at 1; Shen-Jaffe Interview, supra note
157, at 4.
256. Himelein Interview, supra note 117, at 2.
257. Gipson Interview, supra note 236, at 3.
258. See ARTHUR, supra note 32, at 1 n.1.
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money to represent institutionalized clients because this would
further decrease the resources available for poor people who are
counted in the funding formula. 259 "In most states, the legal
services community is localized and programs are small and
geographically based. There is no mechanism for state-wide
priority setting that diverts resources to special client
populations, so there are no prison units."26 ° Ambiguity over
whether inmates should be served by the legal services program
representing their permanent residence or their temporary
residence in the corrections institution further undermines the
incentive to accept inmates as clients.26'
3. Expertise-Differences in the nature and extent of
expertise in corrections and complex litigation also contribute
to the higher rate and scope of involvement by legal services
specialists. Legal services programs with a specialized
corrections project typically have lawyers with corrections back-
ground and expertise.262 In a number of programs, these law-
yers also had substantial experience and expertise in complex
litigation.263 Expertise reportedly contributes significantly to
programs' continued involvement in corrections litigation by
creating a constituency within the organization for devoting
resources to corrections advocacy 264 and reducing the start-up
costs of taking on a corrections case.265 Senior staff lawyers or
program directors with considerable background and experience
in corrections described themselves as having the clout to con-
tinue their involvement in these cases and to obtain resources
necessary for experts, discovery, and monitoring.266
259. Shen-Jaffe Interview, supra note 157, at 5.
260. Id.
261. Most institutions are in rural areas, but inmates typically are from urban
centers covered by different programs. Dick Taylor Interview, supra note 161, at 5.
262. Indeed, every program that identified itself as having some specialization in
corrections had at least one senior staff attorney with considerable experience in
corrections litigation and advocacy.
263. See, e.g., Belodoff Interview, supra note 109, at 1 (attorneys sometimes work
on corrections cases with him to learn about complex litigation); Berry Interview,
supra note 214, at 2 (initially drawn into corrections litigation because he had more
trial experience).
264. See supra note 236.
265. See Gross Interview, supra note 232, at 2 (describing difficulty of moving
staff into the corrections area, with the exception of lawyers currently specializing
in corrections); supra, text accompanying notes 105-07 (describing how the expertise
of national organizations promotes efficiency).
266. See supra note 109.
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Many legal services lawyers, however, particularly those in
small, rural programs, likely have little or no experience with
corrections cases or complex litigation. Most programs cannot
afford to specialize in corrections cases, and they cannot devote
the time and resources necessary to develop expertise in these
cases.267 Among the legal services programs surveyed, limited
expertise is cited by forty-seven percent of the programs not
involved in corrections cases as a reason for their noninvolve-
ment. The. cases that legal services lawyers typically handle do
not require the development of skills in complex litigation.268
"The typical welfare case involves the interpretation of facts
and regulations. Most legal services lawyers have no experience
with experts or class [action] cases. This is a deficit of drawing
from legal services to handle corrections cases."26 9 Moreover,
legal services programs generally face obstacles to recruiting
qualified staff and a relatively high turnover rate among their
lawyers.27 °
4. Activities Devoted to Institutional Change-Legal services
specialists in corrections differed considerably in their emphasis
267. These findings are consistent with those of other studies of legal services
programs. See KESSLER, supra note 1, at 50 (stating that, as a result of high volume
and caseload policies, lawyers "have little time to devote to any particular case").
Kessler summarizes the literature exploring the factors affecting program behavior
of legal services. These factors include characteristics of individual staff members,
recruitment criteria, evaluation measures, caseload policies, and training. Kessler
suggests that the organizational environment of programs interacts strongly with
other factors to affect organizational activity. Id. at 20-28.
268. Soler Interview, supra note 78, at 15 ("Legal services lawyers often are less
experienced in complex litigation. Lawyers five to ten years in legal services may not
have taken a deposition or done a major document production. Many states have law
reform units for those who rise to the top."); Stalker Interview, supra note 117, at 1
(stating that regular local offices lack the expertise necessary for corrections cases).
269. Gresham Interview, supra note 98, at 5.
270. See, e.g., BAR REPORT, supra note 250, at 13 ("The drastic funding cuts to legal
services have resulted ... in ... low pay, difficulty in recruiting, and a high turnover
rate of staff, with a corresponding further decline in service."); Bellow, supra note 23,
at 52 (stating that, due to low salaries and heavy caseloads that result from under-
funding, the tendency is to throw poorly trained and inexperienced lawyers into frus-
trating situations); Peter Kendall, Indebted New Lawyers Shun Public Service, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 20, 1991, § 2, at 1 (describing the difficulty in recruiting law school
graduates for public interest work); Thornton, supra note 253, at A9 (stating that the
number of lawyers in staff offices decreased by about 30% between January 1981 and
January 1983, with many programs losing their most experienced lawyers); Saundra
Torry, Legal Aid Program Struggles to Attract Top Candidates for Low Pay, WASH.
POST, Dec. 17, 1990, at F5 (describing difficulties in recruiting qualified staff
attorneys). John Gresham noted that high staff turnover among legal services offices
is typical, and that many leave after two or three years. Gresham Interview, supra
note 98, at 4.
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on activities specifically directed at organizational change.
Lawyers with expertise in corrections described implementation
of outstanding decrees as a central aspect of their involvement
in corrections advocacy."' Indeed, experienced corrections
advocates described their early involvement in corrections
litigation as naive in its neglect of the importance of remedial
enforcement. 2  Lawyers operating within the demands of
generalist legal services programs indicated that legal services
provides little support for enforcement and monitoring. 273 Even
experts in corrections reported difficulties in meeting the
demands of enforcement. Neil Himelein states that his
monitoring efforts were successful for about a year, but that
now he just skims inmate correspondence and the documents
provided by the corrections department.274 Bob Stalker of
Evergreen Legal Services reports that no one is monitoring the
decree in a major prison case because there are no attorneys
left in the program.275
Legal services specialists in corrections differed markedly
from generalists in their reported involvement in non-litigation
advocacy. Corrections specialists were considerably more likely
to engage in administrative and legislative advocacy. 6 In
contrast, legal services programs without specialized units
handling corrections cases generally do not become active in
linking litigation to broader strategies of corrections reform.
Table 5 below sets forth the extent of nonlitigation activity by
legal services programs involved in corrections litigation in the
last five years.
271. Cullen Interview, supra note 48, at 5.
272. Berry Interview, supra note 214, at 5 (describing the frustration of initially
high expectations); Himelein Interview, supra note 117, at 4 (describing himself as
guilty of naively thinking the Department of Corrections would comply in good faith).
273. Berry Interview, supra note 214, at 2.
274. Himelein Interview, supra note 117, at 6.
275. Stalker Interview, supra note 117, at 8.
276. See, e.g., Belodoff Interview, supra note 109, at 5 (administrative advocacy
includes: trying to administratively resolve medical treatment complaints; participat-
ing in committee appointed by governor to study corrections system; and attempting
to expand corrections advocacy beyond lawsuits where possible); Cullen Interview,
supra note 48, at 5 (describing the importance of administrative advocacy); Love
Interview, supra note 133, at 3 (describing involvement in organizing client communi-
ty and church group support).
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TABLE 5
LEGAL SERVICES' PARTICIPATION IN NONLITIGATION





Legal Services Programs Generally 34%
Only eight of the forty-six general legal services programs
that have handled corrections cases in the last five years
report involvement in any nonlitigation activity. These re-
sults provide further support for the conclusion that repeat
players are more likely to become involved in broader strate-
gies of reform than one shot players.277 Restrictions on lob-
bying and other political activities, heavy caseloads, and a
desire to maintain a low public profile, particularly in cor-
rections matters, help explain legal services' limited involve-
ment in nonlitigation advocacy.2 78
B. Politics and Poverty: Compounding the Constraints on
Effective Corrections Advocacy
Funding and political constraints further limit the capacity of
legal services offices to play a significant role in the corrections
arena. Legal services offices frequently are funded by the state
and face strong pressure not to sue county and local officials. 9
As one lawyer stated, "[i]t is more difficult to raise basic operat-
ing funds for controversial work the closer you are to home."28 °
277. See Galanter, supra note 12, at 100-03, 145-46.
278. Sparrow Interview, supra note 57, at 3.
279. Stalker Interview, supra note 117, at 1 (stating that politics causes at least
one Washington office to avoid jail cases because the program fears negative conse-
quences from the city, based on other programs' experience). Alabama Legal Services
steers away from these cases because they are politically difficult. Atlanta Legal
Services had their funding cut in response to their acceptance of a jail case. This
makes them "think twice before they would do it again." Ortega Interview, supra note
57, at 5.
280. Dick Taylor Interview, supra note 161, at 5.
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Because general legal services programs depend upon local
officials for funding and cooperation in their non-corrections
advocacy, local political pressure is particularly effective in
discouraging high profile involvement in corrections cases.281
Resource constraints further limit the capacity of legal
services offices to become involved in the type of complex,
lengthy litigation frequently required to pursue corrections
claims.282 Almost half of the legal services programs that do not
handle corrections cases attribute their lack of involvement to
the attorney time required by these cases. Size, complexity, and
expense of corrections cases, also emerging from the survey as
significant discouraging factors, compound the problem of
inadequate staff and resources. 283 Legal services offices face
overwhelming demands for representation, and thus resist
involvement in complex cases that will tie up lawyers in pro-
tracted proceedings: "[tihese cases are so labor intensive that
they threaten to swallow up the office's ability to serve the
noninstitutionalized population. Corrections cases have tied up
three out of the eighteen lawyers ... for the entire state. '284 "A
281. There are several ways in which the local environment constrains legal
activity. For example, local commissioners can threaten to cut the legal services
budget in response to the initiation of reform litigation. See KESSLER, supra note 1, at
56-59.
This Article does not attempt to analyze rigorously the factors accounting for
differences among legal services programs in their involvement in corrections
litigation. The presence of a senior staff attorney committed to corrections seemed to
represent the most common characteristic of general programs with substantial
involvement. Other studies do suggest considerable variation among legal services
programs in their level of involvement in complex, law-reform oriented activity. See
HANDLER, supra note 13, at 17-47 (discussing the variety of"legal rights activities"
engaged in by different organizations); KATZ, supra note 1, at 65-70 (discussing the
differences in the activities engaged in by Legal Services and Legal Aid); KESSLER,
supra note 1, at 98-103 (discussing the relationship between lawyers' preferences for
reform or service oriented activities and the actual mix of activities engaged in by
legal services programs). Kessler ranked five programs on a "proactive-reactive"
continuum and found that the large urban programs spent considerably more time
dealing with problems requiring reform strategies than the suburban or rural
programs. Id.
282. Belodoff Interview, supra note 109, at 1 (stating that he would not file a new
jail case without co-counsel because the last one occupied his time for a six to seven
week period); Sanchez Interview, supra note 117, at 4 (stating that many jail com-
plaints show that conditions are ripe for major litigation, but that his program does
not have the resources to take additional cases).
283. See infra notes 301, 328, 335 (discussing the discouragement of private firm
involvement in corrections litigation as a result of these factors).
284. Berry Interview, supra note 214, at 2.
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program needs to be able to handle cases without pulling
anyone completely away from their regular caseload."" 5
In addition, legal services lawyers cited the high costs associ-
ated with corrections litigation as a factor discouraging involve-
ment. Seventy-two percent of the legal services programs
handling corrections cases within the last five years indicate
that the availability of funding for experts significantly limits
the capacity of their offices to handle corrections cases. Many
of those interviewed indicated that resource constraints dramat-
ically limit their ability to accept and prosecute corrections
cases.286 Moreover, most legal services programs are located in
metropolitan areas, far from prisons, and legal services offices
rarely have funding for extensive travel.2"7
In sum, repeat player status predisposes legal services
lawyers to identify with corrections issues and pursue a proac-
tive, advocacy role that emphasizes institutional change.
However, the overwhelming majority of legal services programs
are generalists who tend to resist substantial involvement in
corrections advocacy and limit their activity to a reactive, case-
specific role. Structural, financial, and geographic factors also
limit the capacity of legal services specialists to play an institu-
tional change advocacy role.
VI. PRIVATE FIRMS
The controversy over the appropriate locus of public interest
representation centers upon the role that private practitioners
can and should play. Supporters of private firm involvement point
to the potential for high quality, individual service that private
practice offers. They also put forth the assumption that firms
offer greater independence from political interference and greater
accessibility because of their decentralized and highly diverse
285. Id. The labor intensive character of corrections cases may account for the fact
that the size of the legal services office correlates with the level of involvement in
corrections litigation. Seventy-five percent of the programs involved in corrections
litigation have more than five attorneys on staff.
286. See supra note 282.
287. Shen-Jaffe Interview, supra note 157, at 5 (stating that time and money
needed for travel creates access problems). The Legal Services Corporation investigat-
ed a staff attorney specializing in corrections because of her extensive travel expendi-
tures. Id. Of those programs that have been involved in corrections litigation within
the past five years, the overwhelming majority are located within a major metropol-
itan area. See infra Table 14.
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geographic locations. 2"8 Supporters of a staff attorney model
frequently minimize the potential for private practitioners to play
a significant role in corrections litigation and in public interest
advocacy generally.289 They portray private practitioners as exhib-
iting limited interest in pursuing these cases and a narrow,
service-oriented conception of their advocacy role. Corrections
specialists often presented this negative conception of private
firm involvement as an explanation for their limited efforts to
recruit private firms as co-counsel in corrections litigation.2 90
The interviews and survey results suggest that by polarizing
the issue of private firm involvement, the debate misses the more
promising question of how firms can best contribute to a network
of representation for inmates in corrections cases. Although the
data confirms the sense that most firms currently limit their
involvement in corrections advocacy, assume a reactive, service-
oriented posture, and resist repeat player status, a small but
significant group of private firms devotes considerable resources
and time to these cases. These firms do become repeat players,
and, through financial support and collaboration with corrections
specialists, bring successful and significant corrections litigation
that could not otherwise proceed. As in legal services, interest
and commitment by lawyers with leadership roles in the firm
288. See Saltzman, supra note 5, at 1174-75.
289. See Cramton, supra note 6, at 550-54 (discussing the benefits of the activities
of legal services lawyers); Dooley, supra note 6, at 198-99 (arguing that private lawyers
may be unwilling to accept cases involving corrections litigation or may not be
knowledgeable about these types of cases). Many of the legal services and public interest
practitioners exhibited a deep skepticism over the possibility of effective public interest
advocacy by private practitioners. Some of this skepticism can be traced to the Reagan
assault on legal services, which proceeded through proposals to replace staffed legal
services programs with judicare and other sparsely staffed models that relied heavily
on private firm involvement. See LUBAN, supra note 3, at 298-300.
290. See, e.g., Barkow Interview, supra note 172, at 9 (observing that private law
firms handle corrections cases differently than his office does because they are in
business to make money, and that everyone would be better off if his organization
handled all of these cases); Himelein Interview, supra note 117, at 1 (observing that
bigger firms are worried about keeping clients happy, even as they try to justify non-
involvement in corrections cases using less self-interested terms such as conflicts of
interest); Stalker Interview, supra note 117, at 2 (stating that program usually does
not refer corrections cases to private firms because they lack experience and interest).
Esther Lardente, an expert in private firm involvement in pro.bono activity, reported
that legal services lawyers exhibit enormous resentment and fear about referring cases
to the private bar. "It is like pulling teeth to get people to send cases." Interview with
Esther Lardente, Consultant, American Bar Association, in Washington, D.C. 5 (June
13, 1991) [hereinafter Lardente Interview] (transcript on file with author).
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emerge as a recurring characteristic of the firms that play this
important role in corrections litigation.
A. The Norm: Limited, Sporadic,
and Reactive Involvement
1. The Extent of Private Firms' Current Involvement-The
extent of private-firm involvement in corrections cases varies
widely depending on the size, location, and pro bono policies of
the firm. Large firms with some form of a pro bono program are
significantly more likely to handle corrections cases, largely due
to their acceptance of court appointments in pro se cases.29' With
some important exceptions, however, large private firms generally
do not handle major institutional litigation. To the extent that
private firms are involved in such litigation, they tend to be small
firms with lawyers who are heavily identified with the public
interest community.
Table 6 shows the results of the survey concerning the level
of firms' past and current involvement in corrections litigation.
TABLE 6
LAw FIRMS' INVOLVEMENT IN CORRECTIONS LITIGATION
Ever Involved Last 5 Years
Large Firms 64.4% (47) 58.9% (43)
Randomly Selected Firms 4.8% (4) 0.0%
These figures suggest that the level of involvement is significantly
greater among large law firms with a pro bono program than
among randomly-selected firms.292 Approximately two-thirds of
the large firms responding to the survey indicated that they have
been involved in at least one corrections case within the past five
years. This figure is only fifteen percent of the total sample,
291. Associates at such firms are likely to devote a considerable amount of time
to those cases. See infra note 318 and accompanying text.
292. The results of the survey indicate that the level of private bar involvement
has not changed significantly over time.
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however, and likely overstates the proportion of firms engaged
in active corrections litigation. The relatively low response rate
of firms to the survey and the absence of participation by
randomly selected firms also suggests that the survey results
overstate the extent of involvement by private firms in corrections
cases.293 The level of involvement reported by the random pool
of firms is extremely low-none reported any involvement in
corrections litigation within the past five years. In addition,
lawyers involved in recruiting private practitioners to handle cor-
rections cases indicate that private-firm involvement among large
firms is much more limited than the survey results indicate, with
some notable exceptions. Recruiters characterized corrections
cases as among the most difficult to refer to private lawyers, and
observed that very few firms volunteer to accept these cases.294
Most of the legal services private bar involvement coordinators
interviewed do not even refer corrections cases to private firms.295
Corrections specialists and others who have attempted to recruit
private firms identify small firms consisting of lawyers with prior
public interest experience and commitment as the primary area
of private sector involvement in corrections litigation.296 In areas
with an active pro bono presence, such as Detroit, San Francisco,
and North Carolina, there is a network of small public interest
293. I received at least 10 letters and telephone calls from firms indicating that
they were not responding to the survey because they did not handle corrections cases.
294. See, e.g., McBride Interview, supra note 222, at 3 (prisoners' cases are refused
by private attorneys more frequently than other types, even those with a very good
chance of generating attorneys' fees); Telephone Interview with Christine McDermott,
Director, Delaware Volunteer Legal Services 8 (July 23, 1991), [hereinafter McDermott
Interview] (transcript on file with author) (stating that firms often do not like to take
prison cases because they are time consuming and the clients are often difficult to work
with); Interview with Lea Witte, Director, Chicago Volunteer Legal Service Foundation,
in Chicago, Ill. 3 (Aug. 14, 1991) [hereinafter Witte Interview] (transcript on file with
author) (corrections cases involving prison conditions are difficult to "sell" to attorneys).
295. See Telephone Interview with Ayres Gardner, Director, Pro Bono Project of
Georgia 4 (July 22, 1991) [hereinafter Gardner Interview] (transcript on file with author)
(stating that she has been unable to find any private practitioners willing to accept
corrections referrals); Telephone Interview with Scott Manion, Director, Florida Legal
Services Private Bar Involvement Program 3 (Aug. 14, 1991) [hereinafter Manion Inter-
view] (transcript on file with author) (program does not refer corrections cases);
Interview with Carl Poirot, Director, San Diego Volunteer Lawyer Program, in San
Diego, Cal. 4 (July 5, 1991) (same); Witte Interview, supra note 294, at 4 (same).
296. See Alexander Interview, supra note 74, at 6 (NPP co-counsels almost exclu-
sively with lawyers from small firms with public interest background); Sanchez
Interview, supra note 117, at 3 (most firms on Private Attorney Involvement panel
are small firms); Shen-Jaffe Interview, supra note 157, at 3 (small firms consisting
of prior legal services attorneys); Sparrow Interview, supra note 57, at 5 (most co-counsel
comes from firms of three or four attorneys).
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oriented firms involved in corrections litigation. Corrections
litigators frequently mention the same small group of committed
and expert private practitioners engaged in this area of litiga-
tion.297
An analysis of the breakdown of private firm involvement in
major prison cases also suggests greater involvement by small
rather than large private firms, at least in major institutional
litigation. Out of the forty-one states listed in the 1990 National
Prison Project Status Report on the Courts and the Prisons as
having institutions or systems under court order as of January
1990, large firms represented plaintiffs in three states plus the
District of Columbia. In contrast, small civil rights firms were
involved in twenty-nine states.298
Interviews with both private-firm lawyers and corrections
specialists suggest that private firms that have been involved
in a substantial corrections case tend not to be repeat players,299
and that many of those who have been involved in major litigation
in the past have reduced or terminated their involvement. One
quarter of the firms involved in corrections cases handled only
one such case within the past five years, and over one half have
been involved in three or fewer cases during that time period.
Many of the partners at large firms who have handled corrections
litigation indicated that they would be reluctant to take another
such case.300 A surprising number of lawyers who have devoted
major portions of their legal careers to corrections litigation have
drastically curtailed their involvement, left the field, or plan not
to accept any new cases.30 1
Advocates of a pro bono model of public interest representation
argue that private firms afford greater access to representation
because they exist in remote areas that otherwise lack any
practicing attorneys.0 2 However, the results of the present study
297. These names include David Rudovsky in Philadelphia, Gaston Faire in North
Carolina, Bill Sheppard in Florida, Alice Benheim in Arizona, Bill Turner, Donna
Brorby, Michael Bien and Sanford Rosen in San Francisco, and Bill Quigley in
Louisiana.
298. See NPP STATUS REPORT, supra note 73, at 1-5.
299. See Galanter, supra note 12, at 116.
300. See infra notes 301, 329.
301. Comments along these lines were made by many of those interviewed. See,
e.g., Knowles Interview, supra note 109, at 1. Interview with David Richmond, Partner,
Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, in Philadelphia, Pa. 9 (July 29, 1991) [hereinafter
Richmond Interview] (transcript on file with author); Interview with William B. Turner,
Partner, Turner & Brorby, in San Francisco, Cal. 1 (July 19, 1991) [hereinafter William
Turner Interview] (transcript on file with author).
302. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
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suggest that private firms rarely provide such representation in
non-metropolitan areas. The overwhelming majority of the firms
likely to be involved in complex pro bono litigation are located
in a major metropolitan area." 3 Lawyers involved in recruiting
private firms for pro bono cases described Washington D.C., New
York City,304 San Francisco, Detroit, and North Carolina as the
areas with considerable private bar involvement in corrections
cases. Table 7 shows the location of large private firms involved
in corrections litigation within the past five years.
TABLE 7
LOCATION OF LARGE PRiVATE FIRMS HANDLING
CORRECTIONS CASES WITHIN THE PAST FIVE YEARS
Every large firm involved in corrections litigation within the past
five years is located in a major metropolitan area. This finding
is consistent with the comments of corrections litigators, who
describe the difficulty of finding lawyers willing to handle
corrections cases in rural areas.30 6 The rural states were described
as having relatively low levels of private-bar involvement in
corrections litigation and in pro bono cases generally.30 7 With the
exception of North Carolina and southeastern Florida, the level
303. As of 1989, 52% of the 500 largest law firms were located in the 10 largest
cities in the United States. Ninety-seven percent of the large firms identified as having
a pro bono program were located in major metropolitan areas.
304. Although a significant percentage of New York firms represent inmates in
cases referred by the courts, interviews and the survey data suggest that New York
firms have not provided significant representation in complex, fact intensive cases.
See Boston Interview, supra note 98, at 15 (stating that private bar involvement in
New York City is primarily pro bono involvement in individual cases); Bronstein
Interview, supra note 84, at 2 (stating that New York firms are difficult to recruit,
and that it is rare for big firms to become involved in fact intensive cases).
305. The total exceeds 100% because figures were rounded off to the nearest tenth.
306. Bronstein Interview, supra note 84, at 7; Soler Interview, supra note 78, at 9.
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of private-bar involvement in corrections litigation in the South
was described as particularly low.
3 °8
2. A Minimalist Approach to Individual Service-Private
practitioners that do provide representation in corrections cases
generally articulate a reactive, individual service orientation.
Frequently, lawyers define their involvement in reaction to the
needs and demands of courts seeking assistance in pro bono cases.
They do not identify with either corrections as a problem or with
inmates as a constituency. Indeed, private firms generally exhibit
an interest in limiting their involvement, particularly regarding
experienced litigators and out-of-pocket expenses.
The results of the survey of firms suggest that law firms are
less involved in class action litigation concerning general
conditions of confinement than are legal services programs or
law school clinics." 9 Although forty-eight percent of the large
firms who reported handling corrections cases within the past
five years have handled at least one class action, only fourteen
percent of the corrections cases brought by large firms surveyed
were class actions. Moreover, of those firms currently involved
in corrections litigation who expressed interest in future involve-
ment, only eighteen percent identified general conditions cases
and eleven percent identified class actions as areas of future
involvement.
Data also show that law firms assume a reactive posture in
defining their involvement in corrections cases.310 Of the firms
308. Lawyers from the Southern Center for Human Rights noted a small core of
interested lawyers in Georgia but virtually no interest among large firms in Georgia,
or the private bar generally in Alabama and Louisiana. Bright Interview, supra note
176, at 4; Ortega Interview, supra note 57, at 3. The legal panel for the ACLU affiliate
in Mississippi currently is inactive because of the lack of any interest shown by the
local bar. Telephone Interview with Deirdre Janney, Executive Director, ACLU of Missis-
sippi 2 (Aug. 2, 1991) [hereinafter Janney Interview] (transcript on file with author).
One lawyer in a private Atlanta firm who conducted a study of potential firm
involvement in death penalty cases noted the low level of current pro bono involvement
and the social stigma attaching to those who represent criminals. He also described
Texas's pro bono involvement as a disgrace. Kinnard Interview, supra note 48, at 2.
309. The survey results concerning the breakdown of types of cases handled by
firms are of limited value due to the low response rate of firms to the questions
concerning the character of their case load. Because they are consistent with the qualita-
tive data and with the results of other studies, however, they are suggestive of the
nature of firm involvement in corrections cases.
310. See Knowles Interview, supra note 109, at 1 ("Taking a case is more a function
of happenstance than strategy-a letter from an inmate or a call from ajudge."); Love
Interview, supra note 133, at 7 (stating that private practitioners "don't know a good
case from a bad one"); cf Bryant Garth et al., The Institution of the Private Attorney
General: Perspectives from an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL.
L. REV. 353, 375-78 (1988) (stating that creativity and strategic decisionmaking in
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which have not represented inmates within the last five years,
sixty-two percent of the large firms and sixty-six percent of the
randomly-selected firms cite "no requests for representation" as
a reason for their lack of involvement. Private firms generally
become involved in corrections cases via court appointment.311
Table 8 shows the referral source of cases handled by large firms
responding to the survey.
TABLE 8
REFERRAL SOURCE OF CORRECTIONS CASES
HANDLED BY PRIVATE FIRMS
3 12
The survey results indicate that fifty-seven percent of all the cases
handled by large firms resulted from court appointment, and that
sixty-one percent of the firms handling corrections cases accept
corrections cases through court appointment.
Court-appointed cases tend to involve individuals seeking
damages or limited injunctive relief. Cases received through court
appointment are unlikely to address systemic problems, especially
because courts do not attempt to screen cases for referral based
on their potentially significant impact. Courts' primary goal in
case selection are confined largely to cases brought by public interest or federally funded
legal services lawyers).
311. Interview with Richard Johnstone, Partner, Hale & Dorr, in Boston, Mass.
4 (Aug. 17, 1991) [hereinafter Johnstone Interview] (transcript on file with author)
(firm accepts corrections cases exclusively through court appointment); Kinnard Inter-
view, supra note 48, at 1 (appointed by magistrate pursuant to requirement that
members of the Southern District accept court appointments in pro bono cases); Inter-
view with Beth Parker, Partner, McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen, in San Francisco,
Cal. 4 (July 19, 1991) [hereinafter Parker Interview] (transcript on file with author)
(reporting that firm will never turn down a pro bono request from a federal judge);
Richmond Interview, supra note 301, at 1 ("Judge's referral is the firm's exclusive
form of involvement in corrections cases.").
312. Because no firms in the random pool have been involved in corrections litigation
within the last five years, this table presents the responses of firms in the large-firm
pool only.
Court Appointment 57.0%
Civil Liberties Organization 14.1%
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appointing counsel is to provide representation in cases presenting
exceptional circumstances such as potentially meritorious claims
presenting complex evidentiary issues, a plaintiff who is unable
to investigate the case adequately, or a plaintiff who is partic-
ularly incompetent.313 One clerk surveyed cited this fact as a
possible explanation for the difficulty in finding private firms
willing to take these cases. Indeed, lawyers reported that prac-
titioners avoid joining the Southern District of Georgia because
of its requirement that members accept appointments in prisoners'
pro se cases.
3 14
In fact, the consensus among both the private practitioners and
the public interest lawyers interviewed is that most firms drafted
by the courts to handle these cases are reluctant participants
who want to minimize the time and resources they devote to these
cases.
The most common request I get is from attorneys in private
law firms who cannot devote the time to the case. They must
bill hours. I get a lot of calls from attorneys around Georgia
and Alabama who say they want to do as little as possible
on a case because they "don't have the time or the expertise
to do the job. 315
The corrections specialists described numerous experiences with
law firms who take a case and then do not follow through316 or
who drop out of litigation at a late stage.317 Large firms involved
in corrections cases most commonly assign them to young
313. Out of 35 districts that responded to a survey conducted of representative
district and appellate clerks, 20 have some program or procedure for appointing private
counsel in pro se prisoner cases. Districts with such a program frequently consider
the merit and complexity of the prisoners' rights case and the competence of the plaintiff
to present that case as the criteria for appointment ofcounsel. See, e.g., Cooper v. Sher-
iff, Lubbock County, 929 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. 1991); Hodge v. Police Officers, 802
F.2d 58,61-62 (2d Cir. 1986). Only one of the districts considers the number ofinmates
affected or the importance of the issue as a factor in determining whether to appoint
counsel. See also Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 451-54 (providing an overview of court
appointed counsel programs for prisoners).
314. Kinnard Interview, supra note 48, at 2.
315. Ortega Interview, supra note 57, at 1; see also Love Interview, supra note 133,
at 5 (stating that he receives many phone calls from private lawyers saying that they
cannot take the case).
316. Specter Interview, supra note 192, at 1.
317. Barkow Interview, supra note 172, at 9 (stating that when they co-counsel
with large firms, Massachusetts Correctional Legal Services ends up doing all the work);
Love Interview, supra note 133, at 5 (telling of an example where private firm co-counsel
withdrew two weeks before trial).
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associates who lack the credibility, experience, and judgment of
seasoned litigators.318 All of the expert corrections litigators who
provide technical assistance in response to telephone inquiries
report that many of the calls are from junior associates who have
been "cut loose" with a corrections case.
Many law firms have also shown surprising resistance to
financing corrections litigation. Most of the private lawyers
interviewed described their firnis' reluctance or refusal to cover
any out-of-pocket costs of the litigation. "The expenditure of time
was not the problem. It was the tangible expenses .... The
managers of the firm had an easier time if not called upon to lay
out money." 19
Not surprisingly, private firms generally have not been involved
in advocacy other than in the context of formal litigation. Of the
firms surveyed that handle corrections litigation, only twenty-four
percent engage in any nonlitigation activities, such as lobbying,
education, or consulting. Several partners have been involved
in bar committees on corrections and prepared reports on
corrections for those committees. Others serve on the board of
318. Bien Interview, supra note 177, at 2; Gresham Interview, supra note 98, at
8 (stating that people very frequently call saying that this is their first case and that
they are on their own); Kinnard Interview, supra note 48, at 3; Interview with Judge
Morris Lasker, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
in New York, N.Y. 2 (Nov. 14, 1990) [hereinafter Lasker Interview) (transcript on file
with author) ("Big firms assign these cases to the most junior people who are at a dis-
tinct disadvantage. Theirjudgment is not good. They have no sense of proportion. They
make big things out of everything."); Love Interview, supra note 133, at 7 (stating that
partners give advice but that cases are handled basically by new associates); Ortin
Interview, supra note 177, at 4 ("Associates spend a lot more time doing pro bono than
partners .... A partner may be supervising 12 pro bono matters, but the time they
spend on each is not that great."); Parker Interview, supra note 311, at 2 ("There is
a handful of partners who do a lot of pro bono work. Most is done by associates.").
Partners are somewhat less involved in corrections litigation relative to associates
than in pro bono cases generally. These results are consistent with the findings of other
studies of pro bono involvement by private firms. See Timothy J. Lindon & Susan M.
Hofman, Pro Bono: Can It Survive the Bottom Line?, WASH. LAW., Sept./Oct. 1990, at
29 (finding in a survey of lawyers at private firms in Washington, D.C. that recent
graduates perform more pro bono work than older attorneys).
319. Sparks Interview, supra note 51, at 4; see also Bien Interview, supra note 177,
at 4 (stating that he hopes that other organizations will advance fees for experts);
Dorsey Interview, supra note 32, at 2; Himelein Interview, supra note 117, at 1; Parker
Interview, supra note 311, at 3; Interview with Patricia Refo, Partner, Jenner & Block,
in Chicago, Ill. 4 (Aug. 12, 1991) [hereinafter Refo Interview] (transcript on file with
author) (stating that it is easier to convince the firm to give hours than to get them
to pay for the costs of the case); Richmond Interview, supra note 301, at 10; Dick Taylor
Interview, supra note 161, at 2-3 (stating that small firms cannot afford to do
corrections cases by themselves and that much of the work done by private attorneys
in North Carolina would not happen if PLS was not there to support it).
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directors of corrections organizations.32 A few of those interviewed
tea ch or occasionally speak to community groups about their
involvement.
The data suggest a variety of explanations for firms' reluctance
to embrace corrections advocacy. The incentive structure in many
pri vate firms discourages lawyers from devoting substantial time
to corrections cases. In firms without a policy or commitment at
the highest level of the firm to pro bono work, associates devote
time to pro bono cases at the risk of sacrificing partnership
opportunities.32' Partners devoting time to this litigation risk un-
dercutting their position in the firm by working on unpopular
cases and failing to generate adequate income.322 Many geographic
areas lack a legal culture supportive of pro bono work. Twenty-
two percent of the randomly sampled firms report that limited
pro bono work explains their lack of involvement in corrections
cases. Even in firms with pro bono policies and partners commit-
ted to pro bono work, lawyers reported pressure to limit the
amount of time devoted to such work.323 Advancement in the firm
320. See Bronstein Interview, supra note 84, at 7; Interview with Alex Landon,
Sole Practitioner, in San Diego, Cal. 3 (July 8, 1991) [hereinafter Landon Interview]
(transcript on file with author); Soler Interview, supra note 78, at 5; Sparks Interview,
supra note 51, at 2.
321. Brorby Interview, supra note 53, at 6 (describing considerable career sacrifices
taken by those active in corrections litigation, and reporting associates' impressions
that those active in pro bono do not aspire to partnership); Lardente Interview, supra
note 290, at 3 (describing frequent incidents of young lawyers who do outstanding pro
bono work and then do not get partnership, and expressing concern over the message
conveyed when this happens); Interview with William J. "Zak" Taylor, Partner, Brobeck,
Phleger & Harrison, in San Francisco, Cal. 1 (July 18, 1991) [hereinafter Zak Taylor
Interview] (transcript on file with author) (after two pro bono cases handled when he
was an associate, partners thought he should "cool it out for a while").
322. See Bien Interview, supra note 177, at 2 (reporting that firm developed a
competitive environment for both associates and partners that required lawyers to
produce billable hours to get compensation, and that he was advised that "[p]artners
should be on the pleadings, but associates should be doing most of the hours"); Zak
Taylor Interview, supra note 321, at 2 (reporting that extensive pro bono involvement
resulted in significant set back in partnership because not as economically productive
as other partners).
323. See Bien Interview, supra note 177, at 2; Kinnard Interview, supra note 48,
at 1, 4 (stating that "Doing pro bono work doesn't help you. Younger people would be
more involved if they felt they had the green light" and adding that he does not staff
the case the way he would a private case, explaining-that "I don't want to drag in others,
since we are not going to get paid anyway"); Richmond Interview, supra note 301, at
2 (stating that pro bono is acceptable if you don't spend an unreasonable amount of
time); Zak Taylor Interview, supra note 321, at 2; Interview with Tim Turner, Partner,
Shepard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton in San Diego, Cal. 2 (July 7, 1991) [hereinafter
Tim Turner Interview] (transcript on file with author) (stating that these cases are
a problem if they interfere with productivity); see also Lindon & Hoffman, supra note
318, at 29, 58-59 (stating that billable hour pressures, pressure to build a billable client
base, and desire for advancement are dominant obstacles to pro bono involvement).
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for both partners and associates typically depends on excellence
in fee generating work. There is evidence suggesting that tough
economic times have made pro bono work even more difficult in
large firms.324
In some communities, there are also political disincentives to
accepting corrections cases. Some local lawyers are afraid of
angering judges and do not like the idea of suing the state or the
county.325 One legal services lawyer active in corrections litigation
described an unwritten rule in the Georgia Attorney General's
office: that if your firm sues the Corrections Department, you
will no longer receive any state business.326 Especially in rural
counties, many private firms represent the county and conflict
of interest prevents their involvement. 327 Thus, the argument that
private firms are less vulnerable to political pressures ignores
the realities constraining private firm involvement in con-
troversial matters.
The demands imposed by large, complex corrections cases
discourage continued private firm involvement even among those
that have developed expertise in this area.328 Some found the
cases too demanding, and spoke of being "burned out" by the
cases.329 Some prefer other types of public interest work.33 °
324. Bien Interview, supra note 177, at 3 (saying that pro bono now is much harder
to do as the firm becomes determined to increase revenues per partner and to tighten
competition); Kinnard Interview, supra note 48, at 4 ("With economic problems,
nonbillable work is way down on the list."); Refo Interview, supra note 319, at 3 (stating
that it is a tough time for pro bono work); see also Steve Albert, Is Pro Bono the Next
Recession Victim?, RECORDER, Dec. 24, 1992, at 1 (Pro bono programs "have begun to
feel the effects of attorney layoffs and the slowed hiring of associates .... [P]artners
at large firms admit privately that they have kept some associates busy in the past
year or so doing pro bono work. Nonetheless, partners in charge of pro bono efforts
agree [that] their jobs were easier when business was better.").
325. Soler Interview, supra note 78, at 12.
326. Cullen Interview, supra note 48, at 2.
327. Holman Interview supra note 205, at 2; Lardente Interview, supra note 290,
at 4. In large firms that are willing to handle these cases, the problem of potential
conflict of interest can be resolved through the use of Chinese walls and other
techniques. Richmond Interview, supra note 301, at 7.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 48-55.
329. See Knowles Interview, supra note 109, at 6 ("These cases are an enormous
time and psychological drain .... You just wear out."); William Turner Interview, supra
note 301, at 1 ("At my age and stage of life, I do not want to invest so many years in
a case. Life is too short.").
330. See Interview with David Casey, Partner, Peckham, Lobel, Casey, Prince &
Tye, in Boston, Mass. 2 (Aug. 20, 1991) [hereinafter Casey Interview] (transcript on
file with author); Interview with David Rudovsky, Partner, Kairys & Rudovsky, in
Philadelphia, Pa. 3 (July 9, 1991 & July 30, 1991) [hereinafter Rudovsky Interview]
(transcript on file with author).
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Private firms' capacity to handle corrections cases may also
be limited by financial concerns,33' particularly for small firms
that cannot carry a big case without regular payments.332 Lawyers
cited the difficulties of taking risks in private practice when the
firm faces financial difficulties.333 A corrections specialist who
previously litigated corrections cases from private practice
commented that "in private practice, you must constantly worry
about what cases will do to your practice. Time pressures are
a real impediment to involvement."334
Private practitioners' limited involvement in corrections
litigation also stems from their perception of corrections as a
foreign and unfamiliar world they would prefer not to enter. Fifty-
two percent of the large firms and sixty-six percent of those
randomly sampled cite inadequate expertise as the explanation
for their lack of involvement in corrections cases.335 The survey
results also indicate a lack of interest in corrections as an
important factor explaining firms' limited involvement. Forty-one
percent of large firms attribute their lack of involvement to a
preference for other types of pro bono work. Fifty-seven percent
of the large firms cited "increased expressions of interest by
attorneys" as a factor likely to increase firm involvement in
corrections litigation.
Most general practitioners lack the federal court and class
action experience necessary to provide adequate representation
in conditions of confinement litigation. 6 Moreover, attorneys
in private practice generally lack the familiarity with the
correctional context that is so essential to effective representation
in these cases.337 Private practitioners lack familiarity with the
331. Cf. Garth et al., supra note 310, at 377-78, 381-82 (1988) (asserting that
lawyers concerned about fees will aim for lawsuits than can be won easily and will
produce large amounts).
332. One expert described a major case in which the plaintiffs' lawyers had to borrow
money to continue in the case. "They were distracted by fee generating work land]
limited in the time and attention they [could] devote to the case. They also know exactly
how much they have to bring in to keep the doors open." Expert Interview (To preserve
neutrality in ongoing litigation, the identity of the source of this statement will not
be disclosed.).
333. Interview with Peter Fenn, Partner, Fenn & King, in Boston, Mass. 4 (Aug.
19, 1991) [hereinafter Fenn Interview] (transcript on file with author); Ortega Interview,
supra note 57, at 2.
334. Midgely Interview, supra note 117, at 1.
335. These figures were tabulated from the survey results. The tables presenting
these results are on file with the author.
336. See supra note 309 and accompanying text.
337. There are some notable exceptions, such as Michael Bien, Donna Brorby, David
Rudovsky, and William Turner, all of whom specialize in complex corrections litigation.
See infra Part VI.B.
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relevant law. "People handling these cases in private practice
are starting out at a pretty basic level."338 Some firms have been
reported to have a lengthy start-up time due to their need to
become familiar with basic aspects of corrections cases.339
Private practitioners' lack of expertise and identification with
the correctional context emerged as a recurring concern affecting
the nature of private firm representation. Advocates described
numerous examples of firms' lack of awareness or concern for
systemic problems and for the general effects their case may have
on a prison.340 Also, corrections experts with extensive involve-
ment in litigation report that private practitioners sometimes
lack sensitivity to correctional culture and are unwilling to take
the time to master the context. 4' They may be more likely to
consider only the short-term interests of their clients.342 Correc-
tions experts spoke critically of this exclusive focus on the inter-
ests of the individual client, arguing that it sometimes adversely
affected the long-term interests of the client and the class. They
reported numerous examples of a lack of sensitivity to the
interests of inmates and a willingness to take positions that
conflict with their clients' interests.343 Specialists also report
receiving many complaints from inmates that their private
counsel will not answer their phone calls or respond to their
letters.344
Lawyers and experts observed that private practitioners'
financial interests sometimes influence their strategy and decision
making, to the detriment of the inmates. They cited examples
of law firms which were reluctant to settle during the remedial
stage of litigation because of their financial interest in fees for
monitoring work.345 There also were reports of settlements that
338. Krisberg Interview, supra note 130, at 5.
339. Ortin Interview, supra note 177, at 4.
340. Alexander Interview, supra note 74, at 9, 30; Berg Interview, supra note 142, at
2; Boston Interview, supra note 98, at 7; Bright Interview, supra note 176, at 4 (citing
examples of private practitioners who did not know what they were doing and "screwed
up" the case and the law in the jurisdiction); Bronstein Interview, supra note 84, at 9; Gipson
Interview, supra note 236, at 3; Zak Taylor Interview, supra note 321, at 2.
341. Expert Interview (To preserve neutrality in ongoing litigation, the identity
of the source of this statement will not be disclosed.).
342. Id. at 6; Alexander Interview, supra note 74 at 30; cf Garth et al., supra note
310, at 377.
343. See, e.g., Alexander Interview, supra note 74, at 15 (describing the position
taken by a law firm representing a class in the United States Court of Appeals that
some remedy other than prisoner release should be adopted).
344. Brorby Interview, supra note 53 at 6; Ortega Interview, supra note 57, at 3;
Stalker Interview, supra note 117, at 2.
345. Alexander Interview, supra note 74, at 11.
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appear to compromise the interests of the class and favor those
of the lawyer.346
Perhaps the area where law firms' lack of corrections expertise
is potentially most damaging involves remedies. Many of the
private practitioners interviewed considered the remedial stage
to be quite different from traditional litigation and considered
themselves-ill-prepared to manage the remedial stage without
assistance. 34" These concerns echoed those of corrections special-
ists, who cited examples of unworkable remedies developed by
private counsel or simple lack of attention paid to the case once
the trial was won.348 Many were skeptical of private firms'
willingness to use more innovative processes of remedial
formulation and oversight.349
Small-firm practitioners can be overwhelmed by the monitor-
ing responsibilities demanded by a single case, and such lawyers
frequently cannot devote the time needed to stay abreast of the
decree.50 Interviews suggest that lawyers in large firms fre-
quently are reluctant to devote the time to monitoring:
Compliance takes a lot of leg work. Law firms do not do that.
Attorneys refer complaints to the court who refers them to
attorneys who sit on them because something else is on the
front burner.
351
Corporate firms have not done a good job representing the
class in other than a litigation mode. They make little or no
346. Id. at 11 ("I sometimes see consent decrees where it looks like the lawyer was
paid off."); Krisberg Interview, supra note 130, at 5 ("Their tendency is to cut a deal
and get out.").
347. See, e.g., Ortin Interview, supra note 177, at 3; Parker Interview, supra note
311, at 5.
348. Alexander Interview, supra note 74, at 9, 30; Koren Interview, supra note 85,
at 5.
349. An exception is small private firms that specialize in corrections or civil rights
litigation, which have been described as quite successful in their remedial efforts. See,
e.g., Mark Soler & Loren Warboys, Services for Violent and Severely Disturbed Children:
The Willie M. Litigation, in STEPPING STONES: SUCCEsSFuL ADVOCACY FOR CHILDREN 61, 96
(Sheryl Dicker ed., 1990) (describing the extraordinary work of attorneys from small
private law firms); Nathan Interview, supra note 20, at 4 (describing Turner & Brorby
as equals of NPP lawyers).
350. See, e.g., Rudovsky Interview, supra note 330, at 3 (stating that a prison case
involving conditions of confinement is too large for one person in a small practice and
that he monitors less than he should).
351. Ortega Interview, supra note 57, at 3.
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attempt to hassle the system in response to inmate com-
plaints. They can't handle the every day shit.352
Where possible, firms look to local corrections organizations to
perform this enforcement role.353
Finally, enforcement can entail the most difficult aspect of
corrections litigation, requiring an ongoing series of negotiations
and litigation concerning the content of the order, the steps
necessary to comply, and the prerequisites to terminating
judicial oversight. Unless private firms have access to corrections
expertise or a willingness to commit the time necessary to
master the context, they are not likely to oversee implementation
effectively. 54
B. The Exception: Sustained Commitment and
Collaboration with Specialists
There are some notable exceptions to the general tendency of
firms to limit or avoid involvement in corrections litigation. A
small but significant number of large firms with effective pro
bono programs and committed partners who become personally
involved in handling corrections cases have devoted considerable
and sustained energy and resources to major institutional
cases.355 In most instances, extensive large firm involvement
coincides with a move toward a team approach to corrections
advocacy, linking corrections specialists and legal services
lawyers with private practitioners.5 6
352. Brorby Interview, supra note 53, at 6.
353. Parker Interview, supra note 311, at 3; Soler Interview, supra note 78, at 9.
354. See supra notes 134-43 and accompanying text (discussing implementation
problems experienced by national organizations).
355. For example, Covington & Burling in Washington, D.C., Jenner & Block in
Chicago, and Holland & Hart in Denver represent inmates in major conditions cases.
Morrison & Forster in San Francisco essentially adopted a local jail by sending a
mailing to inmates indicating the firm's willingness to represent them. Breed
Interview, supra note 49, at 4.
356. San Francisco lawyers describe a "prison mafia"-a regular group of small
and large firms who have been involved in major institutional litigation over the past
10 years. Don Specter of the Prison Law Office reports that he regularly co-counsels
these cases with one of four or five San Francisco firms. Specter Interview, supra note
192, at 1. Several small firms in San Francisco also specialize in corrections litigation.
Prisoners Legal Services regularly co-counsels class action litigation with large D.C.
law firms, including Covington & Burling, Arnold & Porter, and Van Ness, Feldman
& Curtis. Lopes Interview, supra note 117, at 2.
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A small number of large private firms assumes primary
responsibility for major institutional litigation, usually at the
request of a judge or as a result of the commitment of a partner
to an issue or organization.357 The key to obtaining this private-firm
expertise in corrections cases is the commitment of experienced
law firm partners with the power to commit their firms to the
litigation.35 In virtually every instance where partners have been
involved in this way, the partner has had some prior experience
or contact with either corrections issues or the entity recruiting
their participation. Several partners active in corrections litigation
serve on the board of directors of the organization that recruited
their aid on a case.359 Others have had previous experience with
problems confronting correctional institutions.36 ° Many of the
partners involved in corrections litigation have a strong personal
commitment to public interest work.361
In cases with partners actively involved in the litigation,
firms often provide extensive back-up and support, including
associate, paralegal, and support staff.362 Firms that assume
major responsibility have reported devoting huge amounts of
lawyer-hours to these cases.363 Some of the law firms that have
357. Covington & Burling in Washington, D.C., Morrison & Foerster and McCutchen,
Doyle, Brown, & Enerson in San Francisco, Holland & Hart in Denver, and Jenner
& Block in Chicago were described as engaged in ongoing, major corrections litigation
challenging conditions of confinement and/or overcrowding in major institutions or
entire systems. Morrison & Foerster reported the greatest amount of pro bono work
of any firm in the country in 1989-over 54,000 hours. Cameron Barr, Doers and Talkers,
AMERICAN LAW., July-Aug. 1990, at 51, 52.
358. See Lardente Interview, supra note 290, at 1. Such involvement is the exception
rather than the rule.
359. See, e.g., Bronstein Interview, supra note 84, at 4 (stating that Jim Crawford
is President of the local ACLU affiliate); Sparks Interview, supra note 51, at 1, 2 (stating
that a partner who involved himself in the California Youth Authority case was on
the board of Youth Law Center).
360. See, e.g., Bronstein Interview, supra note 84, at 7 (stating that the pro bono
coordinator at Covington & Burling, a firm with considerable involvement in corrections
litigation, is a former staff member at NPP); Johnstone Interview, supra note 311,
at 5 (stating that he previously worked for the [State] Department of Corrections);
Kinnard Interview, supra note 48, at 1 (stating that he was appointed to a bar committee
to study the problem of private-bar involvement in death penalty cases); Richmond
Interview, supra note 301, at 2 (stating that and he investigated a prison riot with
Jim Crawford, and that he was on a blue ribbon commission on corrections).
361. See Bronstein Interview, supra note 84, at 3 (describing Jim Hartley, a partner
at Holland & Hart, as committed to public interest); Knowles Interview, supra note
109, at 2.
362. But see Kinnard Interview, supra note 48, at 4 (stating that he would
hesitate to use "substantial firm resources in the case").
363. Firms reporting involvement in corrections litigation over the past five years
report that associates have devoted an average of 880 hours and partners an average
of 172 hours during this span.
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committed to this litigation have laid out massive amounts to
cover the costs of experts, discovery, and trial.364
Interviews with partners in these firms and with specialists
who have been co-counsel with them on corrections cases sug-
gest that these firms typically rely upon specialists in correc-
tions litigation or upon ACLU affiliates to determine the
viability and significance of a particular case and to guide their
advocacy strategy.365 Private practitioners described an evolu-
tion in their orientation toward their corrections involvement as
a result of their collaboration with corrections specialists. They
were more likely to discuss the relationship of their particular
case to a broader strategy of institutional change and to take
into account group interests and concerns in defining their
role.36 6
Lawyers who participated in collaborations involving private
firms and public interest specialists emphasized the significant
role that firms specializing in complex litigation play in correc-
tions advocacy. Large firms in particular were cited for their
skill in handling complex litigation.367 Lawyers specializing in
areas such as environmental toxic tort and antitrust litigation
commented upon the parallels between their routine work and
364. For example in Gates v. Deukmejian, No. Civ. S-87-1636 (E.D. Cal. 1990),
McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enerson generated $1,585,178.70 in fees, Brobeck,
Phleger & Harrison generated $800,818.20 in fees, and Rosen & Phillips generated
$668,635.00 in fees. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs'
Application for Attorneys' Fees and Costs, Gates v. Deukmejian, No. Civ. S-87-1636
(E.D. Cal. filed June 4, 1990) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform). In that case, the court awarded plaintiffs a total of $6,627,399.66 for attor-
neys' fees and $346,226.26 as costs and disbursements. Id. at 1.365. See Specter Interview, supra note 192, at 1 ("The secret of success is to get
a partner personally involved. PLO [the Prison Law Office] has been working with
the same people for years. We have won all our big cases so firms get fees back. When
I bring other cases, they trust that they are bringing a case that is important and
winnable.").
366. See Parker Interview, supra note 311, at 3 (describing importance of her
interaction with Allen Breed, a corrections expert, in defining her strategy and in
forming her transactional approach to her corrections cases); Sparks Interview, supra
note 51, at 3.
367. Alexander Interview, supra note 74, at 14; Ortega Interview, supra note 57,
at 1 (stating that co-counseling with private firms enabled her to tap into firms'
expertise as experienced litigators); Bien Interview, supra note 177, at 4 ("We [pri-
vate firms] have more experience managing and trying large complex cases.");
Bronstein Interview, supra note 84, at 2 (large firms are well equipped to handle
complicated cases which are heavily fact oriented). Interview with Michael Keating,
Partner, Foley, Hoag & Eliot, in Boston, Mass. 2 (Aug. 15, 1991) [hereinafter Keating
Interview] (transcript on file with author) (same).
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class-action corrections cases.3 68 Discovery was mentioned most
frequently as a particular strength of large firms.369 One correc-
tions specialist noted the extraordinary ability of large firms
and their paralegals to organize and analyze documents. He
stated that "[t]he documents were delivered to the firm and one
week later it was done."370 Another specialist noted that "[flirms
can present a solid wall front to the opposition. The defendants
knew that they could not inundate us with documents."37'
Private practitioners and public interest lawyers alike com-
mented on the legitimizing effect of private firm involvement in
corrections cases. Public interest litigators sometimes face
hostility from or limited credibility with local judges and politi-
cians, particularly if they are not part of the local legal
community.372 Lawyers perceived a considerable difference in
judges' attitudes toward corrections cases when partners from
private firms are involved:
You are dealing with local courts with local judges that
know the power of the firm so you get instant respect and
influence when you go in with one of these cases. Usually
when [NPPI goes into another locality, we have to build
that. That takes some time and some doing.373
The private lawyer on the case golfs with the judge. That
doesn't hurt.374
368. See, e.g., Bien Interview, supra note 177, at 3; Richmond Interview, supra
note 311, at 3.
369. Alexander Interview, supra note 74, at 14; Knowles Interview, supra note
109, at 3; Lopes Interview, supra note 117, at 2; Ortin Interview, supra note 177, at
4; Parker Interview, supra note 311, at 5; Rudovsky Interview, supra note 330, at 2.
370. Soler Interview, supra note 78, at 13; see also Lopes Interview, supra note
117, at 2 ("With legal memos, firms can do in a few days what Prisoners Legal
Services would require a month to do.").
371. Refo Interview, supra note 319, at 10.
372. The Executive Director of the Youth Law Center described one experience
where a judge would not address him in chambers and would speak directly to local
counsel only. Soler Interview, supra note 78, at 11. Other advocates describe experi-
ences indicating that judges suspect that they will say whatever the inmates want
them to say. Ortega Interview, supra note 57, at 2. Allen Breed, a special master with
extensive corrections experience, reports thatjudges "sometimes don't respect public
interest lawyers. They admire them, but think they are caught up in a social change
process." Breed Interview, supra note 49, at 1.
373. Koren Interview, supra note 85, at 5.
374. Bright Interview, supra note 176, at 2.
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Experienced litigators can intimidate defendants. Also,
judges won't look at him like a flaming liberal. Some judges
are more likely to listen.375
The judge was impressed that a senior partner in a San
Francisco firm was there .... Judges listen in a different
way when it's a law firm.376
Public interest lawyers who have co-counseled with firms also
described the positive impact that this collaboration could have
on their role in the case. One lawyer commented that his
experience with the firm led him to be more organized in his
own case preparation. Public interest lawyers also remarked on
the disciplining effect of litigating with a partner at a large
firm: "[uit was the closest thing we could have to a federal judge
on the case .... He held us up to a microscope and made us
argue for everything. He wouldn't let us get away with some of
the things we would try."377 Partners in smaller firms also
proved "excellent litigators, committed to the issues, and willing
to be mentors to the younger PLS lawyers."
'3 78
In addition, many lawyers considered several areas of spe-
cialization particularly appropriate for private firms to handle
on their own. Private firms have had notable success in
handling attorneys' fee litigation for corrections specialists, and
these referrals allow specialists to devote more time to the
substantive issues.379 Many lawyers also deemed firms better
able to try damages cases, particularly if such firms handle
malpractice or plaintiffs' tort litigation as part of their general
practice.38 °
A small number of private practitioners who have ongoing
involvement in corrections litigation have been very successful
in the implementation stage of litigation. 381 Because their time
375. Ortega Interview, supra note 57, at 2.
376. Breed Interview, supra note 49, at 1; see also DeWolf Interview, supra note
117, at 11; Refo Interview, supra note 319, at 3; Soler Interview, supra note 78, at 12.
377. Soler Interview, supra note 78, at 12.
378. Dick Taylor Interview, supra note 161, at 2.
379. Bien Interview, supra note 177, at 7; Bright Interview, supra note 176, at 2;
Nathan Interview, supra note 20, at 5.
380. Alexander Interview, supra note 74, at 31; Boston Interview, supra note 98,
at 11; Ortega Interview, supra note 57, at 3; Stalker Interview, supra note 117, at 2.
381. See Breed Interview, supra note 49, at 6 (describing extensive involvement
of Michael Bien in monitoring compliance); Bronstein Interview, supra note 84, at 3
(describing Covington & Burling's involvement in D.C. jail litigation as a rare example
of follow-through and commitment to corrections litigation by a large firm); Nathan
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is covered by attorneys' fees, the lawyers have the capacity
and incentive to devote the time necessary to follow through
in these cases.
38 2
Participation by private firms in corrections litigation poten-
tially can mobilize influential lawyers to advocate informally
on behalf of correctional reform. There have been cases in
which private practitioners who are well-connected politically
have worked with the legislature and local government officials
to facilitate the settlement of aspects of litigation.383 Influential
lawyers who previously were ignorant of the problems facing
correctional institutions and hostile to inmates report that
involvement in such cases taught them about the seriousness
of the problems and the humanity of the clients.384 This height-
ened sensitivity to correctional problems may interest other
lawyers in handling corrections cases.
Thus, private firms generally face considerable obstacles and
disincentives to meaningful involvement in corrections
advocacy. However, those firms that do become involved have
brought considerable expertise and resources to a collaborative
effort. This collaboration has expanded the orientation toward
representation and the capabilities of both private
practitioners and public interest lawyers engaged in correc-
tions advocacy.
VII. LAW SCHOOL CLINICS
Law school clinics constitute another player in the field of
organizations providing legal representation for inmates in
corrections cases. Clinics generally define their involvement
in particular cases in relation to their educational mission.
Interview, supra note 20, at 1 (describing successful monitoring efforts by the small
private firm Turner & Brorby); Richmond Interview, supra note 301, at 7 (describing
extensive involvement in enforcing consent decree).
382. See Bien Interview, supra note 177, at 8 (stating that a monitoring fees are
an important part of the firm's income); Breed Interview, supra note 49, at 2 (stating
that small private firm specializing in prison litigation is doing an excellent job in
monitoring compliance); Bright Interview, supra note 176, at 2 (private firm does good
job monitoring[compliance]); Rudovsky Interview, supra note 330 at 5-6 (stating that
attorneys' fees are an important part of the firm's income).
383. Alexander Interview, supra note 74, at 2 (stating that local counsel in particular
litigation did an excellent job working with the legislature).
384. See Kinnard Interview, supra note 48, at 4; Sparks Interview, supra note 51,
at 4.
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Most clinicians emphasize client centered counselling, litiga-
tion skills and training as central to their pedagogical goals.
The scope, logistics, and client access problems common to
corrections cases thus predispose many clinicians against
significant involvement in major corrections litigation.
Some law school clinics, however, do form ongoing institu-
tional relationships with particular correctional institutions.
These programs establish a presence through substantial in-
volvement in administrative and individual case advocacy.
Through this sustained presence, institutional change-oriented
advocacy emerges as an important aspect of law school clinic
involvement. Indeed, the programs that specialize in correc-
tions and focus at least in part on providing legal representa-
tion in a particular institution, such as the Danbury Prison
Project at Yale Law School, were portrayed as the most stable
and educationally viable of the clinical programs that handle
corrections cases.
A. The Extent of Clinics' Current Involvement
Most law school clinical programs have not provided repre-
sentation to inmates in correctional institutions within the
past five years.38 5 Of those that have been involved, only a
small proportion regularly represent inmates in cases chal-
lenging prison conditions. Table 9 shows the level of in-
volvement of law school clinical programs in cases challenging
conditions and practices in correctional institutions.
TABLE 9
LAW SCHOOL CLINICS' INVOLVEMENT
IN CORRECTIONS LITIGATION
Ever Involved 52.4%
Within Past Five Years 35.2%
385. This neglect of corrections in clinical education is only one example of the law
schools' failure to expose law students to the legal issues surrounding corrections. Only
17 of the 95 programs responding to the survey offer a course on corrections as part
of their academic curriculum.
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These figures show that the level of involvement by clinics
within the past five years is considerably lower than the
overall clinic involvement. This finding is consistent with
interviews of clinic directors and survey comments indicating
that many law school clinics have discontinued programs that
provide representation to inmates.386 The survey results show
that thirty-six law schools, however, continue to have some
kind of program providing such representation. Table 10
provides a further breakdown of the extent of law school clinic
involvement.
TABLE 10
THE SCOPE OF LAW SCHOOL CLINICS'
INVOLVEMENT IN CORRECTIONS LITIGATION
Volunteer student-run programs 4
Programs providing solely out-of-court legal assistance 5
Representation only at administrative hearings 2
Advice only 3
Programs providing occasional representation3 87  15
Programs regularly providing representation in
corrections cases 12
TOTAL 36
B. The Constraints Flowing From Individual Service and
Adversary Process as the Pedagogical Model
Although clinical programs vary considerably in the nature
and extent of legal services provided, most programs focus on
individual service as their primary model of representation.
Tables 11 and 12 below show the breakdown of the types of
cases brought by law school clinics within the past five
years. 38 These programs focus on providing individual repre-
sentation to inmates. Although sixty-six percent of these
386. See Hauhart, supra note 149, at 108 (documenting clinical programs that have
discontinued involvement in corrections cases).
387. "Occasional representation" is defined as fewer than ten cases over a five-year
period.
388. Many corrections cases fall into more than one of the categories identified in
Tables 11 and 12. For example, most class action cases also fall into the categories
of cases challenging conditions of confinement and seeking injunctive relief. Many cases
challenge both general conditions of confinement and discrete problems, such as medical
care.
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programs have handled at least one class action within the
past five years, only eight percent of the cases handled by law
school clinics during this period were class actions. 389 Table
12 indicates that law school clinics focus on cases challenging
discrete problems in male prisons, involve themselves mini-
mally in jails and in female prisons, and provide virtually no
representation to juveniles in correctional facilities. Clinic in-
volvement in disciplinary cases and administrative proceedings
greatly exceeds the involvement of legal services or private
firms. A substantial proportion of the clinics participate in
cases challenging medical care and general conditions of
confinement in male prisons.
TABLE 11
PERCENTAGE OF LAW SCHOOL CLINICS
BRINGING PARTICULAR TYPES OF CASES






Cases Challenging Discrete Problems 90.6%
Clinics' method of case selection further reflects their reac-
tive, individual service orientation. Most of those interviewed
routinely accept cases at the request of the court and do not
generally focus their case selection priorities on cases likely
to prompt broad institutional change. As Table 13 on the
following page illustrates, clinics rely upon court appointment
more than any other source for referral of corrections case.
389. This figure was computed by tabulating the total number of class actions
reported by the clinics. It does not include representation by clinics in administrative
hearings.
390. The percentages reflected in this table do not total 100 because multiple entries
are possible.
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TABLE 12
BREAKDOWN OF TYPES OF ISSUES HANDLED BY LAW
SCHOOL CLINICS INVOLVED IN CORRECTIONS
CASES WITHIN THE PAST FIVE YEARS
3 9 1
Prisons (Prisons Jails Juvenile
(Male) (Female) Facilities
General Conditions of
Confinement 43.8% 3.1% 12.5% 6.3%
First Amendment 43.8% 6.3% 3.1% 0
Disciplinary Rules and
Procedures 56.3% 6.3% 3.1% 0
Classification 34.4% 3.1% 3.1% 0
Guard Brutality 50.0% 9.4% 12.5% 0
Medical Care 14.8% 0 3.1% 3.1%
AIDS Issues 21.9% 6.3% 0 0
Programming 392  25.0% 6.3% 6.3% 0
Representation in
Administrative Proceedings 31.3% 9.4% 3.1% 3.1%
Other 18.8% 6.3% 3.1% 0
TABLE 13
REFERRAL SOURCE OF CORRECTIONS CASES
HANDLED BY LAW SCHOOL CLINICS
Yet as this Article has shown, court appointment generally
is not effective as a means of selecting cases most likely to
have an impact on conditions and practices.393
391. The percentages reflected in this table do not total 100 because multiple entries
are possible.
392. These cases include claims involving programming activities such as education,
recreation, employment, and job training.
393. See supra notes 313-18 and accompanying text.
Court Appointment 38.2%
Civil Liberties Group 13.1%
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Law school clinics' definition of their educational mission
is the predominant explanation for their limited involvement
in major corrections litigation. Clinics must grapple with an
inherent tension between choosing significant cases and
meeting their educational objectives.394 Although some clinics
consider the significance and potential overall impact in
selecting cases,395 most choose their cases based primarily upon
their perceived educational value.39 Clinicians interviewed
generally evaluate the educational merit of cases based on
their capacity to inculcate traditional litigation skills as
defined by the individual service model of advocacy.397 Every
clinician interviewed spoke of the importance of discrete,
manageable cases that progress quickly and preferably can
be completed within a semester or a year.398 They want
students to have hands-on responsibility for a case, and, if
possible, to see it through from start to finish.
For this reason, many clinics avoid conditions of confinement
cases and other major, fact-intensive cases that require
sophisticated litigation skills.399 Instead of the typical clinic
allocation of student responsibility and faculty supervision,
students in conditions cases play more of a back-up role, with
faculty assuming primary responsibility for the litigation.4 °0
394. Telephone Interview with Howard Eisenberg, Professor and Director of Clinical
Programs, Southern Illinois University 20 (July 18, 1991) [hereinafter Eisenberg
Interview] (transcript on file with author) (stating that "it is unusual to have clinic
goals coincide with correctional program" litigation needs); Gresham Interview, supra
note 98, at 9.
395. See Eisenberg Interview, supra note 394, at 9; Telephone Interview with Susan
Kay, Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School 4 (Aug. 6, 1991) [hereinafter
Kay Interview] (transcript on file with author); Telephone Interview with Jay Pottenger,
Clinical Professor and Supervising Attorney, Yale Law School 1 (July 29, 1991)
[hereinafter Pottenger Interview] (transcript on file with author).
396. Kay Interview, supra note 395, at 4; Pottenger Interview, supra note 395, at
1; Telephone Interview with William Rich, Professor of Law and Clinical Director,
Washburn University School of Law 2 (July 18, 1991) [hereinafter Rich Interview]
(transcript on file with author).
397. For a critique of this approach to clinical education, see Harold A. McDougall,
Lawyering and the Public Interest in the 1990s, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1991).
398. See, e.g., Pottenger Interview, supra note 395, at 1; Rich Interview, supra note
396, at 3; Telephone Interview with Dean Rivkin, Professor of Law and Director,
University of Tennessee Legal Clinic, University of Tennessee Law School 4 (Aug. 5,
1991) [hereinafter Rivkin Interview] (transcript on file with author).
399. See Boston Interview, supra note 98, at 16 (conditions litigation requires more
thought, involvement and work by clinical faculty); Bronstein Interview, supra note
84, at 2; Pottenger Interview, supra note 395, at 3.
400. Eisenberg Interview, supra note 394, at 2, 8 ("The student's role in most of
the prisoner litigation is supportive, not primary."); Rich Interview, supra note 396,
at 3; Rivkin Interview, supra note 398, at 4 ("In larger actions the model is less
collective and more like a senior partner and associate style.").
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"The older and more complex a case becomes, the more difficult
it is to take on new students. It is easier to do the job my-
self."4"1 Most clinicians consider students' role in major
litigation to be educationally inferior, and the time demands
imposed by the cases to hurt both faculty and students.4"2 Only
two of the seven clinicians interviewed identified pedagogical
advantages to impact litigation, such as the exposure to
discovery, the opportunity to work on appeals, and the
"unusual opportunity to observe and learn."40 3 Even these
clinicians were troubled by the size and duration of corrections
cases and insisted that corrections cases must be part of a
larger mix of cases.40 4
Clinicians' individual service orientation also predisposes
them to down-play the potential educational value and signifi-
cance of monitoring and enforcement activity. The benefits of
involvement in remedial enforcement-exposure to the com-
plexities and challenges of judicially imposed bureaucratic
change-do not fit neatly into traditional categories of legal
representation. Clinical faculty do not generally consider
monitoring to be educationally valuable and thus seek to limit
students' involvement in the implementation stage.40 5
Clinics also tend to limit their involvement in nonlitigation
advocacy of correctional issues. Only thirty-one percent of the
clinics that handle corrections cases engage in any
nonlitigation advocacy. Programs supported by the Legal
Services Corporation face prohibitions on certain forms of
nonlitigation advocacy. State supported clinics report limiting
their involvement in nonlitigation advocacy for political rea-
sons. 4 6 Most of the clinical faculty interviewed do not view
nonlitigation work as part of their teaching mission.
Clinics funded directly by the state or by public universities
face additional constraints on their ability to handle major
corrections litigation. Publicly funded clinics may be prohib-
ited from taking law suits to change state public policy,40 ' or
from pursuing cases against the state that could result in
401. Rich Interview, supra note 396, at 6.
402. Pottenger Interview, supra note 395, at 3; Rich Interview, supra note 396,
at 2; Rivkin Interview, supra note 398, at 4.
403. Eisenberg Interview, supra note 394, at 11. See also Pottenger Interview, supra
note 395, at 3.
404. Eisenberg Interview, supra note 394, at 11.
405. See Pottenger Interview, supra note 395, at 6; Rich Interview, supra note 396,
at 7.
406. Rivkin Interview, supra note 398, at 3.
407. Marron Interview, supra note 150, at 2 (stating that his program handles only
civil legal problems of inmates).
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attorneys' fee awards.4" 8 One clinic "got its wrist slapped by
the university" for getting involved in a case challenging
conditions in a local jail.4 °9 Another state-funded clinic
reported that it does not play a role in monitoring decrees
because of the tension with the state that would result.41 °
Logistical constraints are another factor affecting clinics'
case selection. Clinics limit their caseload to institutions that
are accessible to the university.411 There is also a consensus
that clinics face considerable impediments to effective repre-
sentation in complex and lengthy corrections cases. Forty-
four percent of the clinics that do not handle corrections
cases cite lack of expertise as the explanation. Unless they
have active co-counsel, clinical faculty must handle cases
alone or with student assistance. Students typically lack the
skills necessary to develop and litigate these cases, and it is
time consuming to teach these skills.412 Corrections cases
typically outlast students' involvement with the clinic, and
thus clinic cases suffer from a lack of continuity of student
involvement. By the time students develop any expertise in
these cases, the semester is over. 413 Faculty then must train
new students.41 4
Although the clinical faculty do frequently have considerable
expertise in complex litigation or corrections issues, their
primary commitment to teaching discourages them from
accepting cases that require them to assume major respon-
sibility. Most of the clinicians interviewed had extensive correc-
tions and trial experience prior to their clinical appointment.415
408. Rivkin Interview, supra note 398, at 1 (stating that there is a tacit under-
standing that his clinic will not pursue these cases).
409. Bronstein Interview, supra note 84, at 9.
410. Rivkin Interview, supra note 398, at 6.
411. Eisenberg Interview, supra note 394, at 9-10.
412. Eisenberg Interview, supra note 394, at 16 ("It is a time consuming proposi-
tion to teach students about the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and what discovery
looks like. Students come to us pretty green. They are doing everything for the first
time and, as a consequence, it takes a lot of time.").
413. Yale minimizes this problem by starting the clinic in the first year and
staffing each case with a new student, an experienced student, and a faculty member.
Pottenger Interview, supra note 395, at 4.
414. Alexander Interview, supra note 74, at 9; Eisenberg Interview, supra note
394, at 11; Rivkin Interview, supra note 398, at 5.
415. See, e.g., Eisenberg Interview, supra note 394, at 1 (stating that he worked
as a state public defender for eight years and handled significant conditions cases);
Pottenger Interview, supra note 395, at 6 (stating that he handled corrections and
other complex litigation as pro bono cases in private practice); Rivkin Interview, supra
note 398, at 1, 6 (stating that he worked as a law clerk for pro se clients and then for
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Clinicians that devote considerable time to corrections cases
also develop the familiarity with particular institutions and
contacts with inmates that are invaluable in litigating these
cases. Yet, only those practitioners who perceived a significant
pedagogical benefit from student involvement in corrections
cases sustained their involvement over time. A surprising
number of lawyers specializing in corrections described experi-
ences where clinics simply dropped out of corrections litigation
once they determined that such litigation was not pedagogically
rewarding.4
16
This does not mean that clinics never pursue institutional
change-oriented advocacy. Those clinics, such as the clinic at
Yale Law School, that have a project specializing in prison
litigation, and that focus at least some of their work on a
particular institution, sustain more extensive and varied
involvement and attempt to link individual service to institu-
tional patterns and problems.417 Also, the relatively rare
clinicians with a strong interest in corrections report sustained
involvement in corrections advocacy and an interest in linking
skills education to a broader, proactive approach.418
Thus, law school clinics that focus their activities upon
particular institutional settings provide the continuity of contact
and outside scrutiny needed to pursue institutional change.
They also provide representation in some jurisdictions that
otherwise lack any legal service to inmates. Nevertheless, logis-
tical constraints and pedagogical concerns informed by an
individual service model of clinical teaching predispose many
clinics to limit or avoid involvement in corrections advocacy.
Appalachian Research and Defense Fund handling corrections cases and has been
handling these types of cases for more than 20 years).
416. Boston Interview, supra note 98, at 16; Gresham Interview, supra note 98,
at 9; Love Interview, supra note 133, at 5.
417. The prison clinic project at Yale has been in operation for 20 years. The clinic
has a contract to provide legal services to inmates at Danbury prison, where it devotes
approximately one-third of its time to administrative hearings. In addition, the clinic
does institutional reform work for state and federal prison inmates, with its most
substantial activity involving medical care issues. Pottenger Interview, supra note
395, at 1, 3.
418. See, e.g., Eisenberg Interview, supra note 394, at 4; Kay Interview, supra note
395, at 6.
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VIII. TOWARD A COLLABORATIVE MODEL
OF CORRECTIONS ADVOCACY
This Article has shown that no one sector of the legal profes-
sion is situated to meet the complex demands of corrections
advocacy. Local corrections specialists offer the greatest
potential to pursue the institutional change model. With
adequate resources and independence, they can combine formal
and informal advocacy, become ongoing participants in the
public dialogue about prison conditions, and coordinate the
activities of other actors engaged in corrections advocacy. Yet,
their emphasis on local institutional change fails to provide
a national presence or to take a broad view of the field. More
importantly, most states lack any corrections litigation program,
and those that have such a program lack adequate resources
and independence to play an effective role.
The national corrections specialists provide the visibility and
field support essential to playing a role in the national
discussion of corrections issues. They have the expertise and
scope to lead the field in law reform litigation, to develop inno-
vative techniques for addressing prison litigation, and to provide
support to new corrections litigators. They also have the
perspective and resources to troubleshoot in the many areas
of the country that lack local counsel for important corrections
problems. National Specialists, however, must depend on local
advocates to perform the institutional change role so crucial
to effective corrections advocacy. Remedial enforcement and
informal advocacy pose particular challenges for the national
specialists.
Legal services programs face overwhelming demands on their
resources and attention. Their primary concern with providing
across-the-board representation to poor people, their system
for allocating resources, and their dependence on local and state
government for financing tend to limit legal services' potential
as a significant provider of institutional change advocacy.
Nevertheless, they remain an important part of the service
delivery system because they are geographically dispersed and
involved as local counsel. Indeed, legal services programs are
among the few organizations that have provided significant
representation in jail cases, which tend to be local and more
discrete in scope. Also, programs that have created specialized
units representing inmates do effectively pursue institutional
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change, even in the face of dramatic resource constraints. With
a change in funding approach and a greater emphasis on
institutionalized persons, legal services offers the potential
to play a much more significant role in the future in corrections
advocacy.
Private firms have not generally demonstrated great promise
as major players in corrections advocacy and proponents of
an institutional change model of advocacy. However, the small
number of firms that have collaborated with corrections special-
ists or undertaken corrections litigation as a specialty offer
tremendous expertise in complex litigation, significant resources
and staff support, and a measure of credibility to the courts
and mainstream bar.
Finally, law school clinics have also exhibited resistance to
embracing corrections advocacy as a mainstay of their program
for pedagogical and logistical reasons. Law school clinics that
target administrative and legal advocacy in particular correc-
tional institutions, however, offer tremendous potential as
institutional change advocates and educators.
The key to overcoming the limitations facing each sector of
the legal profession lies in creative collaboration. The communi-
ties that have developed litigation teams combining the efforts
of law firms, legal services lawyers, law school clinics, and
corrections specialists also appear to sustain the greatest level
of involvement of each organizational player. The interaction
among the various organizational players expands the
perspective and skills that each brings to the advocacy effort.
It also disperses the economic and staff burden more broadly,
allowing each organization to pursue other goals without
compromising their commitment to a particular case. It over-
comes the obstacles of limited expertise and familiarity with
corrections that so many private practitioners described as
a significant factor preventing their involvement. Collaboration
generates and sustains interest in and hope for the advocacy
effort. Advocates who participated in team efforts repeatedly
emphasized the importance of collegial support in sustaining
their interest and involvement. Many of those who described
frustration with their corrections work indicated that partici-
pation in a team endeavor would be critical to their continued
involvement in corrections. They also perceived such collabora-
tion as crucial to the success of any major corrections initiative.
Finally, geographical differences in composition of the legal
services delivery system necessitate a diversified approach to
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corrections representation. The overwhelming majority of the
organizations providing representation to inmates are located
in metropolitan areas. As shown in Table 14, only a small
percentage of law school clinics and legal services programs
are located in non-metropolitan areas. Yet because most prisons
are located in remote, rural areas, inmates may have difficulty
obtaining legal representation.
TABLE 14
LOCATION OF PROGRAMS PROVIDING REPRESENTATION
To INMATES IN CORRECTIONS CASES
I Metropolitan Non-metropolitan
Large Firms 100.0% 0.0%
Legal Services 80.7% 19.3%
Law School Clinics 71.9% 28.1%
Table 15 suggests that law firms are most involved in the
Northeast, legal services programs in the South, and law school
clinics in the North-Central region of the country.
TABLE 15
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ORGANIZATIONS PROVIDING
REPRESENTATION TO INMATES IN CORRECTIONS CASES
Northeast South West . NthCentral
Large Firms 53.5% 9.3% 11.7% 25.6%
Legal Services 16.9% 38.6% 21.7% 21.7%
Clinics 37.5% 15.6% 6.3% 40.6%
Thus, an effective legal services delivery system for correc-
tions would self-consciously allocate responsibility among
specialists and generalists, public interest and private firm
lawyers to encourage involvement and build on the strengths
of each sector of the legal profession. Corrections specialists,
particularly at the local level, would form the center of any
advocacy team effort. As this Article has shown, if these
100
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organizations are adequately staffed and funded, they are
situated to pursue effectively an institutional change advocacy
strategy and to coordinate test cases and individual services
to complement that strategy. 419 Although their primary roles
are as litigators and advocates, these organizations also provide
a range of support and co-counselling activities key to the
participation of law firms, legal services offices, and ACLU
affiliates in major corrections litigation. The specialists who
co-counsel cases are looked to for assistance with case strategy
and other important decisions, maintenance of the relationship
with the client, use of experts, and planning of the remedy.
420
This assistance is frequently critical to generalists' capacity
to provide adequate legal representation in corrections cases.421
Organizations specializing in corrections also provide techni-
cal assistance to practitioners. Such assistance has been
reported to increase willingness to handle corrections cases.422
419. See supra Part IV.
420. Lopes Interview, supra note 117, at 2; Soler Interview, supra note 78, at 11;
Sparks Interview, supra note 51, at 1; see also supra Part IV.A.2.
421. One lawyer vividly described the importance of collaborating with corrections
experts to his capacity to provide adequate representation:
When I first got appointed to the prison case, I called SPDC [Southern Prisoners
Defense Committee, now known as Southern Center for Human Rights]. The case
was [a] logistical nightmare. I had to rely heavily on the people at SPDC just
to get my arms around what the problem is, how to make information requests,
who is in the network, and what to ask for. Without them, I would have wasted
an enormous amount of time. I would not have done a good job. If you don't have
an organization like SPDC, you are going to have significant slippage in the quality
of representation. People don't want to do these cases. Even if they do them, if
they are left on their own, the level of representation is going to be inadequate.
Kinnard Interview, supra note 48, at 2.
422. Although Barry Barkow of Massachusetts Corrections Legal Services rarely
co-counsels cases, he does refer cases to law firms on the condition that his organization
will provide technical assistance. Barkow Interview, supra note 172, at 4. For cases
declined by YLC, the organization typically will provide the names of other child
advocates in the area, information about what has worked in other states, names of
experts, and strategy assistance. YLC staff attorneys receive requests for information
and technical assistance from around the country. They attempt to link private attorneys
and local advocates to whatever advocacy network exists in their particular locale.
Sanchez Interview, supra note 117, at 4; Soler Interview, supra note 78, at 7; Sparks
Interview, supra note 51, at 3.
The Southern Center for Human Rights and some of the state and local organizations
also devote significant time responding to requests for assistance from lawyers who
lack expertise in corrections. At least two local and state corrections organizations-the
Correctional Law Project and Prisoners Legal Services of New York-provide assistance
to lawyers appointed by the court to represent inmates in pro se cases. Several private
lawyers emphasized the value of having a local organization available to provide technical
assistance and back-up, and these lawyers expressed some doubt that they would rely
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Table 16 shows that a significant proportion of legal services
programs, large private firms, and law school clinics identified
increased availability of back-up support, training, and technical
assistance as likely to increase their involvement in corrections
litigation.
TABLE 16
INTERVENTIONS LIKELY TO INCREASE ORGANIZATIONAL
INVOLVEMENT IN CORRECTIONS LITIGATION
Legal Services Large Law
Firms School
I _ _ Clinics
Increased back-up support,
training, technical assistance 49.4% 36.4% 37.5%
Co-counseling with expert
organization 39.8% 34.1% 28.1%
In addition, organizations specializing in corrections litigation
provide training for lawyers handling corrections cases.423
They play the crucial role of training the next generation of
corrections lawyers by hiring law students to work as summer
associates or fellows.424 Specialist organizations also play a
critical role in recruiting other lawyers to participate in
corrections cases, either on their own or as part of a team of
lawyers. Most of the private firms and legal services lawyers
as heavily on a national organization for hands-on support. See Kinnard Interview,
supra note 48, at 3; Sparks Interview, supra note 51, at 4.
423. Both NPP and YLC have been involved in training lawyers to handle
corrections cases, although they currently lack the resources to undertake a program-
matic approach to training. Currently, NPP only provides training in response to
requests, most of which come from local affiliates. NPP has taught continuing legal
education programs in conjunction with law schools. These programs have had an
attendance of over 100 people and have been identified as good recruiting tools for
both local affiliates and corrections cases. In Idaho, the training program was video-
taped at the request of the Director of the Department of Corrections. The program
is shown as part of the training package for correctional officers and is included in
the inmates' law library. Bronstein Interview, supra note 84, at 2. District of Columbia
Prisoners Legal Services holds a training program twice a year under the auspices
of the District of Columbia Bar. Lopes Interview, supra note 117, at 1.
424. For example, Ed Koren estimates that approximately 100 students have
worked at NPP over the last 15 years. SCHR was described by one lawyer as a "bullpen
for good people" and its director has been said to "clone" lawyers committed to this
field. Koren Interview, supra note 85, at 5.
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interviewed that have handled major cases would not have done
so without the participation of NPP, YLC, or another specialist
organization able to guide and support their involvement in
these cases.4 25 Their participation is essential to the formation
of litigation teams involving lawyers in private practice4 26 and
legal services lawyers.427 State and local organizations are par-
ticularly important in this recruitment effort. They are most
likely to have the contacts with the local bar and knowledge of
potential participants in legal services and private firms.428
They also can sustain an ongoing effort in the corrections arena.429
425. Sparks Interview, supra note 51, at 3 (stating that his firm would not take
a case like the California Youth Authority case without co-counsel like YLC); Rudovsky
Interview, supra note 330, at 3-4 (stating that none of the local actors has done a
system-wide case and that NPP's expertise in the Pennsylvania statewide case is
crucial); Specter Interview, supra note 192, at 1 (describing the network of San
Francisco firms that co-counsel with the Prison Law Office); Ortin Interview, supra
note 177, at 3 (stating that PLO and NPP were essential to his law firm's participa-
tion); Soler Interview, supra note 78, at 9 (stating that some firms will take over cases
completely, primarily damages cases, but that normally they want ongoing assistance);
Dick Taylor Interview, supra note 161, at 2 (stating that PLS resources are greater
than those of small private firms, who depend on PLS for financing cases).
426. Coalitions of lawyers in large firms, small firms, ACLU affiliates, and
corrections organizations have developed in San Francisco, at the initiation of Mark
Soler ofYLC and Don Specter ofPLO. Bien Interview, supra note 177, at 5 ("Don Spec-
ter is responsible for getting people here as well organized as we are. If there is an
overall strategy, he is at the heart of it."). YLC co-counsels a number of its major
California cases with large firms, and YLC has been very successful in obtaining
litigation and financial support from large firms in San Francisco. Mark Soler reports
that he has never been turned down by a large firm asked to participate in juvenile
institutional litigation.
NPP is currently part of a coalition of lawyers challenging overcrowding in the
entire Pennsylvania prison system. The litigation team includes the ACLU affiliate,
Legal Services' Institutionalized Persons Project, and David Rudovsky, a private practi-
tioner with considerable expertise in the corrections field. Rudovsky Interview, supra
note 330, at 2.
427. Legal services programs that have handled corrections cases within the past
five years do participate in litigation teams and have played an important role as local
counsel in major corrections cases. Fifty-five percent of the general legal services pro-
grams and 94% of the institutionalized persons projects involved in corrections
litigation within the past five years report that they have collaborated with other
organizations in conducting this litigation. Legal services programs participated in
litigation as part of a team in over 17 of the states with major correctional institutions
operating under court order as of January 1990.
428. For example, Grace Lopes, the Director of D.C. Prisoners' Legal Services
("PLSP") at the time of this study, has had considerable success in recruiting private
firms. She has worked in Washington, D.C. for years and knows the bar well. Many
of the PLSP board members are partners in local firms. PLSP gets involvement from
firm attorneys not through a pro bono referral organization, but by calling someone
personally known by a board member because "[bilind recruitment is unlikely to be
successful." Lopes' primary recruitment technique is to target a senior partner at a
firm that can advance the case, give the firm a blueprint of the litigation in a written
memorandum, and then follow up with a meeting. She refers only meritorious cases
with compelling facts. Lopes Interview, supra note 117, at 2.
429. For example, Don Specter of the Prison Law Office describes a good working
relationship with four or five large firms in San Francisco that regularly co-counsel
cases with his organization. See Specter Interview, supra note 192, at 1.
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Many of those most actively involved in corrections advocacy
have yet to capitalize on the potential for collaboration to
enhance the extent and quality of corrections advocacy. Many
local and state offices currently do not co-counsel or refer
corrections cases on a regular basis.4 30 Typically, the national
organizations are minimally involved in recruiting large firms
to handle corrections cases. NPP relies primarily upon lawyers
recruited by ACLU affiliates as co-counsel, who tend to come
from small firms with previous public interest experience.43'
In its out-of-state cases, YLC also has limited involvement
with large firms, and YLC finds lawyers by calling legal
services or other public interest lawyers within the jurisdic-
tion. National organizations generally are considered less
effective than local groups as recruiters for pro bono participa-
tion by private firms.43 2
Legal services programs generally have not assumed the role
of creating and supporting litigation teams handling corrections
cases, although programs have participated in such teams in
major suits. Although every legal services program accepting
funds from the legal services corporation is required to spend
one-eighth of their budget on private attorney involvement,
interviews with directors of the volunteer lawyer programs
suggest that most of these programs do not refer corrections
cases.4 33 Most legal services lawyers involved in corrections
cases do not generally co-counsel cases, and they are skeptical
about the benefits of private-bar involvement.434
430. See, e.g., Barkow Interview, supra note 172, at 4 (stating that he does not co-
counsel cases or rely much on the private bar for major litigation); Gresham Interview,
supra note 98, at 5 (describing limited involvement of private firms).
431. Alexander Interview, supra note 74, at 16.
432. Lardente Interview, supra note 290, at 1; Soler Interview, supra note 78, at
11 (stating that he knows the local community, maintains partners on the board of
YLC, and has ongoing relationships and hosts events to help in recruitment, but that
out-of-state, he must rely on personal contacts in the jurisdiction where possible,
through either legal services or ACLU offices).
433. Gardner Interview, supra note 295, at 3 (stating that his program has been
unable to find anyone to refer cases to other than Bob Cullen at Georgia Legal Services);
McDermott Interview, supra note 294, at 6-7 (stating that good cases often proceed
without counsel because Delaware Volunteer Legal Services does not know how to find
the good cases, the ones they would want to refer, and that they are unable to screen
cases to see if they have merit); Poirot Interview, supra note 295, at 2 (stating that
he does not refer corrections cases because they do not have the local resources to handle
these cases); Witte Interview, supra note 294, at 4 (stating that Chicago Volunteer
Legal Services Foundation does not refer corrections cases and that they will not take
cases with "noncooperative clients").
434. Barkow Interview, supra note 172, at 4; DeWolf Interview, supra note 117,
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Most private firms also fail to collaborate with other orga-
nizations to enhance their capacity to handle corrections cases
or their willingness to participate in them.435 Many of the
private firm lawyers interviewed did not work with or even
consult organizations with corrections expertise.4 36 Only thirty-
nine percent of the law firms surveyed that handle corrections
litigation have worked with any organization, and less than
ten percent have worked with NPP, YLC, or a local prisoners'
rights group. Firms tend not to be tied into the corrections
network and often do not know that one exists.43 v
Court appointment programs-the primary means of in-
volving private firms in corrections cases-generally fail to
facilitate collaboration between private firms and specialists.438
Most court appointment programs are not currently designed
to match qualified counsel with cases most likely to affect the
quality of life in the institution. Only three out of thirty-five
districts responding to the survey reported having a screening
procedure that included any input by corrections specialists.
Only two of the programs encourage private practitioners to
use the services of local corrections litigators, and most provide
little or no training or support of any kind to lawyers accepting
court appointments.439
at 5; Gresham Interview, supra note 98, at 7; Holman Interview, supra note 205, at
2; Sanchez Interview, supra note 117, at 1. Esther Lardente, a specialist in pro bono
involvement, noted that the legal services community generally exhibits enormous
fear and resentment of private bar involvement as a result of the attempt by the Reagan
Administration to eliminate legal services and substitute private bar representation
for poor people. Consequently, legal services offices tend to refer nonpriority cases.
Lardente Interview, supra note 290, at 5.
435. See Bien Interview, supra note 177, at 4; Kinnard Interview, supra note 48,
at 5; Parker Interview, supra note 311, at 3; Sparks Interview, supra note 51, at 6.
436. See Johnstone Interview, supra note 311, at 4; Keating Interview, supra note
367, at 2; Richmond Interview, supra note 301, at 4.
437. Krisberg Interview, supra note 130, at 4-5 (stating that he regularly is called
by private firms and is "often shocked that they do not know the national network
.... They are starting at ground zero"); Nathan Interview, supra note 20, at 3 (stating
that lawyers do not use NPP the way they could).
438. This information reflects the results of the informal survey of court appointment
programs, which is described more fully in the Methodology section, supra Part III.
439. See Eisenberg Interview, supra note 394, at 5. Several court appointment
programs report innovations that hold considerable promise for fostering collaboration
between private bar practitioners and specialists in corrections. Several districts do
involve local experts in selecting appropriate cases for referral. At least one has
contracted with a local organization to develop a manual for participants in the pro
se program and to offer regular training for lawyers willing to serve on the pro se panel.
See RESULTS OF THE SURVEY OF PRISONERS 3 (1993) (unpublished report, on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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Law school clinics that have in-house programs generally
do not co-counsel cases with private practitioners. Some of
these programs have a formal relationship with legal services
and regularly collaborate with legal services programs. Indeed,
one-half of the clinics surveyed that handle corrections cases
collaborate with other organizations in these cases. Because
of their preference for small, discrete cases that students can
handle, however, law school clinics generally do not play a lead
role in building litigation teams or attracting private firm
involvement in corrections cases.440
Thus, collaboration offers considerable unexplored potential
to increase the level and quality of representation for inmates
in corrections cases.
CONCLUSION
This Article has developed a theoretical framework for as-
sessing the role of lawyers representing inmates in cases
challenging conditions and practices in correctional institu-
tions. It offers the institutional change model of corrections
advocacy as the most promising framework for structuring
representation in corrections cases. Not surprisingly, the
articulation of the desired advocacy norm is only the first step
in the process of its realization. Many of those involved in
pursuing this vision of effective advocacy face tremendous
obstacles. State and local organizations-which should
constitute the foundation of corrections advocacy-face
overwhelming caseloads and limited resources. National
organizations-the preeminent experts and the architects of
a national strategy-face the prospect of a funding crisis.
Lawyers generally socialized to value trial advocacy over all
other forms of intervention face the task of rethinking their
conceptions of litigation to embrace nonadversarial processes
and to link litigation with legislative and administrative
advocacy. Every sector of the legal profession exhibits serious
inadequacies in their remedial capacity-a critical component
of the institutional change model. Law schools face the
daunting task of rethinking their educational mission to
440. See supra Part IV.A.
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broaden their emphasis and equip future lawyers to pursue
this emerging advocacy role.
Repeat players-organizations, projects, or individuals spe-
cializing in corrections litigation-have played, and must
continue to play, a central role in realizing the institutional
change vision of corrections advocacy. Their efforts account
for the overwhelming proportion of significant corrections
litigation."' Organizations specializing in corrections litigation
report the most substantial and sustained involvement in
litigation challenging conditions of confinement. They also lead
the way in the process of revitalizing public interest advocacy
to meet the challenges of institutional change. Finally, their
involvement is critical to the prospect of attracting and
sustaining the involvement of private firms and legal services
organizations in corrections advocacy.
The current level of support for and involvement in correc-
tions advocacy does not begin to address the level of need for
representation.44 2 This Article underscores the particular
inadequacy of representation for juveniles and women. Many
of the organizations studied provide minimal or no representa-
tion to these groups. As in any implementation effort, the
prospect for realization of the institutional change advocacy
model depends on the development of a strategy for increasing
the levels of support for and involvement in corrections
advocacy.
One such initiative is currently underway within the legal,
services community. The Institutions and Alternatives Section
of the National Legal Aid and Defenders Association has un-
dertaken to increase the level of support for institutionalized
persons within legal services, in part by including institutional-
ized persons within the population counted in determining
funding levels.443
Recent case law has opened the door to the possibility of
using litigation to challenge directly the inadequacy of repre-
sentation afforded inmates in corrections cases, particularly
441. This finding is consistent with the results of other empirical studies. For
example, one study found that "a substantial percentage (50%) of the certified class
action suits that closed between 1979 and 1984 in the Northern District of California
were the product of law firms created directly by broad funding agencies trying to
generate legal power for the unrepresented and underrepresented." Garth et al., supra
note 310, at 370.
442. See supra Part III.B.
443. Arthur Interview, supra note 252, at 1.
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in the area of juvenile and women's corrections. In at least
one case, juveniles have been found to have special needs
requiring the provision of access to an attorney to meet the
constitutional requirement of providing inmates with meaning-
ful access to courts.444 Similarly, some courts have found that
women prisoners have special needs that require the provision
of assistance of counsel.445 Courts have begun to recognize that
law libraries are insufficient to meet the needs of adult male
prisoners who are illiterate, mentally incapacitated, or confined
in segregation for lengthy periods.44 Finally, several courts
have ordered states to fund programs providing legal represen-
tation to inmates as a remedy for failure to provide adequate
access to law libraries.447
The potential of this recent case law concerning access to
law libraries 448 to enhance the level and quality of corrections
representation has yet to be fully explored. However, the
experience of current programs resulting from such litigation
reveals that this approach is no panacea for corrections advo-
cacy. In some instances, states were described as instituting
extremely limited programs, and then using their existence
to excuse the inadequacy of the state's law libraries.449
444. See John L. v. Adams, 969 F.2d 228, 233-34 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that a
system failing to provide juveniles with access to legal representation violates the
constitutional duty to provide access to courts). The Supreme Court has recognized
a right of access to courts for inmates' presentation of constitutional claims related
to their confinement. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). Courts have not always
interpreted this right of access to require states to provide legal representation to in-
mates. In most cases involving adult males, courts have instead offered states a choice
between providing adequate law libraries or providing adequate assistance from persons
with legal training. See, e.g., Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 999, 1003 (6th Cir. 1992).
Most states have opted to provide law libraries in lieu of legal representation.
445. See, e.g., Canterino v. Wilson, 546 F. Supp. 174, 216 (W.D. Ky. 1982), affd,
875 F.2d 862 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 991 (1989).
446. See Knop, 977 F.2d at 1005-06. Although this recognition has not necessarily
been found to warrant a requirement of legal representation, it does open the door
to exploring ways of improving access to counsel, through such means as court
appointment programs and law school clinics.
447. See supra note 211 and accompanying text. For example, North Carolina
Prisoners Legal Services receives $1.2 million and Maryland Legal Aid Prisoners Rights
Project receives $400,000 pursuant to court orders requiring states to provide legal
representation due to the state's failure to provide adequate law libraries following
court orders to do so. Dorsey Interview, supra note 32, at 3; Sparrow Interview, supra
note 57, at 7.
448. See supra note 211.
449. Cullen Interview, supra note 48, at 4 (describing Georgia's Prison Legal
Counseling Project as a ploy by the state to justify having only 4 law libraries in the
entire state system; the program provides assistance in parole and other administrative
areas and advice in section 1983 cases, but is not permitted to provide representation
in civil rights actions).
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Programs funded pursuant to court order face a perpetual
struggle with a hostile funding source which is their adversary
in almost every case.450 For these reasons, current recipients
of Bounds funding advise that the Department of Corrections
should not be given unilateral responsibility for developing
a system to provide inmates with legal representation, but
should collaborate with existing organizations already provid-
ing representation. In addition, programs should have an
outside source of funding, in order to maintain their legitimacy
and independence.
This study highlights the importance of creative collaboration
among corrections specialists, legal services lawyers, private
practitioners, and law school clinicians to avoid the pitfalls
facing each sector of the legal profession and to achieve
adequate levels of representation to inmates. Public interest
representation has begun to evolve to meet this challenge. The
debate over the appropriate form of public interest advocacy
must be recast to reflect and inform this evolution in the theory
and structure of legal representation.
450. See supra Part IV.B.
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APPENDIX A
NAME AND ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATION
OF INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED
Adjoa Aiyetoro, Associate Director for Administration, National
Prison Project
Elizabeth Alexander, Associate Director for Litigation, National
Prison Project
Pat Arthur, Staff Attorney, Evergreen Legal Services
Karl Baker, Assistant Director, Defender Association of
Philadelphia
Sandra Baker, Public Defender, Tuscaloosa, Alabama
Barry Barkow, Director, Massachusetts Correctional Legal
Services
Betsy Barnat, Assistant to Executive Director, National Prison
Project
Howard Belodoff, Associate Director, Idaho Legal Aid Services
Dick Beltz, Director, Florida Institutional Legal Services
Randall Berg, Executive Director, Florida Justice Institute
Elliot Berry, Senior Staff Attorney, New Hampshire Legal
Services
Michael W. Bien, Partner, Rosen, Bien & Asaro
John Boston, Legal Director, Prisoners Rights Project, Legal
Aid Society of New York
Allen Breed, Director, National Institute of Corrections
Stephen Bright, Executive Director, Southern Center for
Human Rights
Alvin Bronstein, Executive Director, National Prison Project
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Donna Brorby, Partner, Turner & Brorby, and plaintiffs'
counsel in Ruiz
David Casey, Partner, Peckham, Lobel, Casey, Prince & Tye
Richard Cohen, Legal Director, Southern Poverty Law Center
Meg Connolly, Director, Volunteer Lawyer Project, Boston Bar
Association
William Craig, Partner, Wiggin & Dana
Robert Cullen, Senior Corrections Attorney, Georgia Legal
Services
Ruth Ann DeWolf, Legal Director, Correctional Law Project,
Chicago Legal Assistance Foundation
Charles Dorsey, Executive Director, Maryland Legal Aid
Bureau
Jeffrey Dworkin, Director, Vermont Prisoners Rights Office
Howard Eisenberg, Professor and Director of Clinical Programs,
Southern Illinois University
Malcolm Feeley, Professor of Law, University of California,
Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law
Nancy Feldman, Director, Office of Inmate Advocacy, New
Jersey Office of the Public Advocate
Peter Fenn, Partner, Fenn & King
Ayres Gardner, Director, Pro Bono Project of Georgia
David Geiger, Partner, Foley, Hoag & Eliot
LeAnna Gipson, Director, Monroe County Legal Services
John Gresham, Associate Director, Prisoners Legal Services of
New York
Robert Gross, Executive Director, New Hampshire Legal
Services
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Harvey Grossman, Legal Director, ACLU of Illinois
Judith Guibert, Co-Director, University of North Carolina
Prisoners' Rights Project
Lani Guinier, Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law
School
Robert Hauhart, Director, Prisoners' Rights Program of D.C.,
Public Defender Service
Neil Himelein, Managing Attorney, Community Legal Aid
Society of Delaware
Phyllis Holman, Executive Director, Georgia Legal Services
Rebecca Isaacs, Acting Director, Legal Services for Prisoners
with Children
Deirdre Janney, Executive Director, ACLU of Mississippi
Richard Johnstone, Partner, Hale & Dorr
Susan Kay, Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School
Michael Keating, Partner, Foley, Hoag & Eliot
Stephen Kessler, Director, Legal Services for Prisoners, Inc.,
Kansas
Stephen 0. Kinnard, Partner, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue
Ralph Knowles, Partner, Doffermyre, Shields, Canfield &
Knowles, and former Associate Director, National Prison
Project
Ed Koren, Staff Attorney, National Prison Project, and former
Director, National Jail Project
Barry Krisberg, President, National Center for Crime and
Delinquency
Dick Kurtenbach, Executive Director, ACLU of Kansas and
Western Missouri
Alex Landon, Sole Practitioner
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Esther Lardente, Consultant, American Bar Association
W.C. LaRowe, Director, Texas Center for Correctional Services
Judge Morris Lasker, United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York
Anson Levitan, Senior Attorney, Legal Aid Society of San Diego
Lance Liebman, Dean and Professor of Law, Columbia
University School of Law
Grace Lopes, Managing Attorney, D.C. Prisoners Legal Services
Project
Angus Love, Director, Institutionalized Persons Project,
Pennsylvania Legal Services
Scott Manion, Director, Florida Legal Services Private Bar
Involvement Program
Phil Marron, Director, Legal Assistance to Minnesota Prisoners
Neil McBride, Director, Rural Legal Services of Tennessee
Christine McDermott, Director, Delaware Volunteer Legal
Services
John Midgely, Staff Attorney, Evergreen Legal Services
Anthony Mirenda, Partner, Foley, Hoag & Eliot
Vincent Nathan, Partner,' Nathan & Roberts and Special
Master
Aryeh Neier, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch
Judge Jon Newman, United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit
Aldred O'Ferrell, Director, Inmate Services Division, Maryland
Public Defender
Nancy Ortega, Staff Attorney, Southern Center for Human
Rights
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Luther Ortin, Partner, Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison
Carl (Toby) Oxholm, Partner, Hangley, Connolly, Epstein,
Chicco, Foxman & Ewing
John Packel, Deputy Assistant Director and Chief of Appeals
Unit, Defender Association of Philadelphia
Beth Parker, Partner, McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen
Carl Poirot, Director, San Diego Volunteer Lawyer Program
Jay Pottenger, Clinical Professor and Supervising Attorney,
Yale Law School
Lonnie Powers, Executive Director, Massachusetts Legal
Assistance Corporation
Steve Ralston, Director of Litigation, NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund
Patricia Refo, Partner, Jenner & Block
William Rich, Professor of Law and Clinic Director, Washburn
University School of Law
David Richmond, Partner, Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz
Dean Rivkin, Professor of Law and Director, University of
Tennessee Legal Clinic, University of Tennessee Law School
Regina Rogoff, Executive Director, Legal Aid Society of Central
Texas
David Rozwasky, Director, Inmate Legal Assistance Program,
Connecticut Prison Association
David Rudovsky, Partner, Kairys & Rudovsky
Ernie Sanchez, Executive Director, Idaho Legal Aid Services
Robert Schwartz, Director, Juvenile Law Center
Laurie Seidenberg, President of the Board, Wyoming Chapter
of the ACLU
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Gary Senner, Partner, Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal
Michael Sheehan, Partner, Sheehan, Solomon & Swaine
Ada Shen-Jaffe, Executive Director, Evergreen Legal Services
Linda Singer, Director, Center for Community Justice and
Partner, Lichter, Tristman, Singer & Ross
Gail Smith, Staff Attorney, Legal Aid Society of San Diego
Mark Soler, Executive Director, Youth Law Center
Leslie Sooson, Associate, Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal
John Sparks, Partner, Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison
Marvin Sparrow, Director, North Carolina Prisoners Legal
Services
Donald Specter, Director, Prison Law Office
Robert Stalker, Director of Litigation, Advocacy and Training,
Evergreen Legal Services
Max Stern, Partner, Stern & Shapiro
Dick Taylor, Executive Director, North Carolina Legal Services
William J. "Zak" Taylor, Partner, Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison
Tim Turner, Partner, Shepard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton
William B. Turner, Partner, Turner & Brorby
Tedd Ford Webb, Consultant
Laurie Weinstein, Staff Attorney, Special Litigation Section,
Department of Justice
Betty Wheeler, Executive Director, ACLU of San Diego
Lea Witte, Director, Chicago Volunteer Legal Services Foundation
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Toni Wolfman, Coordinator of pro bono program, Foley, Hoag
& Eliot
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APPENDIX B
LAW FIRM SURVEY ON
CORRECTIONS LITIGATION
Your responses to this questionnaire will be maintained
confidentially, and data obtained from the questionnaire will be
disseminated in the aggregate only, without individual
attribution to your firm.




d. Name and position of person responding




f. Areas of practice
g. Areas of specialty
2. Does your firm provide representation in criminal cases?
Y N
3. How many lawyers did your firm hire in the past year?
4. Over the past five years, what is the average number of
lawyers your firm has hired annually?
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5. Does your firm have a program for providing legal repre-
sentation to the poor and/or disadvantaged?
Y N
If yes, please check each answer that applies to your firm's
pro bono program:
written pro bono policy (please attach)
pro bono committee
individual responsible for coordinating pro
bonoprogram (please provide name and position)
representation by firm lawyers in individual pro
bono cases
special pro bono program (please describe)
6. Please indicate the aggregate number of hours spent by
legal staff in your firm on pro bono litigation. (If precise





7. Please indicate the types of pro bono cases your firm has
handled in the last 5 years.
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Criminal representation




8. Has your firm handled any class actions on a pro bono
basis?
Y N
9. Has your firm represented inmates in cases concerning
conditions and practices in correctional institutions?
Y N
If no, skip to question 27 (page 10). If yes, continue with
question 10-26.
10. Please indicate the number of corrections cases your firm
has handled within the last five years in each category for
each of the following institutions:




























11. Please indicate the number of cases identified in ques-
tion 10 seeking primarily injunctive relief and the num-
ber seeking primarily damages:





12. Out of the cases identified in question 10, please indi-
cate how many of the cases were brought as class ac-
tions:
Cases challenging general conditions of confinement
_Cases challenging discrete conditions and practices
13. Has your firm ever represented inmates in corrections
cases involving out-of-state institutions?
Y N
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If so, please indicate how many out-of-state corrections
cases your firm has handled.
14. Are there specific types of corrections cases that your
firm prefers to handle? Y N
a. If yes, please indicate the types your firm prefers to
handle:
Cases challenging general conditions of confine-
ment in an institution or system
Cases challenging discrete conditions or practices









Cases involving juvenile institutions
Cases involving women's institutions
Other (please describe)
b. If so, please indicate why your firm prefers these types
of corrections cases:
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15. Are there specific types of corrections cases that your
firm prefers not to handle? Y N
a. If yes, please indicate the types of corrections
cases your firm prefers not to handle:
_ Cases challenging general conditions of confine-
ment in an institution or system
_ Cases challenging discrete conditions or practices









Cases involving juvenile institutions
Cases involving women's institutions
Other (please describe)
b. If so, please tell us why your firm does not accept these types
of corrections cases.
16. Please indicate the number of the firm's corrections
cases that came from each of the following referral
sources:
a. Court appointment
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b. Referral by civil liberties or prisoners' rights
organization
c. Referral by pro bono referral organization
d. Individual attorney interest
e. Direct client request
f. Other (please indicate how)
17. Please indicate the aggregate number of hours spent by
legal staff in your firm on corrections litigation. (Please
break out by partners, associates, and paralegals, if pos-
sible; if actual figures are not available, please estimate




18. Please indicate the number of lawyers at your firm in-
volved in corrections litigation over the past five years
a. Partners
b. Associates
19. Does your firm work with other organizations, such as
the National Prison Project, Youth Law Center, an
ACLU affilate, local prisoners rights advocacy groups, or
other private firms on these cases? Y N
If yes, please name
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If yes, would your firm handle these cases without the
involvement of these organizations? Y N
Please explain
20. Does your firm pay for litigation expenses, e.g. expert
fees, discovery, in these cases? Y N
21. Has your firm received outside funding to cover
expenses associated with this litigation? Y N
a. If yes, please check the types of litigation
expenses paid for by outside funding:
-Expert fees
Discovery costs
_ Other (please describe)
b. If yes, please indicate the funding sources
c. If yes, would the firm handle these cases without
outside funding to cover expenses? Y N
22. Has your firm applied for attorney's fees in corrections
cases? Y N
a. If so, have attorney's fees been awarded in these
cases? Y N
b. If so, what does your firm do with attorney's fees
received from corrections litigation?
a. Reimburse firm for expenses
b. Contribute the total award to general
firm revenues
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_ c. Reserve award for further public
inteest litigation by the firm
d. Donate to cooperating public interest
organizations or other non-profit
organizations
____e. Other (please explain)
23. Please indicate other organizations in your firm's locale
that represent inmates in corrections litigation.
24. Is your firm interested in continuing involvement in
correctional litigation in the future? Y N
a. If yes, please indicate the types of corrections
cases your firm would accept:
Cases challenging general conditions of confine-
ment in an institution or system
Cases challenging discrete conditions or practices





Disciplinary rules and procedures
Other (please specify)
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Damages cases
Class actions
Cases involving juvenile institutions only
Cases involving women's institutions only
Other (please describe)
b. If not, please indicate why your firm is not
interested in continuing involvement in
corrections cases:
Limited involvement in pro bono activity
Limited expertise




Location of corrections institutions
Dissatisfaction with the results of
previous efforts
Limited possibility of recovering costs
Concern about malpractice
Other (please explain)
25. Under what circumstances, if any, would your firm con-
sider increased involvement in corrections litigation?
(Check all applicable circumstances)
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_ _ Increased availability of back-up support,
training, technical assistance
_ Reimbursement of expenses
Co-counselling relationship with expert
organizations
_ Increased referrals or requests for
assistance in corrections cases
_ Increased expressions of interest by firm
attorneys
Expression of support for involvement in
corrections litigation by the American Bar
Association or state and local bar
associations
Coverage of malpractice premiums in
corrections cases
Other (please explain)
26. Does your firm engage in any non-litigation activities
involving corrections institutions, such as lobbying,
education or consulting? Y N
Ifso, please describe
The remaining questions apply only to firms that have not
represented inmates in corrections cases.
27. If your firm has never represented inmates in cases con-
cerning conditions and practices in correctional institu-
tions, please indicate all reasons explaining the firm's
non-involvement in these cases:
Limited firm involvement in pro bono activity
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Lack of perceived need
No requests for representation in these cases




_ Size and complexity of cases
Inadequate expertise
Political considerations
_ Conflicts of interest with existing clients
_ Concern about malpractice premiums
Logistical difficulties of representing inmates
(please explain below)
28. Under what circumstances, if any, would your firm con-
sider representing inmates in cases involving conditions
and practices in corrections institutions? (Check all
applicable circumstances)
_ _ Increased availability of back-up support,
training, technical assistance
_ _ Reimbursement of expenses
Co-counselling relationship with expert
organizations
_ Increased referrals or requests for
assistance in corrections cases
Increased expressions of interest by firm
attorneys
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Expression of support for involvement in
corrections litigation by the American Bar
Association
Other (please explain)
Thank you for your time. Please return the completed ques-
tionnaire to Professor Susan Sturm, University of Pennsylvania
Law School, 3400 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6204
by August 15, 1991.

